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This i s an enquiry into a somewhat neglected aspect of a f f a i r s 
surrounding the American Weir of Independence* Traditionally 
historians have tended to examine B r i t a i n ' s attempts to bring the 
colonists to heel and have found a multitude of factors i n t h i s area 
which contributed to the loss of the colonies. I n addition, some 
historians have investigated the attitudes of France towards the 
rebels and towards Great B r i t a i n i n this period. Their studies 
have revealed that the French gave assistance to the Americans both 
before and after the signature of the treaty of a l l i a n c e between 
them i n 1778. However, despite t h i s evidence, i t has not been 
customary to attribute the American victory i n the war d i r e c t l y to 
French assistance. I t i s argued here that without French aid the 
revolt would have collapsed, that B r i t a i n was aware of th i s situation, 
and that the B r i t i s h government chose a policy which was designed to 
prevent France entering the war and to minimize the benefits which 
France could derive from the colonial rebellion. This policy was a 
f a i l u r e , but the reason for i t s failiare was not that the policy was 
faulty, rather i t f a i l e d because those who put i t into practice 
lacked energy and determination. 
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1. 
CHAPTER I : THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERIOD 1775 - 1778 
The debate about the period of the American Revolution has been 
c a r r i e d on almost from the time of the war i t s e l f to the present 
day; i t has been examined from almost every angle by historians 
from several countries, who have brought to i t a wide variety of 
viewpoints. The B r i t i s h side has been examined exhaustively, both 
before and aft e r the perveisive influence of that great historian. 
S i r Lewis Namier, was exerted upon th i s era. The American side 
has been f u l l y studied by the historians of that country, with 
John C. M i l l e r prominent among the more recent contributors from 
that side of the A t l a n t i c . The French side, however, has not been 
surveyed i n r e a l depth at t h i s period, perhaps because the 
proximity of the revolutionary age draws attention away from the 
period under consideration here. I n addition, there has been much 
h i s t o r i c a l study of the Franco-American a l l i a n c e . This has been 
the case from the e a r l i e s t period when research was undertaken into 
t h i s period, and historians such as Bancroft^ and Doniol^, i n the 
e a r l i e r years, and Corwin^, Berais^ and Meng^, have a l l linked French 
policy to the American Revolution. 
There i s , therefore, no shortage of written material on t h i s 
periods This i n turn indicates that the large quantities of 
available primary documents have been extensively examined, and 
one w r i t e r on the period has suggested that a writer who ventures 
to write on t h i s would 'suffer not from lack of contemporary 
material, but from i t s plethora; not from starvation, but from 
indigestion of h i s t o r i c a l fare'^. I n spite of this contention, i t 
i s the present writer's conviction that there i s a need for a study 
of the diplomacy of the period. The reasons for t h i s conviction 
may require some explanation. 
The key to the present work i s to be foxmd i n the f i r s t two 
words of the t i t l e : - B r i t i s h Policy, for i n the reading that has 
been undertaken i n the preparation of t h i s work, the author has 
not found any study of t h i s complex period which makes a r e a l attempt 
to understand the B r i t i s h aspect of the a f f a i r . This seems to be a 
lamentable situation for, when a l l i s considered, Great B r i t a i n was 
one of the main actors i n the drama, i f not the main one. Yet, 
despite this prominent position, F a r g e l l i s and Medley are forced 
to admit, that *N(b comprehensive study of European or English 
diplomacy for t h i s period e x i s t s . . . There are few recent monographs 
of general importance*.^ I n general t h i s has been found to be the 
case. 
There are, as noted e a r l i e r , works on the diplomacy of the 
period, but i n general these concentrate on the Franco-American 
aspects of the a l l i a n c e ; the writers of France being usuedly 
determined to build up the reputations of the French diplomats of 
the period; and those of America often concerned to show Great 
B r i t a i n i n the worst possible l i g h t , or to enhance the diplomatic 
s k i l l s and i n t e g r i t y of the American envoys to the iuropean courts. 
I n the face of these conceits, j u s t i f i a b l e as they may be, the 
position of Great B r i t a i n remains curiously neglected. This country, 
which was one of the foremost of world powers at the time, which Wcis 
the mother country of the American rebels, and the chief adversary 
of France, a f a c t that was c r u c i a l i n bringing the French to the 
aid of the colonists, i s accorded treatment by the historians of 
these events that would be more applicable to a minor power. 
B r i t a i n i s assiimed to be running a set course, a course set out by 
the French Ministry, and one that w i l l l e l d to the destruction of 
B r i t i s h power and the transfer of her trading interests to France. 
She i s eissumed to be governed by men of no calibre or vision, and 
she i s assumed to be exercising unjust powers and unfounded rights 
over exploited colo n i s t s . L i t t l e or no thought i s given to her 
actual circvmistances; l i t t l e consideration given to the rights and 
wrongs of the American stxniggle from an eighteenth century viewpoint 
rather than from a nineteenth or twentieth century one. Also, 
although the ministry of Lord North i s strongly c r i t i c i s e d , scant 
consideration i s given to the alternatives that twere open to the 
government, i f there were any; or whether, i f i t had been replaced, 
as some suggested, an alternative government would have done any 
better. 
For a l l these reasons then, the present writer believes that 
there i s scope for another study of the diplomacy of the period, 
from a B r i t i s h point of view. This therefore i s an attempt to 
consider the position of the B r i t i s h government of the time and the 
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alternatives that were before i t . I t i s hoped to do th i s i n such 
a way as to take account of the constraints that were imposed 
upon the government by the eighteenth century society i n which i t 
existed. By so doing, i t i s intended that a clearer understanding 
of the period may be gained, and, although the errors of the 
London government w i l l not be passed over, i t i s hoped that i t w i l l 
be seen that the government was not incompetent, but that i t was 
confronted by circumstances that were completely foreign to i t s 
experience. That the choices of the government were often wrong 
i s not to be wondered a t . What gives cause for surprise i s rather 
that they did not panic, and that so many of their decisions were 
f a i r and sensible even under duress. 
Before embarking on the main body of the thesis, however, i t 
i s intended to give a b r i e f analysis of some of the works that have 
appeared on t h i s period, and to draw attention to some of the 
influences which may, due to events current at or near to the time 
of writing, have affected the views of certain historians. Also 
i n t h i s section i t i s hoped to give an indication of some of the 
general ideas that have been brought to the study of th i s period 
of his t o r y . These comments have been placed i n a separate chapter 
eis they are of a somewhat peripheral natiire to the main study. 
I n what follows there w i l l be consideration of two periods of 
h i s t o r i c a l writing by French authors; there w i l l be attention given 
to the writing of American historians i n the general sense, and i n 
Pca:>ticulea:> to those writings at one period where i t seems l i k e l y 
that cvirrent a f f a i r s played a p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t part i n 
influencing the attitudes of his t o r i a n s . F i n a l l y there w i l l be 
some b r i e f e r remarks on the works of B r i t i s h authors at this period; 
b r i e f because few B r i t i s h historians seem to have embarked upon the 
diplomatic history of B r i t a i n i n t h i s period. 
F i r s t l y then, the French historians, of whom there are many, 
and who have written about the period over a wide range of time. 
Here however, i t i s intended to concentrate on the writers who wrote 
at two pa r t i c u l a r times - the l a s t t h i r t y years of the nineteenth 
century, and the years between the f i r s t and second world wars. At 
these two periods, more than any others, the present writer believes 
that events current i n France and i n the world at large played a 
considerable part i n shaping the attitudes that were brought to bear 
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on the period of the American Revolution by French histor i a n s . 
I n 1870, j u s t l e s s than a century after France had defeated 
B r i t a i n i n the American war of Independence, the French army and 
state were brought to t h e i r knees by the r u t h l e s s l y e f f i c i e n t 
m i l i t a r y machine of the Prussian Army. After a brief s p e l l of 
anarchy the country gradually f e l l into an i n s t i t u t i o n a l frame-
work that was eventually to form the Third Republic, although 
t h i s republican system was by no means on a sure footing, jath the 
Bonapartist party i n dissarray, the republicans taken by surprise 
and the state i n shaky hands, the monarchist groups emerged onto 
the p o l i t i c a l stage, and for the f i r s t years of the new regime 
they dominated the Assembly and the Senate. Under the influence 
of t h i s monarchist upsurge, the f i r s t two presidents of the 
Republic were thought to be r o y a l i s t sympathisers. Thus for the 
f i r s t time since the overthrow of Louis Philippe in 1848, there 
was a chance that a member of the house of Bourbon might s i t 
again on the throne of France. 
The fac t that t h i s never took place, and the reasons why the 
plans f a i l e d are not s i g n i f i c a n t for t h i s purpose. What i s 
important i s that once again Monarchism was a p o l i t i c a l force i n 
France. This was to remain so for many years to come, eilthough 
there was a steady loss of strength i n public support, and well 
into the twentieth centuiy the League of Action Francaise was to 
lead the monarchist caxise, and i t s influence on literairy and 
cultured l i f e i n France was enormous. I n t h i s new atmosphere i t 
W21S natural that good pu b l i c i t y should be sought for the monarchist 
cause i n order to bring the people to a new acceptance of monarchy. 
I n a France recently humiliated on the b a t t l e f i e l d , memories of 
past v i c t o r i e s would be very appeeding. 
I n such a s i t u a t i o n what better example was there than the 
French aid to the Americans i n the War of Independence? This 
provided an appeal to a l l groups. To the Right wing i t represented 
the l a s t great achievement of the Bourbon Monarchy in foreign 
a f f a i r s , and was made even more appealing by the fact that t h i s 
achievement came i n the form of a blow to the traditional enemy of 
France - EngleUid. To those of a more moderate turn of mind the 
war could be seen as helping struggling colonists to set up a model 
country, which, i t was rapidly becoming clear, was developing into 
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one of the most economically powerful states i n the world. Thus 
to the centre and to the right, the groups making up the great 
majority of French public opinion, the American War had 
considerable appeal and so i t became, somewhat incongruously, a 
p u b l i c i t y argument for the Monarchy. I t showed the Ancien Regime 
at i t s best to the minds of the l a t e nineteenth century. 
By another fortuitous circumstance the l a t e r Boiu-bons were 
also beginning to emerge from behind the h i s t o r i c a l v e i l that had 
been t a c t f u l l y drawn over them. Louis XV was at length beginning 
to be seen as something other than a king of many vices and few 
v i r t u e s . I n 1844 a book had been published i n P a r i s which Weis an 
attempt to give a favourable consideration of Louis XVI. This 
work i s too early to be considered as a twigger to those which are 
about to be analysed, but i t does show the extremes to which an 
h i s t o r i a n can go i n magnifying the achievements of his subject. • 
The following quotation shows the attitude of the author:-
«... i l r ^ s u l t e r a de ce l i v r e , j'espere, une 
consequant, c'est que Louis XVI ne fut 
seulement un bon r o i , mais un grand r o i , pour 
l a partie importante des a f f a i r e s , c'est a dire 
l a diplomatie et l e development des forces 
nationales... ce l i v r e est destine' a prouver 
q u ' i l e t a i t un prince a idees i n t e l l i g e n t e s , 
^levees, nationales.... * 
Such opinions, tending as they do to give an impression that 
Louis XVI was a prime mover i n the making of French national 
policy i n foreign a f f a i r s would require much convincing evidence 
to back them up. I t i s to be doubted whether many historians would 
accept t h i s analysis of Louis XVI. 
The major influence i n foreign a f f a i r s , there can be no doubt, 
was the Comte de Vergennes, and i n the new rush of writing on the 
American War t h i s was to become cle a r . Vergennes was to emerge 
from the long shadows that had been cast over him by h i s audacious 
and b r i l l i a n t predecessor Choiseul. I n fact , from t h i s time on, a 
trend was to begin i n which Vergennes was to attain a status that 
Choiseul had never achieved as the symbol of France's success 
against her ancient opponent. The reason for t h i s was simple; 
except for the Napoleonic era, the War of Independence was the 
l a s t great success that the French had enjoyed i n mili t a r y a f f a i r s . 
At a time of m i l i t a r y defeat and pro-monarchist sentiment, the 
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appeal of the American war was obvioiis. 
The most important French histo r i a n at t h i s period was 
Henri Doniol whose work i s a cornerstone of any study of the 
period of the American war. Doniol c a l l e d h i s monumental work: 
Hi s t o i r e de l a Partic i p a t i o n de l a France a I'establissement des 
E t a t s Unis. The t i t l e here betrays a certain amount of Doniol's 
attitude i n the writing of the book, the wording implying that 
the French role i n the war was instrumentaO. i n the creation of 
the United States. As i s natural i n a work of such great length 
(the book runs to f i v e voliunes) on such a b r i e f period of history, 
t h i s i s one of quite exceptional d e t a i l , and i t also reproduces a 
large quantity of contemporeury material. However, the I880's were 
a period when international tr a v e l weis l e s s eeisy theui i s the case 
today, and i n addition many documents relevant to the period were 
not available a t that time. S. Fo Bemis writing a t a l a t e r date 
has c r i t i c i s e d Doniol»s work i n these terms:-
besides being out of reach of the average 
reader or student (the work) i s too dominantly 
French i n i t s point of view and i t s presentation 
of selected documents, volvoninous though they 
are, from the archives of the French foreign 
office'5 
As the t i t l e of the work implies Doniol was concerned to show 
only the French side of a f f a i r s , but t h i s attitude, supported by 
reading and using almost excliisively French o f f i c i a l sources, has 
resulted i n a French interpretation of the events. This fact has 
further drawn Doniol into some of the traps that were l a i d by 
Vergennes eind Beauitieirchais; that i s to say that he believed some 
of the arguments that were put forward by these men to draw 
others with t h e i r thinkoJig.;.;, Thus Doniol i s too convinced by 
Vergennes' argianents that France and Spain were threatened by 
B r i t a i n i n the West Indies and that they must therefore wage a 
defensive war on Britain.•'•^ A more impartial view, which can be 
taken from the wealth of document«ury evidence av«dlable today, i s 
put forward by Corwin and shows t h i s argument by Vergennes for the 
ploy that i t undoubtedly was.'^^ Further, Doniol i s s l i g h t l y 
g u i l t y of excessive admiration for Vergennes. This can be seen by 
the brusque dismissal he gives to the objections that were raised 
by Turgot, the Controller-General, to Vergennes' plan for sending 
secret aid to the rebel colonists i n America. Turgot sent a Memoire 
to the King i n which he stated h i s objections which were beised on 
the f a c t that aid would lead to war, war to f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n , 
and f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n to the postponement of badly needed reform 
i n the finances of the Kingdom: also, Turgot sensibly observed 
that the colonists woiild free themselves when they were ready for 
freedom and not before; French help would not make any difference. 
These argiunents, potent though they were, are brushed aside by 
Doniol as 'moraliste' but not 'politique'. 
Doniol's book therefore f a l l s down i n respect of th i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y French attitude and i n i t s reverence for the 
b r i l l i a n c e of Vergennes, h i s a s s i s t a n t Beaumarchais and their 
somewhat unwilling accomplices, Louis XVI and Maurepas. He views 
the question as a plain one of French in t e r e s t s , and there i s l i t t l e 
r e a l analysis of the problem, largely due, i n a l l probability, to 
the f a c t that Doniol had l i t t l e with which he could compare his 
French primary sources. Further, and inevitably having regard to 
the above c r i t i c i s m , Doniol makes no attempt to comprehend the 
B r i t i s h government's point of view or the reeisoning behind i t s 
policy. 
Here then we have a vastly detailed account of the f i n a l 
culmination of France's foreign policy i n the period after 1763, 
a policy that was the fulfilment of the ambition of the French to 
achieve revenge for t h e i r defeat i n the Seven Years War, and one 
that r e f l e c t e d well on both the monarchy and the ancien regime. 
Doniol could not avoid being bom at that era, but there i s a 
strong coincidental l i n k between the events of h i s lifetime and 
the theme of h i s huge work, which r e f l e c t s so well on the l a s t truly 
ancien regime period of French history. One could not perhaps c a l l 
Doniol a propagandist of Monarchism, but he may at le a s t have been 
not a l i t t l e influenced by the events surrounding that period of 
hi s country's history i n which he wrote, for to have published the 
f i r s t volume of a book of t h i s s i z e i n 1884 the idea must have 
germinated i n the author's mind at l e a s t several years beforehand. 
Somewhat l a t e r , but s t i l l well within the period during which 
monarchist ideas were playing a considerable role i n French Society, 
we f i n d Lacour Gayeit's book, i n h i s se r i e s on the French navy under 
the l a t e r Bourbon Kings of France, which was published at P a r i s i n 
1903.^^ I n th i s book we find a combination of many of the natural 
prejudices of French writers on t h i s period. This book has for 
i t s material an exceedingly d i f f i c u l t subject which, on the 
factual side, i t seems to treat extremely f a i r l y . At l e a s t i n 
many cases the figures stated i n i t agree with those drawn up by 
the B r i t i s h Admiralty, hardly the most l i k e l y source from which 
Lacour Gayet would draw h i s information, and thus we may deduce 
that the information of the B r i t i s h Admiralty was accurate. I t 
i s i n h i s treatment of people and p o l i c i e s that Lacour Gayet 
appears to miss the mark by a wide margin i n more than one 
instance. This i s never better demonstrated than, when writing 
of Louis XVI, Lacoiu* Gayet wrote the following:-
'Louis XVI, qui n'a pas su vouloir beaucoup 
des choses, mais qui a VOTAIU seconder l a l i b e r t e des 
Am^'icains'.-'-^ 
This i s simply not true. Louis XVI never wished to help the 
Americans to be f r e e . He had greater sense than to support the 
Americans for t h e i r sakes, he knew exactly how dangerous that 
could be. Rather he suppoet^d them because of the pressure that 
was put upon him by h i s ministers and their henchmen such as 
Beaumarchais. Louis XVI was no 'philosophe', and neither were 
those who surrounded him and gave him advice. He went to war 
eventually because they had succeeded i n wearing down h i s 
resistance and that of Maurepas. They had succeeded i n doing t h i s 
because they put forward enough plausible arguments in favour of 
the step, which convinced Louis XVI that he was doing France a 
great service; i n fac t he was storing up disaster for himself and 
for France. 
I n the same vein, though as i t was written i n 1918 i t i s 
u n l i k e l y that i t was influenced by the same factors, we find 
Merlant i n h i s book La Frgmce et l a Guerre de 1'Independence 
Americaine 1776-1783 taking Vergennes as a paragon of v i r t u e . He 
was »un e s p r i t t r e s eleve et tres sage, I'un des plus grands 
Serviteurs qu'ait jamais eu l a France*. As sfuch his aims i n 
rebuilding French greatness were not such unworthy objects as 
aggrandisement or t e r r i t o r i a l gain, but rather the pvire and j u s t 
intention to restore european diplomacy to a foundation i n 
«les droit s sacrees de l a j u s t i c e et l a propriete*. I n keeping 
with these worthy ends we find that Vergennes prepared for war 
merely i n order to ward off the threat of war from Great B r i t a i n . 
The f a c t that no one i n B r i t a i n appears to have even considered 
attacking France or her overseas possessions does not seem to 
concern Merlant. I n t h i s , as i n most other ways, Merlant's book 
i s merely a rather pale shadow of the masterly work of Doniol. 
However, Merlant's work i s of interest for another reeison eis 
w e l l . This i s that i t marked the transition to a new phase of 
h i s t o r i c a l writing on the subject of the American War i n France 
which was to be very prevalent i n the inter-war years. This 
phase began with the a r r i v a l of General Pershing i n France i n 1917 
at the head of the American troops when he said "Beaumarchais nous 
v o i c i " . This speech inaugurated a period i n which writers were at 
pains to show the strength of the t i e s between France and America. 
These t i e s were supposed to have t h e i r origin i n the fact that 
France came to the a i d of the American rebels when they were 
desperately struggling for t h e i r independence, and were re-affirmed 
i n 1917 when the Americans retximed the compliment by coming to the 
assistance of the French i n t h e i r hour of need. The fact that 
generations of Frenchmen and Americans have detested each other 
from the time when Quebec was a threat to the American colonists 
before 1763 to the time when General de Gaulle withdrew France 
£rom Nato has again been conveniently subnerged in h i s t o r i c a l myth. 
This attitude of repayment of a long-standing debt i s c l e a r l y 
expressed i n Admiral de Faramond's a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 'Les Fondements 
de I'Amitie Franco-Americain'. I n t h i s a r t i c l e the following 
passage i s to be found:-
'C;'.est en France que l e s Americains trouverent un 
Roi et un peuple disposes £i de grands sacrifices pour 
aider, a I'heure c r i t i q u e de sa naissance, l a 
Republique des E t a t s Unis'.^6 
This approach i s t y p i c a l of a large number of inter war works by 
French authors who include i n t h e i r introductions, and often appear 
to have been inspired to write by t h i s notion of a long-standing debt 
having been repaid by the Americans coming to the aid of France at 
the l a t t e r ' s 'heure c r i t i q u e ' . 
There are-many other interesting examples of works on the period 
on which contemporary events may have impinged. Of these, by 
reason of space, an a r t i c l e by de Fraguier w i l l have to stand as an 
example. This a r t i c l e was published i n 1912, at a period when Great 
l i ) . 
B r i t a i n and France were j u s t beginning to become aware of the dangers 
threatening them both i n the shape of Wilhelmine Germany. They were 
coming to r e a l i s e the need to draw together i n the face of the 
common enemy, and thus to see the need to abandon the coolness that 
had marked t h e i r relations up to t h i s point. De Fraguier's 
a r t i c l e , published at t h i s time, argues i n favour of the policy 
of peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n that was pursued by the Due d'Aiguillon 
between 177I and 1773. De Fraguier also takes pains to point out 
the advantages that might have come to France had she pursued the 
course l a i d down by d'Aiguillon after the years of mutual h o s t i l i t y 
under Choiseul. I t seems that i t may be more than mere coincidence 
that de Fraguier's a r t i c l e should appear at such a similar juncture 
i n the history of the two countries.l7 
Evidently t h i s cannot be a complete survey of the French 
historians who have written on t h i s period, but i t i s hoped that i t 
has helped to drasa attention to some of the more evident 
coincidences between h i s t o r i c a l events as they happen and history 
as i t i s written. We must now however pass on from French 
historians to consider those of American origin, who have written 
about the creation of the American nation from the thirteen 
colonies which, i t i s well remembered, George I I I and Lord North 
l o s t for Great B r i t a i n . 
I n any consideration of American h i s t o r i c a l writings on t h i s 
period i t has to be remembered that from the s t a r t Americans have 
had a low opinion of the B r i t i s h governments of the second h a l f of 
the eighteenth century. I n the Declaration of Independence, with 
i t s implications that the B r i t i s h government had ceased to protect 
the basic rights of the individual, both the government and the 
King are subjected to attacks that are i n many cases far from 
j u s t i f i e d . The rights and vrongs of the Stamp Act and i t s 
aftermath do not conem us here. At t h i s stage the point that has 
to be made i s that there i s almost an obligation on American 
his t o r i a n s to highlight the e v i l s of the B r i t i s h governments of 
the period and to play down the f a u l t s of the Americans. To do 
otherwise i s to cast doubts on the rights of the cause, on the 
wisdom of the founding fathers and on the truth of the b e l i e f s 
for which George Washington and h i s army fought. Such thoughts 
amount to a doubt as to whether or not America should e x i s t at a l l . 
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and so are hardly tenable by a p a t r i o t i c American. I n a sense i t 
i s the old story: ' I f treason prosper, none dare c a l l i t treason'• 
American writers are, i t appears to me, subject to two weaknesses 
i n the attitudes with which they approach the study of t h i s period. 
F i r s t l y they tend to assume that the Americans of the period were 
almost a different type of human being from t h e i r European 
counterparts. The American i s pure and innocent, quite untouched 
by the dark and devioiis ways of Eiiropean diplomacy. Bemis provides 
us with an excellent example of such an attitude i n the following 
quotations:-
'European diplomacy i n the eighteenth century was 
no gentle c r a f t . The Chancelleries of power acted 
according to the unblishing principles of • 
Machiavelli - that the attainment of a good end 
j u s t i f i e d the use of any means, however d i r t y . 
What the monarchs of Europe and th e i r advisers 
defined as a good end was the interest and 
welfare of th e i r own as against the interest and 
welfare of other s t a t e s . I t was a world of the 
surv i v a l of the strongest .... Between wars the 
battles of diplomacy went on continuously and 
unmercifully, often with l e s s sense of honourable 
treatment than obtained i n the c o n f l i c t s of open 
warfare No r u l e r trusted another, not even 
a blood r e l a t i v e and treaty a l l y ' . 
Again on the following page:-
'There were no such things as national boundaries 
or race l i m i t s .... I n a l l t h i s the statesmen did 
not consult or even think of the wishes of the 
people concerned i n the transfers these 
grosser crimes obscure the continual contemptuous 
tr i c k e r y by which the diplomacy of the eighteenth 
centviry was conducted'.^° 
Value judgements such as these are r e a l l y useless, although 
unfortunately we find that many American writers are prone to them. 
They make no contribution to h i s t o r i c a l analysis of the period, and 
serve to obscure rather than c l a r i f y the issues that are at stake. 
This apart, Bemis's c r i t i c i s m s of the eighteenth century are not 
only applicable to that age, for the aim of diplomacy has always 
been the securing and furthering of the interests of one's own 
country and the hindering of the aims and interest of those 
towards which one i s h o s t i l e . The eighteenth century may not have 
been a paradise for diplomats, but such a paradise has never 
existed. There were rules that governed diplomatic behaviour -
Hugh E l l i o t , the over zealous B r i t i s h ambassador at B e r l i n , for 
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example, over stepped these rules when he st o l e the papers of the 
American Arthur Lee - and although the rules were unwritten they 
were no l e s s e f f e c t i v e because of that. The diplomatic world of 
the eighteenth century was eis l e a s t as pure as any since, and 
probably snore so than many on either side of i t i n the time scale* 
After a l l the spies of the eighteenth century had f a r l e s s 
equipment or opportunities than t h e i r counterparts of today. 
I f Bemis»s righteous indignation"about the world of diplomacy 
i s uncalled for, then h i s views on s e l f determination are t o t a l l y 
out of place. Far from expecting that 'peoples' ought to have 
any right to decide t h e i r own destiny, the governing classes i n 
the eighteenth century would have considered any such notion as 
close to insanity. Purthennore, such a right, even had i t been 
granted, would have had l i t t l e effect upon the l i f e of the 
ordinary working man, for war, disease, famine and a l l the other 
i l l s of the period affected a man and h i s family whether they were 
Dutch, French or Austrian. 
From t h i s c r i t i c i s m of what may be c a l l e d the 'wicked Europe' 
concept i n American h i s t o r i c a l writing, we may move on to 
consider a further weakness which i s i n some senses a counterpart 
to t h i s idea. This i s the impression that Americans were somehow 
different from the Eiuopeans of the day and that America was a 
land that flowed with metaphorical milk and honey. Bemis again:-
'Some thoughtful Americans had vaguely sensed that 
peace was a more normal condition of American 
l i f e than of that of the old world'.19 
And again:-
' I t was the cyni c a l and brutal international world 
of the eighteenth century into which the United 
States of America was to be delivered as a l i v i n g 
state».20 
Here again we are faced with useless value judgement. The 
international world heis always been cynical and brutal, and i t i s 
to be doubted whether peace was a more normal condition of l i f e 
i n America, for Americans had been f u l l y involved i n the Seven 
Years War, and were constantly involved i n struggles with the 
Indians and indeed with the forcies of nature. 
The idea of America as a superior nation gives r i s e to a 
further notion. This i s that her envoys to Europe were^members 
of a new breed of diplomat on a higher plane than those of the 
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old world, although some are forced to make an exception to th i s 
r u l e i n the case of S i l a s Deane. The chief among th i s group of 
heroes i s , as i s natizral, Benjamin Franklin. As the chief envoy, 
the darling of P a r i s i a n Society and an ornament to any salon or 
soiree. Franklin has a natural advantage. Add to this the fact 
that Franklin was the friend of the Philosophe movement i n France 
and the architect of the Franco-American a l l i a n c e and one has a 
figure that a l l Americans can scarcely help but admire. But 
although Franklin may be an admirable figure to Americans, he was 
regarded very b i t t e r l y by the B r i t i s h who had seen him for a 
time as a moderating influence on the more rabid of the r e b e l s . ^ 
I f Franklin i s to be taken as a representative of the new America, 
then h i s conduct must be examined, and some of i t w i l l then appear 
to be jiast as 'brutal and c y n i c a l ' as that of the most accomplished 
of European diplomats. One example of t h i s i s the use that was 
made by Franklin of the peace mission of Wentworth i n the winter 
of 1777-1778. Wentworth, formerly an important government agent 
on American a f f a i r s and an expert on France's relations with the 
rebels, went to P a r i s to try to freat with Franklin and h i s 
colleagues. Franklin made very s k i l l f u l use of Wentworth. He 
gave him j u s t enough encouragement to keep the London government 
i n hopes of a settlement; while i n r e a l i t y he was using the 
mission to frighten the French ministry that America might agree 
terms with B r i t a i n and turn on France. This was a very effective 
ploy, but i t i s not the type of t a c t i c s that are to be expected 
from a representative of the new and honest diplomacy of the new 
world. 
Franklin's colleagues i n Paris also offer scope for considering 
jtis t how foreign to the Americans the ways o"f European diplomacy 
ac t u a l l y were. Arthur Lee, for instance, can hardly be seen as an 
example of that openness and candour that are so much prized by 
American w r i t e r s . Lee distrusted everyone, not only the B r i t i s h 
and French but also his fellow envoys from America. Lee's 
suspicious nature i n fact led to a curious circumstance.- Dr. 
Edward Bancroft was chosen by Franklin and Deane to be their 
private secretary and secretary to the American delegation, Lee 
distrusted Bancroft, and was l a t e r shown to be quite correct to 
do so, because Bancroft was a constant source of information to 
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the London government. Lee refused to have Bancroft as h i s 
secretary and t h i s , combined with Lee's suspicious nature led 
to h i s being l e f t out of the main parts of the negotiations. 
I r o n i c a l l y , however, although Lee had refused Bancroft, the man 
he eventually chose as h i s secretary, Thornton, was also a 
B r i t i s h agenti Thornton was l e s s important to the B r i t i s h , but 
t h i s was only-so because Lee was distrusted both by h i s own colleagues 
and by the French ministry.22 
I t i s interesting to wonder whether Bemis i n h i s harsh comments 
on the e v i l s of eighteenth century diplomacy i n h i s introduction to 
The Diplomacy of the American Revolution which he began to write on 
4 J u l y 192623 may • have been influenced by ideas current i n 
America at the time. For t h i s was the period of Woodrow Wilson and 
the ennunciation of the new doctrine of Open Diplomacy i n which 
secret t r e a t i e s were to be abolished and a l l international dealings 
were to be conducted with the cards firmly on the table. I t was 
also a period i n which America turned her back on the Europe of the 
period and withdrew into i s o l a t i o n , rejecting the plans of her 
President contained i n the 1919 Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , thus gaining 
for h e r s e l f that 'comparative disentanglement from European 
convulsions' that-Bemis speaks of as one of the aims of the 
American Revolution.24 
To svim up then on American writers of history i n t h i s period, 
they can be c l e a r l y seen as suffering from several weaknesses. 
They tend to view t h e i r own countrymen ' and the i r own country as 
a world apart and as a world that i s superior to the "old" world 
i n Europe. They tend to s e e ' B r i t a i n i n her worst possible 
l i g h t , and although t h i s tendency i s natural i t should not be 
allowed to i n t e r f e r e with good h i s t o r i c a l judgement. F i n a l l y 
they tend to express views that are acceptable i n the nineteenth 
or twentieth century and assume that they would also have been 
acceptable i n the eighteenth century. The political world of the 
eighteenth century was supremely easy going, as Namier has s a i d : -
'Men went there (to the House of Commons) to "make 
a figure", and no more dreamt of a seat i n the 
House i n order to benefit humanity than a c h i l d 
dreams of a birthday cake i n order that others 
may eat i t ; which i s i n no way reprehensible'. 
25 
There was no place i n such a world for ideas of s e l f determination 
of peoples or democracy, and t h i s f a c t must be remembered when writing 
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the history of the period. 
Now, f i n a l l y , l e t us turn to look at those who have written on 
the history of B r i t a i n i n t h i s period. B r i t i s h historians are 
b i t t e r l y divided among themselves i n t h e i r opinions on the period 
of George I l l ' s reign. As Valentine says:-
*Ho two men of our own century have contributed 
more to an understanding of Lord Notith's time 
than Namier and B u t t e r f i e l d , but any work praised 
by the followers of one i s almost certain to be 
condemned by the d i s c i p l e s of the other'.26 
The works of these two great historians, however, are r e a l l y 
concentrated upon the in t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s of B r i t i s h Society i n the 
l a t e eighteenth century, and as such can only impinge marginally on 
a study of the diplomacy of the period. This overlap:, comes i n the 
r e f l e c t i o n s that are cast i n diplomacy and foreign policy by the 
int e r n a l pressures of domestic p o l i t i c s : for example, the degree to 
which the warlike Bedford group i n the North government could 
determine the policy of the ministry, of which they were an essential 
part, but which they alone were incapable of replacing. I n that 
sense the contribution of these historians i s inveiLuable i n enabling 
the twentieth century mind to grasp the complex world of checks and 
balances which i s t o t a l l y foreign, to present day conditions. But 
as f a r as diplomatic history i s concerned the writings of Namier 
and B u t t e r f i e l d are of l i t t l e d i r e c t assistance. Neither are the 
writings of t h e i r l a t t e r day emulators, men l i k e Ritcheson27 an 
American write r on the internal a f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n at t h i s 
period; or Donoghue^^ a B r i t i s h writer on 'party p o l i t i e s ' , such 
as they were, at t h i s era. These books which concern ' p o l i t i e s ' , 
deal rather with the s h i f t i n g sands of parliamentary influence 
than with the grand strategy of foreign a f f a i r s . 
Apart from books such as these, there heis been, u n t i l recently, 
a dearth of books i n t h i s f i e l d ; Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice's l i f e 
of the E a r l of Shelbume^^ i s one notable exception. More recently 
there have been attempts to r e c t i f y t h i s and to throw new l i g h t on 
several personalities of the time. Valentine has made two good 
studies i n the period, one of Lord North, and one of Lord George 
Germain, both of whom have been sadly neglected.^O George I I I has 
received sensible and s e n s i t i v e treatment from John Brooke, a 
d i s c i p l e of Namier.^l However, apart from these books, the 
prominent personeilities i n the government of the day remain i n 
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shadows that are quite unthinkable i n these days of mass communication. 
Not c i l l that many people, one may stispect, are even aware that Lords 
Suffolk, Rochford, Weymouth and Dartmouth were Secretaries of State 
i n t h i s period, and s t i l l l e s s would they be aware of what the 
p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s of these men were or how far they influenced 
poli c y . These men have remained unstudied, and have suffered 
c o l l e c t i v e c r i t i c i s m for the loss of the American colonies. 
However, the changes which can be wought have recently been 
i l l u s t r a t e d by the case of Lord Sandwich, who had largely been 
disregarded and discredited as a womanizer and as an i n e f f i c i e n t 
administrator. This situation has now been considerably altered 
by the publication of Sandwich's papers and of a biography of the 
E a r l . ^ ^ 
The lesson to be drawn from t h i s i s that historians of Great 
B r i t a i n i n t h i s period have tended to concentrate on internal 
p o l i t i c s , or, i n c i p i e n t l y , on biography, and have been reluctant 
to venture into the sphere of foreign a f f a i r s . This may well be 
caused by the apparent f a i l t i r e of B r i t i s h diplomacy, resulting i n 
the l o s s of the colonies and the defeat of B r i t a i n i n the war. 
That i s to say the reluctance of B r i t a i n ' s historians to look at 
t h i s subject may be seen as stemming from the same reasons that 
make i t so popular with historians of France and America - success 
and f a i l u r e . 
"The Cabinet that l o s t America", t h i s i s how the ministry of 
Lord North i s inevitably remembered; and although this i s a true 
statemait, i t i s also a simple one. Too often the cabinet i s 
dismissed i n t h i s way with no thought being given to the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s that i t faced. 
The government was faced by i n f l e x i b l e attitudes on the part." 
of the King. George I I I had a strong sense of h i s duty, as was 
only r i g h t and proper, and he does not deserve the sniping, to 
which he heis frequently been subjected, as having opinions enough 
for both himself and North; or for over ruling the Cabinet, 
something that he scrupuloizsly avoided on matters of major policy. 
As Brooke has written:-
•Sir Winston Churchill has said that he did not 
become Prime Minister i n order to preside over 
the dissolution of the B r i t i s h Empire. Neither 
did King George become King i n order to surrender 
the American colonies'.^3 
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To an eighteenth century King, whether constitutional or absolute, 
the idea that h i s overseas possessions should be surrendered at 
the l e a s t sign of revo l t was unthinkable. Another problem was that 
the Parliament was also of the King's opinion, and even the most 
c r i t i c a l opponent of the government - did not go so f a r as to advocate 
independence u n t i l that was the inevitable r e s u l t ; Brooke again:-
• I t was one thing to recognise American 
Independence i n 1783 after seven years of 
war had f a i l e d to subdue the Americans. 
I t would have been quite another i n 1778... 
A nation can submit to defeat i n war... 
But no nation can deliberately perform an 
act of humiliation except under pressure 
of overwhelming force'.34 
I n t e r n a l l y then. North and h i s - colleagues faced d i f f i c u l t i e s i n that 
they could not have abandoned the fight even hcul they wanted to. 
Externally t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s were even greater. They faced France, 
America, Spain and Holland as active enemies, and also the passive 
h o s t i l i t y of Pr u s s i a and the B a l t i c States. I n the face of the 
h o s t i l i t y of almost a l l Eiirope, and having l o s t the main source of 
t h e i r naval timber and a major recruiting ground for soldiers and 
s a i l o r s , the cabinet of North, under great pressure at home, 
sustained a war for seven years and enabled the next government 
to secure a peace treaty that denied to France almost a l l her war 
aims save the restoration of her battered prestige. This i s surely 
no mean achievement, esp e c i a l l y when i t i s considered that, - not long 
a f t e r , the Younger P i t t was forced to r e t i r e , exhausted, af t e r 
fighting republican France for fewer years than North had withstood 
the combined h o s t i l i t y of Europe. 
C r i t i c i s m there c e r t a i n l y was at the time, both from inside and 
outside the ministry, and yet there Weis no constructive or credible 
cdtemative put forweird by any of the c r i t i c s . The opposition, even 
had i t s p o l i c i e s been of a r e a l i s t i c nature, had no chance of a 
majority, and furthermore i t had no chance at a l l of ass\uning o f f i c e 
because of the wide gulf which separated i t from the King. I t i s of 
l i t t l e use to c r i t i c i s e North for not having resigned, and of even 
l e s s to c r i t i c i s e the opposition for not having forced him to do so, 
both events were equally impossible. C r i t i c i s m must be made of, and 
judgement based on the policy which North chose, or was forced, to 
follow. 
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North had taken into h i s cabinet a l l the major talents of the 
opposition, even managing to include Charles James Fox for two 
b r i e f periods. By means of these appointment he had, said Walpole, 
reduced the opposition 'to the l a s t stages of consumption'.^5 .jn 
the l i g h t of t h i s achievement i t seems highly imreasonable to say 
that North ought to have stood down. He was, as nearly as any 
po l i c i a n can ever be, indispensable; he was the only man who could 
have held together a cabinet composed of so many able and diverse 
men, and, above a l l , he was the only minister whom the King would 
t r u s t , and i t must be remembered that George I I I actually drew up 
a declaration of abdication to be used i f the Americans were 
granted their independence. A Chatham or a Churchill might have 
succeeded i n keeping America as a B r i t i s h possession, but t h i s 
would not have been a long term solution. Besides Chatham was 
not prepared to fight the Americans, nor to grant them independence, 
a viewpoint f a r l e s s r e a l i s t i c than North's. Rather then, than 
i n s i s t that North should have stood down,-it seems that historians 
should concentrate on the factors which r e s t r i c t e d h i s freedom of 
choice, and on the attitudes and opinions of the time which made 
i t impossible for North to follow other courses of action which 
might have proved more f r u i t f u l . I n addition, a greater attempt 
to look for the advantages of the government's policy should be 
made than has hitherto been the case. A deli c a t e l y balanced game of 
diplomacy vas being played out and for a long time the scedes could 
have come down on either side. 
Whatever the subject, there are always prejudices that w i l l 
a f f e c t the writer of any book and therefore what he writes. 
This chapter has been an attempt to show some of the attitudes that 
h i s t o r i a n s have brought to t h i s particuleir period. Bemis claims, 
i n h i s introduction to The Diplomacy of the American Revolution 
that for the f i r s t time a writer has had f u l l access to a l l the 
records, and vrrites that h i s 'endeavour has been to present 
a balanced and somewhat condensed narrative of the diplomacy of the 
American Revolution'p6 There have been many attempts to do t h i s , 
but i t seems t h i s objective i s not e a s i l y attained, because the 
subject i s undeniably an emotive one, and inevitably attitudes are 
shaped by nationality and sentiment. I believe that the treatment 
that heis been accorded to Great B r i t a i n has not been balanced, but 
often unfair and usually blinkered. Hitherto the interpretations of 
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events surrounding the American War of Independence have usually 
started from a standpoint that B r i t a i n ' s actions were either 
wrong, or dictated to her by the clever diplomats of France or 
even that they were downright stupid. Here, i n what follows, i t 
w i l l be our concern to show that French diplomacy was not as 
clever as has often been made out to be the case; to examine the 
options that were open to the North government and to see why i t 
elected to follow the courses that i t did. I t w i l l also be shown 
that contemporary c r i t i c i s m s , though sometimes v a l i d , were seldom 
p r a c t i c a l , and that those of the hi s t o r i a n have often taken 
advantage of hindsight and have been coloured by useless moral 
judgements t o t a l l y inapplicable to the eighteenth century world. 
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CHAPTER I I : THE BACKGROUND: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND AMERICA 1765 - 1774 
Following the Seven Years War the p o l i t i c a l and diplomatic 
picture i n Europe was dramatically changed. For most of the 
preceding century France had been seen as the chief threat to the 
peace and s t a b i l i t y of the continent. But the events which 
followed the Diplomatic Revolution proved diseistrous to French 
ambitions. Drawn into an exhausting war i n Central Europe France 
had watched her armies march and counter mardi across Germany, 
achieving l i t t l e or nothing that was of importance to French 
i n t e r e s t s . This Weis due i n IcO'ge measure to the genius and 
r e s i l i e n c e of Frederick the Great, but i t was also due to the 
fac t that France's e s s e n t i a l i n t e r e s t was not i n Germany. 
I f the land war i n Europe was an error for France, then the 
world wide naVeiL and colonial c o n f l i c t with Great B r i t a i n was a 
catastrophe. The years between 1756 and 1763 saw the naval power 
of the French reduced i n the eyes of contemporaries to negligible 
proportions, and also saw the loss of a large number of colonial 
possessions, the major item here being the vast t e r r i t o r y of 
Canada. The los s of t h i s largely unproductive area was to have a 
profound effect upon the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n North America 
over the next f i f t e e n years. 
The Seven Years War may be seen as a watershed i n the history 
of the eighteenth century. I t humbled the might of the French i n 
Europe, and, i n the place of that threat i t raised a new one. 
This was the p o s s i b i l i t y of the domination of Europe by Great 
B r i t a i n . This new threat, although not so di r e c t as that of 
France, was none the l e s s a r e a l and meaningful one, especially 
to the maritime nations, France, Spain, Holland and the B a l t i c 
S tates. To these States, the newly acquired t o t a l naval 
dominance of B r i t a i n appeared as a considerable threat to their 
trading r i g h t s I t i s worthy of note that the B r i t i s h claim 
of the right of search on the high seas Wcis to be the cause of 
much h o s t i l i t y and resentment, and a major contributing factor 
i n the formation of the Armed Neutrality at a l a t e r date. 
I f the Seven Years War had removed one threat from Europe 
only to replace i t with another, i t s effect upon North America 
was altogether d i f f e r e n t . While the French had been the masters 
of the Northern portion of the continent, there had been a constant 
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threat that they would act against the B r i t i s h colonies and seize 
them. The B r i t i s h colonies, running i n a narrow s t r i p along the 
coast from the St Lawrence southwards were surrounded by French 
t e r r i t o r y , Canada to the North, and the vast, largely unexplored, 
area to the West which was nominally i n French hands. This area 
contained French trading posts, which allowed the French to 
contact the Indian tribes and to make use of them against the 
B r i t i s h . The Indians were generally better disposed towards the 
French because they came only to trade and to trap animals for 
furs ; the B r i t i s h came to s e t t l e and plant the land. 
This threat of attack and possible conquest had ensured the 
friendly disposition of the colonists towards the mother country, 
and had secured the support of the Americans for Great B r i t a i n i n 
any war with France. The war of 1756 - 1763, which weis fought on 
the American continent to prevent a possible French expansion there, 
was no exception to the ru l e , and the Americans rendered 
considerable assistance to B r i t a i n i n the defeat of France. This 
f a c t was c l e a r l y demonstrated by Thomas Townshend when, i n the 
debate on the Address on 31 October 1776 i n the Hoiise of Commons, 
he pointed out that i n the l a s t war the American colonists had 
provided 12 - 13,000 men for the B r i t i s h navy.2 I n addition to 
manpower, i t must be re c a l l e d that the American colonies were a 
major source of supply for shipbuilding timber. America had 
therefore played a considerable part i n the overthrow of French 
power, a fact that throws l i g h t on the attitude of the Americans 
towards the French. There can be l i t t l e doubt that the Americans 
d i s l i k e d the French, and t h i s should not be a cause for sxirprise. 
The Americans were f i e r c e l y protestant i n r e l i g i o n and therefore 
d i s l i k e d the cat h o l i c French; the French use of the Indian tribes 
to cause trouble for the colonists deepened th i s animosity, and 
i t was completed by the knowledge of the colonists that the 
French colonial aims were even more oriented towards the benefit 
of the mother country than were those of the B r i t i s h . 
The Seven Years War, by removing the French from Canada, also 
removed t h i s threat to the B r i t i s h colonists. The removal of t h i s 
threat resulted i n a decline i n the importance of B r i t i s h protection, 
to the colonists, and t h i s new found freedom from danger could 
soon lead to a new and independent s p i r i t among the colonists. 
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At the same time as i t had these effects i n American, the war 
also had a marked effect on the national debt i n B r i t a i n . 
Between 1755 and 1763 the t o t a l of the funded and unfunded debt 
rose from £72,505,572 to a monumental £132,716,049.^ This 
increase i s a measure of the f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n imposed upon 
B r i t a i n by the war, and i t also explains the strength of the 
desire for peace i n 1763, which so disgusted P i t t . 
The frightening l e v e l of the debt made the members of the 
government begin to look for new ways i n which the administration 
could reduce expenditure or increase revenue, so reducing the 
Government's borrowing requirements. The p o s s i b i l i t y of cuts i n 
expenditure at home was not overlooked, and as we s h a l l see l a t e r 
the r e s u l t s of these cuts were f a r from helpful. However, an 
obvious drain on the finances was the payment for the defence of 
the colonies i n America r and the feeling began to grow among the 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l classes that the colonies should be made to ^ay 
for t h e i r own defence, or at l e a s t contribute towards the cost 
of i t . 
This was not a new idea. There had been taxes on the colonists 
i n the past i n the form of customs duties, indirect taxation that 
i s to say; an example being the 6d molasses duty that had been 
imposed by Walpole. This tax and other s i m i l a r ones were collected 
by the colonial governments i n American, and the collection was 
highly i n e f f i c i e n t . When George Grenville came to power he was 
shocked by t h i s i n e f f i c i e n c y and took steps to remedy the situation. 
He halved the duty to 3d, and tightened up the c o l l e c t i o n procedures 
i n order to re-coup the loss of revenue incurred by the cut. At the 
same time, the money raised was c l e a r l y set aside to be used for 
American purposes. There was nothing objectionable i n t h i s . The 
B r i t i s h public was c l e a r l y behind the action, and the American 
colonists could f i n d l i t t l e to take exception to as the duty had 
been reduced and since i t was s t i l l within the area of indirect 
taxation on trade which had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been accepted. 
I n March of 1765, however, Grenville took a further step, which 
was to have far reaching r e s u l t s . He introduced into Parliament an 
Act which would impose a Stamp Duty on the American colonists. The 
Act-was quickly passed into law, and was to be the cause of much 
trouble for the B r i t i s h government. To do j u s t i c e to Grenville, he 
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had not wanted to impose t h i s upon the colonists and so he had 
offered them the chance to put forward an alternative way of 
r a i s i n g the same amount of money, and had s a i d that he would 
accept t h e i r proposals. There were none, and so the Stamp Act 
was passed. 
A Stamp duty had been a part of the B r i t i s h f i s c a l system 
for many years. But to the Americans i t Weis new. Not only was 
i t new, but i t was also instantly disliked, and t h i s despite 
the f a c t that the revenue raised by i t was to be used to pay for 
the defences of the New World. The colonists resented the duty 
on two major counts. F i r s t they contended that the tax was an 
int e r n a l tax and therefore was t r a d i t i o n a l l y outside the scope of 
the London government, and a break with precedent. Second they 
contended that such a tax ought to be raised by the i r own 
colonial governments and not by a minister i n London who, they 
claimed merely wanted more posts as American tax collectors to 
use as patronage. The cry "No taxation without representation" 
was raised, and a campaign was mounted to d i s c r e d i t Grenville 
i n the public eye. A storm was r i s i n g , but i t was eis yet only a 
breeze, and Grenville ignored i t ; the Stamp Act remained. 
GrenxdLlle could ignore America , but there were factors i n 
the p o l i t i c a l climate of Britedn that proved too strong for him. 
George I I I had always loathed him, and had tolerated him only 
because there was no ef f e c t i v e alternative. But i n the summer 
of 1765 he was rescued by a c o a l i t i o n of the friends of the Duke 
of Newcastle, l e d by Rockingham and supported by the King's 
uncle, the Duke of Cumberland. Grenville was dismissed on 
10 J u l y 1765f and at h i s l a s t audience, he told the King "as he 
valued h i s own seifety, not to suffer anyone to advise him to sepeu:>ate 
or draw the l i n e between h i s B r i t i s h and American dominions". By 
t h i s Grenville meant that the King should maintain the rights of 
the B r i t i s h parliament against those of h i s American subjects.^ 
I n terms of p o l i t i c a l t a c t i c s what Grenville meant was that the 
Stamp Act should not be repealed, however hard the Americans might 
press for t h i s , as long as i t was supported by a majority of the 
members of Parliament. This i s the s t a r t of the debate between the 
B r i t i s h view of the sovereignty of parliament and the American view 
of i t . The Americans contended that, though they understood the 
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King's sovereignty over them, the concept of parliamentary power 
over-them was not v a l i d . How,, they asked, could a representative 
body create laws which were binding upon those unrepresented i n i t ? 
The Rockingham ministry was a leaderless a f f a i r . I t s true 
leader was P i t t , but he had refused to come i n , and so the 
remaining leaders had to do t h e i r best without him. The ministers 
were generally agreed that the Stamp Act should be repealed, the 
more so since they f e l t the repeal would appeal to P i t t who had 
opposed the Act from the s t a r t . But the problem was that the 
majority of Members of Parliament f e l t that America ought to pay 
for her defense.^ To extricate themselves from t h i s predicament 
the ministers resorted to a compromise. They repealed the Stamp 
Act, as they had wanted to, but at the same time they passed the 
Declaratory Act which reaffirmed the right of Parliament to tax 
America. This Act was intended to save face i n American and to 
c^pease the majority i n Parliament. 
Rockingham's cabinet had been weak to s t a r t with, and the 
death of Cumberland and the defection of several ministers ensured 
i t s f a l l . The new ministry was headed by William P i t t , who had 
now been created E a r l of Chatham, and was intended to l i f t the 
nationfe p o l i t i c s out of the factional struggles that had 
dominated them for so long. But Chatham, now old and i n i l l 
health, was no longer the man of e a r l i e r years. He soon r e t i r e d 
to Bath with a severe attack of gout, and the ministry was l e f t 
to d r i f t . I t had seoned that Chatham might have been acceptable 
to the American colonists, and indeed there was considerable 
r e j o i c i n g i n the colonies when Chatham came to power. Had he not 
c r i t i c i s e d the Stamp Act as an instrument of slavery and had he 
not s a i d ' I r e j o i c e that America has r e s i s t e d a...'?^ However, 
as E a r l of Chatham, P i t t f a i l e d to l i v e up to the expectations 
of the Americans, and the p r i n c i p a l contribution of h i s ministry 
to American a f f a i r s Wcis to exacerbate rather than mollify the 
anger of the c o l o n i s t s . I n the early months of 1767, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles Townshend, under great 
pressure from the opposition, introduced a meastire that imposed 
import duties on lead, glass, paper, pednter's colours eind tea 
sent from Great B r i t a i n to the colonies. This event aroused »a 
colonicd agitation against a l l forms of taxation for English 
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7 revenue, including i n d i r e c t taxation*. The Townshend duties 
were ill-conceived and had unfortunate consequences. Townshend 
had f e l t that as customs duties, these would be acceptable to the 
Americans, where the Stamp Act had not been; this was not the case, 
and they merely served to harden American opinion further. 
From 1767 onwards B r i t i s h policy towards America drifted, 1768 
saw the a r r i v a l i n the ministry of the Bedford group i n the ministry, 
and t h e i r influence resulted i n increasingly hostile policy 
decisions i n the American sphere. 1768 also witnessed the creation 
of the third secretaryship of State, with special responsibility for 
colonial a f f a i r s . This move can be seen as a pr a c t i c a l attempt to 
acknowledge the fa c t that administration of the colonies created 
too much work for the conventional scheme to cope with e f f i c i e n t l y ; 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y i t can be seen as an attempt by the Bedford group to 
increase t h e i r power i n the ministry by wresting this important area 
from the grasp of Shelbume, Chatham's closest d i s c i p l e , who was 
seen by the Bedford group as a friend of the colonists. Most 
probably the creation of the new o f f i c e was due to a combination 
of both these f a c t o r s . Without the extra v/ork created by the 
colonies the Bedford group would have had no case to create the 
new post. Later indications, however, show that the move may not 
have had such b e n e f i c i a l r e s u l t s for the Bedford group as they had 
hoped, for they were reluctant to grant the third Secretary an equal 
share of power with the Secretaries of ancient foundation. ^  
The new Secretaryship was given to Lord Hillsborough, a man 
who was to show himself f a r from sympathetic to the American 
cause. This appointment, together with the p o l i t i c a l situation 
i n general, was f a r from the intentions of the E a r l of Chatham; 
h i s ministry was as much a prisoner of p o l i t i c a l faction as any? 
of i t s predecessors had been. Chatham resigned i n disgust, and 
Shellbume followed him. This l e f t the Duke of Grafton to lead 
a ministry that was now composed almost e n t i r e l y of Bedford 
friends, the two major exceptions being Grafton himself and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord North. I n 1770, North replaced 
Grafton as chief minister, and at the time i t was widely f e l t 
that North was merely a caretaker leader u n t i l the Bedfords could 
fi n d s u f f i c i e n t support to assume power. I f t h i s was the intention 
of the Bedford group, they had miscalculated badly, North's 
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government was to l a s t for twelve years, and at the beginning 
i t seemed to herald a return to more moderate policy towards 
the colonies. This impression was strengthened by the removal 
of Hillsborough from the colonial Secretairyship and his 
replacement with North's half-brother Lord Dartmouth i n 1772, 
and also by the removal of a l l the offensive import duties 
imposed on the colonies except that on tea, which was retained 
as a sop to B r i t i s h public opinion. 
The background to the internal p o l i t i c s of B r i t a i n has been 
dwelt upon at some length i n order to show the d i f f i c u l t i e s that 
were faced by the London government. E s s e n t i a l l y these problems 
remained the same for the duration of the American question up 
to 1783. The pressures on the government i n dealing with the 
colonists were great and were brought to bear by people inside 
and outside the ministry, inside and outside Parliament. 
" Parliamentary pressure came from the county members 
who s t i l l f e l t that the ^Americans should be made to pay for the 
cost of the defence of t h e i r lands and posts. Pressure also came 
from the merchants i n those ports which dealt extensively i n 
trade with the American colonies, such as Liverpool and B r i s t o l . 
These ports suffered heavily from the brealcs i n trade which were 
the American response to the Stamp Act and the Townshend duties, 
and were anxious to ensure steady and regular trade l i n k s . The 
King too had firm ideas on the American question. We have already 
seen the King being warned by Grenville that he must not give way 
to American pressure; and yet under Rockingham he agreed to repeal 
the Stamp Act. This decision was only taken by the King very 
rel u c t a n t l y because of great pressure brought to bear by the 
ministers. George I I I had favo\ired a middle course on the Stamp 
Act, he wanted to see the parts that were objectionable to the 
colonists removed i f there were good grounds for doing so. But 
Rockingham informed him that there were only two choices available; 
either to repeal the Act or to use m i l i t a r y methods to enforce i t 
on the c o l o n i s t s . Faced with t h i s choice the King declared i n 
favour of repeal rather than use force against h i s own subjects. 
This action, he l a t e r became convinced, was a mistake, and he wrote 
of »The f a t a l compliance of 1766 ....»^ 
- I f the King was hardening h i s heart towards the Americans, the 
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ministry was by no means decided. Throughout the years between 
1763 and 1774 there had been divisions of opinion that made i t 
impossible for a firm policy to be adopted and pursued; the 
differences of opinion had also led to frequent changes of 
administration. Among the groups responsible for t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n were the Bedfords; not a s u f f i c i e n t l y large group to 
create a ministry of t h e i r own» but powerful enough to dominate 
any ministry i n which they were included. Their views on the 
American si t u a t i o n were harsh and were probably representative 
of the opinions of a majority of the members of the governing 
c l a s s i n B r i t a i n . Concession was not a word favoured by t h i s 
group. Another powerful group was gathered aromd Lord 
Rockingham, and t h i s section was prepared to compromise with 
the c o l o n i s t s . But the Rockingham group clung to the principle 
outlined by the Declaratory Act, that Parliament had the right 
to r a i s e taxation from the colo n i s t s . Their devotion to this 
concept weakened the Rockingham faction i n two ways; i t caused 
them to lose c r e d i b i l i t y with the Americans, and i t kept a 
distance between the Rockingham group and the followers of 
Chatham, who Weis i n favour of con c i l i a t i o n of the colonists, 
though he was not prepared to see them reach ihdependenceo 
Hovering uneasily between these groups were to be found North 
and Greifton. North's views were generally thought to be 
moderate, and there-were suggestions that Grafton had stayed 
on i n the Cabinet vinder North to try to modify violent measures 
that the Bedford group might try to push through. On 18 March 
1770, Franklin, who was then s t i l l i n London, could write to a 
colleague i n American a f t e r the repeal of the Townshend Duties 
•though the Duke of 6raf3ton and Lord North were 
and are, i n ray opinion rather inclined to s a t i s f y 
us, yet the Bedford party are so violent against 
Tis, and so prevalent i n the Council, that more 
moderate measures could not take place».10 
Hence the formation and execution of a consistent and 
siistained policy towards the colonies Weis impossible due to 
fact i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and frequent changes of ministry. 
However, throughout the period between 1763 and 1774 the 
question of the American colonies was not the central issue for 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s , and very frequently B r i t i s h leaders were 
f a r more concerned by domestic e i f f a i r s . This i s a point of v i t a l 
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importance, and though i t i s often made by historians i t seems 
to be taken as a side issue, whereas i t i s surely central to the 
entire issue. Both ministers and people i n these years were 
preoccupied with such issues as the reduction of the national 
debt, the creation and medntenance of a stable government, the 
reduction of the land tax from i t s high wartime l e v e l ; these 
were the important issues to the p o l i t i c a l l y powerful sections 
of the community i n B r i t a i n . General warrants, the Middlesex 
elections, the l e t t e r s of Junius and the Gordon Riots; these 
were issues that threatened the established order and therefore 
caused concem to the ruling c l a s s . By comparison to these 
domestic matters, petty squabbling over .taxation i n far away 
America must have appeared to be very t r i v i a l . As l a t e as 1774 
and w e l l into 17751 the majority of the King's l e t t e r s to h i s 
ministers have nothing to do with the American situation, and 
t h i s ought to come as no surprise to those who are familiar with 
the ideas of the functions of government that were generally 
held i n the eighteenth century. But even when feeling Weis 
aroiised i n Parliament, i t usually burnt i t s e l f out in counter-
productive measures. Tax, protest, repeal; tax protest, repeal, 
the process repeated i t s e l f with the Stamp Act and with the 
Townshend Duties, and i t was l i k e l y that i t would continue to 
repeat i t s e l f u n t i l a stable government could be formed which 
could conceive the need for an "American policy" as such, and 
could put such a policy into practice i n a consistent attempt 
to solve the problem. For t h i s to be a p o s s i b i l i t y there had 
to be a cessation of factional groupings i n Parliament, or at 
l e a s t a stable majority for the minister which would enable him 
to overcome any opposition to h i s meeisures. 
However, even granted a s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s , there i s no 
guarantee that the American problem would have been tackled any 
e a r l i e r or any more de c i s i v e l y . The reason for t h i s i s to be 
found i n the apathy of the members of Parliament of the period. 
The reasons for which these men went to Parliament (as described 
by Namier, see above page 14) meant that they were unlikely to 
take action about America u n t i l i t was brought home to them as 
an issue of importance. 
These two conditions needed to be f u l f i l l e d i f there Wcis to be 
a determined effort to resolve the American problem. But 
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unfortunately, when a stable and l a s t i n g ministry was formed, 
as was the case under North, i t s leaders lacked energy to 
tackle the problem; and indeed i n the years between 1770 and 
1774, the American issue i t s e l f was l e s s active than at 
almost any time i n the previous s i x years. I n these 
conditions therefore, the problem of America remained out 
of sight and out of mind. 
For the most part, B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s at t h i s time were 
not animated by general issues, and i t i s interesting to note 
that Burke, who had grasped the importance of the American 
issue e a r l i e r than most i n B r i t a i n and who was the agent i n 
London for two of the colonies, had great d i f f i c u l t y i n 
arousing any enthusiasm for, or interest i n , American e i f f a i r s 
i n h i s B r i s t o l constituency i n the general election of 1774. 
This apathy on the part of the electors of B r i s t o l i s the 
more surprising since the electors could have been excepted 
to have an in t e r e s t i n the matter because B r i s t o l was one of 
the major ports for trade with America. However, since the 
e a r l i e r c r i s e s of trade over the Stamp Act and the Townshend 
Duties, the merchants of B r i t a i n had begun to look elsewhere 
and t h i s had changed t h e i r p o l i t i c a l views:-
•the r e l a t i v e importance of American trade 
to English mercantile interests was declining 
with the r e s u l t that English merchants were 
l e s s w i l l i n g to demand capitulation to the 
American point of view».-^^ 
Commeiting upon the government's easy victory i n the debate on 
the b i l l presented by Alderman John Hayley on 23 January 1774, 
and on two s i m i l a r b i l l s presented on 25 and 26 January, the 
same author goes on to say that a f t e r these attempts 'the 
Rockinghams' e f f o r t s to arouse the English mercantile - classes 
petered out-feebly«.12 
This same argument which bases the lack of support given by 
the English merchants to the Americans on the decline i n Anglo-
American trade i s stated by another writer i n the following terms: 
•between 1771 and 1775 B r i t i s h trade with 
the colonies had declined by over 25 per 
cent ... When merchants re a l i z e d that the 
colonies wanted, among other things, free 
trade with the non-British world, t h e i r 
disaffection deepened'.13 
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Thus we can see that by means of non-importation agreements, 
free-trade demands and other such trading demands, the 
Americans had succeeded i n alienating the support of that 
group which had always been loudest i n i t s demands that the 
government should compromise with the demands of the colonists. 
With the alienation of the trading interest, the Americans 
l e f t themselves with few supporters i n England. At no time i n 
the l a t e 1760»s and early 1770•s were there more than about 
s i x t y Members of Parliament who could be counted upon to vote 
regularly against the government on American measures. These 
were sometimes a s s i s t e d by a roughly equal number of 
independent Mernbers, but none the l e s s i t was only r a r e l y that 
the opposition could muster more than eighty or ninety votes i n 
a d i v i s i o n , and frequently the i r strength was down as low as 
f i f t e e n or twenty.^4 i n addition to the handicap of low voting^-? 
strength i n the Commons, the opposition was further hindered 
from effective action by the f a c t that i t s leaders were b i t t e r l y 
divided on certain i s s u e s . A major stumbling block here was 
the Declaratoxy Act, which Rockingham f e l t had to be retained 
at a l l costs, but which Chatham saw as i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Yet 
another hindrance was the f a c t that a l l the major p o l i t i c a l 
figures i n B r i t a i n , including Chatham and Rockingham, were 
unanimous i n the opinion that America could not be edlowed to 
become independent. This meant that the opposition's disputes 
with the government co\ild only be on matters of d e t a i l . 
I n a l l t h i s t a l k of 'government' and 'opposition*, i t has 
to be r e c a l l e d that the distinction-between the two was 
generally very vague. Almost a l l groups could be tempted into 
the government lobby i f the price offered to them i n places and 
influence was r i g h t . Idealogical issues had r e a l l y faded from 
the scene, and the administration of the coimtry was generally 
run on very s i m i l a r l i n e s whichever group held power. As a 
symbol of t h i s unanimity e i l l p o l i t i c i a n s i n the mid-eighteenth 
century would have c a l l e d themselves whigs, the tories having 
been discredited by the Jacobite l i n k . General agreement on 
policy was a feature of the p o l i t i c s of the period, and, perhaps 
surprisingly: t h i s l e d to d i f f i c u l t y i n obtaining a stable 
government, becaxise there were no issues about which groups 
differed strongly^ i t was an easy step to change sides. 
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The American issue WEIS to change t h i s . Here was a decisive 
question the l i k e s of which had not been seen i n England for 
many years. Because English p o l i t i c i a n s had become accustomed 
to a r e l a t i v e l y CcOm l i f e , the American issue remained unrecognised 
for some considerable time. I t was not u n t i l 1770 that Lord North 
declared to the House of Commons:-
•The Contest i s now for no l e s s than 
sovereignty on the one hand, and 
independence on the other. W i l l any minister 
dare give up the sovereignty of t h i s country 
over her colonies? Or w i l l any minister 
venture to declare open war upon the l a s t 
extremity, to maintain her sovereignty?'^5 
This statement was made early i n 1770 while Greifton was s t i l l head 
of the ministry; i t shows an early r e a l i z a t i o n of the problem that 
was to confront B r i t a i n at a l a t e r date. I n 1770 neither the, 
majority of the House of Commons nor the majority of the American 
colonists would have accepted t h i s analysis of the situation, which 
seemed to be fedrly calm at the time. But i t i s a cleeir statement 
that no minister could w i l l i n g l y give up the American colonies, 
while a t the same time to declare war upon them would be a move 
that would be f a r from popular. That North was early i n seeing 
the problem can be shown when we see that i t was not u n t i l 1774 
that the King wrote to North i n terms which showed that he had 
now come to the same conclusion:-
'The New England Governments are i n a 
State of Rebellion, blows must decide 
whether they are to be subject' to t h i s 
country or independent ...' 
I n a further l e t t e r of the same day-he wrote i -
'We must either master them or t o t a l l y 
leave them to themselves and treat them 
as aliens ..... I am for supporting 
those (measures) already undertaken'.^6 
Lord North was early i n seeing the problem which faced the 
government and t h i s might have been an advantage to B r i t a i n ; 
however many of the speeches he made on the subject, and the 
punitive actions of the government against America created an 
image i n the minds of the colonists of Lord North as a firm 
opponent of American aspirations. He was, i t i s true an 
opponent of independence, which he f e l t would be f a t a l to 
B r i t a i n ' s position as a world power. But, by comparison to some 
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of those who were to hold m i n i s t e r i a l o f f i c e i n t h i s 
period North's views were notably moderate. We have already 
seen Franklin drawing attention to North's moderation (see 
above page 27), and t h i s impression of North 3S a moderate 
i s further substantiated by the following passage from 
Valentine i n which he comments upon Grafton's attempt to 
r e s t r a i n government policy by remaining i n Gabinet:-
'Neither h i s (Grafton's) capacities nor 
h i s position enabled him to a l t e r the 
p o l i c i e s i n s i s t e d upon by Gower, Rochford, 
Sandwich, Suffolk and the King'^-7 
This l i s t of those favouring tough measures does not include 
the name of North, and thus removes him from the ranks of the 
hard-line opponents of America*. and would tend to place him 
with the moderates, Grafton, Dartmouth and Lord Barrington, 
who was Secretary at War, and who was a firm opponent of a 
land war i n America.^^ 
Despite the many pressures on the ministry, and despite 
the many important figures who f e l t the colonists should be 
given harsh treatment from the s t a r t , there were few men i n 
England who seriously f e l t that the Americans would undertake 
open resistance to the authority of Parliament. The r e s u l t 
of t h i s was that domestic and European issues continued to 
overshadow America as the focus for debates i n Parliament. 
I n A p r i l of 1774, j u s t a f t e r the passage of the Boston Port Act, 
Edward Gibbon, who was a government supporter, could write to a 
f r i e n d : - 'with regard to America, the Minister seems moderate 
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and the House obedient' The c i f f a i r s of America were s t i l l 
not an issue i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . 
I f the years between 1763 and 1774 were largely years i n 
which the American issue was seen i n B r i t a i n as a side issue, 
the s i t u a t i o n i n France was very different. 1763 had been a 
nadir i n the international situation of France. She had been 
reduced to these depths by her t r a d i t i o n a l enemy, and for the 
next twenty years, with only one short break of three years, 
her foreign policy was to be directed towards obtaining revenge 
for the humiliation of 1763. 
Choiseul, who had managed to escape from the disasters of 
the Seven Years V7ar with h i s reputation s t i l l . intact, was to 
be the director of t h i s policy. From 1763 u n t i l h is dismissal 
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i n 1770 he concentrated almost the whole of h i s considerable 
energy upon t h i s aim. He was almost obsessed with t h i s idea 
a f a c t r e f l e c t e d by the following description of Choiseul^s 
attitude:-
•Que Choiseul se s o i t l a i s s ^ hypnotiser 
par I'idee de l a revanche contre 
i^Angleterre est certain; i l s a c r i f i a . 
toute'a cette pensee^.^O 
I n t h i s desire for revenge, Choiseul concentrated upon a 
reconstruction of the armed forces of France. He found the array 
badly disorganised after the war, and the navy i n a 
catastrophically weak condition. He reformed both services. The 
most dramatic e f f e c t s of t h i s reform were to be seen i n the navy, 
which Choiseul appreciated had to be strong before another war 
could be undertaken against the B r i t i s h . He set targets of 80 
ships of the l i n e and 55 f r i g a t e s , and by the time he f e l l from 
power i n 1770 the French navy possessed 64 ships of the l i n e and 
50 f r i g a t e s ; a naval strength quite s u f f i c i e n t to pose a serious 
threat to B r i t a i n . I n the process of these reforms, Choiseul also 
improved French port f a c i l i t i e s , set Up new naval training schools 
and created new harbours and arsenals. 
Choiseul was also early to spot the threat to B r i t a i n from 
col o n i a l troubles. Verdier again:-
•Choiseul avait compris quelle menace pesait 
sur 1 •Angleterre: l a Rebellion des colonies 
d»Amerique l u i p a r a i s s a i t devoir se produire 
tot ou tard et i l entendait bien en prof i t e r ; 
on s a i t q u ' i l ne se trompait pas'.^^ 
Although Choiseul made i t very clear i n h i s memoire of 1765 that-^ 
he was intent on revenge on Great B r i t a i n , he was also 
determined to exploit the American situation to i t s f u l l 
p o tential. His hope was that the American colonies wovdd deal 
a crippling blow to B r i t a i n by removing t h e i r trade and 
support from B r i t a i n , and transfer these to France. This 
would, Choiseul thought, create a situation i n which France 
could f l o u r i s h and B r i t a i n would no longer be a threat. 
I n addition to these hopes, Choiseul was further determined 
that there should be no war between B r i t a i n and France u n t i l 
the armed forces of France were i n a f i t state to undertake 
such a struggle with every possible hope of success. 
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Choiseul's policy was ca r e f u l l y planned. He needed to have accurate 
information on the state of opinion i n America, because he was w e l l 
aware that a n t i B r i t i s h feeling i n America did not mean that the 
Americans would be prepared to involve themselves with the French. He 
also needed an accurate assessment of the state of B r i t i s h preparations 
for a war. To obtain t h i s information spies and agents were sent by 
Choiseul to America, to encourage colonial discontent, and to B r i t a i n 
to observe B r i t i s h preparations i n the ports and to discover 
favourable s i t e s for the landing of invasion forces in the event of a war. 
But the information received by Choiseul was f a r from encouraging. Baron 
de Kalb reported to h i s master that the Americans, even though they were 
very discontented with the B r i t i s h , were s t i l l f a r from the point at which 
they could be expected to a l l y with the French. His arguments appear to 
have convinced Choiseul, for he wrote to Louis XV:-
'There w i l l come, i n time, a revolution i n America 
- but we s h a l l probably not see i t - which w i l l 
put England into such a state of weakness where 
she w i l l no longer be a terror i n Europe... The 
very extent of the English possessions i n America 
w i l l bri^g about t h e i r separation from England, 
but as I have said, t h i s event i s yet f a r off'.^^ 
The Coffite de Broglie also noticed the potential danger to B r i t i s h power 
from America. I n a lengthy memoire directed by him and presented to 
Louis XV, i n the closing months of h i s reign, he drew attention to the 
'imminence of a schism with the colonies' as one of the weaknesses in 
B r i t a i n ' s s i t u a t i o n a t the time. I n addition to t h i s he pointed to the 
s i z e (f B r i t a i n ' s national debt i n urging Louis XV to laxmch a war 
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against B r i t a i n i n the near future. 
Louis XV however had seen enough wars which had produced unfavourable 
r e s u l t s for France, and he was not to be persuaded by the arguments of 
the war party. He would not go to war even in 1770 when h i s a l l y Spain 
weis appeu?ently being humiliated by B r i t a i n and Choiseul and h i s colleagues 
were preparing for war.. The King stepped i n and dealt briskly with the 
s i t u a t i o n by writing, on 21 December 1770 to the King of Spain: 'My 
ministers would have war but I w i l l not'. ' Choiseul was dismissed from 
o f f i c e and never held power again. This move, together with the 
resignation of Lord Weymouth i n London, enabled peace to be presez>ved. 
The period from the f a l l of Choiseul u n t i l the death of Louis XV i n 
1774 marks a strange interlude i n Anglo-French h o s t i l i t y . At V e r s a i l l e s 
the Due d^Aiguillon headed a ministry whose foreign policy was one of co-
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operation with the London government of Lord North. Within France the 
government was pre-occupied with a programme of domestic changes 
including the reform of the Parlements, and attempts to c u r t a i l 
expenditure which were directed by Terray the Controller-General. The 
resultant peaceful foreign policy was one that received an enthusiastic 
welcome i n London, where the government was keen to economise also i n 
an attempt to reduce the debt which was s t i l l a problem even eight years 
a f t e r the end of the l a s t war. One major area i n which expenditure 
could be reduced was to avoid large scale payments to the armed services, 
and t h i s could only be achieved i f French policy appeared to be p a c i f i c , 
a rare occurrence i n the second h a l f of the eighteenth century. 
However, despite these weighty motives for a peaceful co-existence 
between the two countries, the r e a l basis for the friendly attitude of ' 
France xi these yeeU^s vas the aversion of Louis XV to the idea of another 
war. On h i s death i n May 1774 i t was almost inevitable that French 
policy would change, and feeling i n B r i t a i n was that this change would be 
for the worse. Such feeling was expressed by Lord Stormont, Ambassador 
to V e r s a i l l e s , when he reported on 8 May 1774 that there was no hope that 
Louis XV would recover, and commented: 'There can be no doubt that this 
catastrophe w i l l occasion a f a t a l change df scene'. 
Eventually the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n France began to become clear 
a f t e r the inevitable intrigues had run their cowse D'Aiguillon, who had 
shown signs of trying to r e t a i n h i s position, was dismissed at the 
beginning of June, and on 7 June 1774 Stormont reported to London that 
h i s successor was to be the Comte de Vergennes. The changes following 
the death of Louis XV had therefore brought to power a monarch who was 
reputed to hold a n t i - B r i t i s h views and a minister who was prepared to 
seek out and take advantage of methods of attacking B r i t a i n . The c±ange 
of scene appeared to have been every b i t as £atal as Stormont had feared, 
although i t would c e r t a i n l y have been worse had Choiseul been recedled 
to power. 
Unlike h i s predecessor, Vergennes was not obsessed with the idea of 
gaining revenge on B r i t a i n . However we are l e f t i n no doubt that he 
blamed B r i t a i n for France's weak position i n the world and that he was 
no friend to England, from the terms of the memoire he submitted to 
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Louis XVI at the s t a r t of h i s reign. His h o s t i l i t y to England becomes 
even c l e a r e r i n another memoire which he submitted on 8 December 1774 i n 
which he describes B r i t a i n as 'plus jalouse de l a prosperite'' de ses voisins 
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que de son propre bonheur'^^, and l a t e r i n the same document i t i s made 
very c l e a r that Vergennes i s contemplating a war:-
'Les Ministres qui parlent au r o i ne sont pas 
l o i n d'entrevoir xm jour oi>. I'honneur autant 
que I ' i n t e r e t politique commanderont de 
souhaiter cette guerre'. 
From 1774 onwards then, France was one again looking for ways and 
means to obtain revenge for the humiliation of 1763, and t h i s time she 
was i n a position to take advantage of any opportunities that arose 
due to the reforms of the armed forces that had been undertaken by 
Choiseul. The search for opportunities was once again begun, and the 
eyes of the French administration turned again towards the American 
colonies. Beaumarchais was sent to London and was there.for almost a 
year before we find the f i r s t reference to America i n his correspondence 
with Vergennes; one can be certain that Beaumarchais would have used that 
year to e s t a b l i s h contacts with the colonial agents i n London^?. The 
French spy network i n B r i t a i n , largely neglected under D'Aiguillon, 
was r e v i t a l i z e d ; the House of Commons was i n f i l t r a t e d and a Secretary at 
the Colonial Office was bribed to furnish information to the French 
embassy, thus giving the F r ^ c h ministry a finger on the pulse of 
p o l i t i c a l opinion i n England and a detailed knowledge of reports coming 
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i n from the colonies. Furthermore i n November 1774 a gentleman known 
as the Sieur Frontier was sent to B r i t a i n to watch and report on 
preparations and a c t i v i t y i n B r i t i s h ports. As one of the spies who had 
operated under Choiseul, Frontier would have been experienced in t h i s 
type of work, and we may be sure that the information the French government 
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received from him would have been accurate. 
The questions that must be asked for the purpose of t h i s study are to 
what extent the problems that the B r i t i s h government faced in regard to 
i t s American colonies were a cause of tension i n the relations between 
France and B r i t a i n , and whether the i n t e r e s t of the. French i n America as a 
meazis of destroying B r i t a i n ' s position as a world power had a similea* 
e f f e c t . A l l the signs are, -however, that America was not i n any r e a l sense 
a cause of tension, or that there was any degree of alarm among B r i t i s h 
p o l i t i c i a n s at the p o s s i b i l i t y of exploitation of B r i t a i n ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s 
by the French, during t h i s entire ten year period. The correspondence 
between the Ministry and i t s ambassador i n P a r i s for the year 1774 - that 
i s to say the year i n which French i n t e r e s t i n a war vas reawakening - was 
not concerned to any s i g n i f i c a n t degree with America, and well into 1775 
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there was only scant coverage of the American issue u n t i l rumours of 
arms t r a f f i c k i n g became widespread. The dispatches up to t h i s date were 
c h i e f l y concerned with other matters: the removal of d'Aiguillon, the 
likelihood of a return to power by Choiseul with the aid of the new 
Queen's influence, the attitudes of Louis XVI towards Britedn, and the 
usual round of ambassadorial duties such as freeing B r i t i s h subjects 
who had been imprisoned i n France and protecting the trading interests 
of B r i t i s h merchants. At a l a t e r stage there was considerable speculation 
on the p o s s i b i l i t y of a general european war resulting from the Spanish 
quarrel with the Portuguese over t h e i r colonies i n South America. Such 
were the matters that dominated the correspondence between London and 
P a r i s i n these days which were l a t e r to be longingly recalled by 
Stormont, when one despatch would cover a l l necessary business. 
The Correspondence of King George I I I contains no reference to any 
connection between France and the Colonies, or even to the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
any such connection, \mtil even l a t e r . The f i r s t r e a l reference to a 
threat from France i s to be found i n a Cabinet minute of 20 June 1776, 
when as a r e s u l t of 'the l a t e intelligence received r e l a t i v e to 
Armaments i n the Ports of France and Spain' the government took measures 
to prepare the Navy,^^ The cause of these preparations i n the Bourbon 
ports i s not made cle a r , but i s l i k e l y that they had more to do with the 
Spanish quarrel with Portugal than any events i n the B r i t i s h Colonies of 
North America. But whatever the cause, t h i s weis the f i r s t mention i n the 
King's l e t t e r s of any threat, and i t was written at a much l a t e r date. 
The whole of the King's correspondence i n the period prior to 1775 
was apparently unconcerned with the prospect that h i s brother monarch at 
the Court of V e r s a i l l e s might be planning to j o i n hands with the 
thirteen rebellious colonies i n order to humble the might of Great 
B r i t a i n . This was an attitude that was a l l too common among B r i t i s h 
p o l i t i c i a n s at the time. For example the E a r l of Sandwich's correspondence 
did not show any signs of alarm u n t i l the beginning of 1776 when S i r Hugh 
P a l l i s e r wrote to him i j i the following terms:-
' I have taken notice of the several a r t i c l e s in the 
foreign mails r e l a t i v e to eU'maments i n Spain and 
France which your Lordship has; and am constantly 
thinking (when other matters that require immediate 
attention do not possess my mind) what would be the 
best plan to adopt upon any sudden alarm from those 
quarters, w h i l s t we have so many seamen i n almost the 
whole of our frigat e s employed at such a distance and 
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such a body of our troops i n such a situation. 
Indeed a plan of measures to be adopted i n case 
of such an event i s necessary, and I hope i s 
prepared against i t may happen'.33 
There are two interesting points to be drawn from t h i s . F i r s t that even 
Sandwich, who was to show l a t e r that he was more aware than most of the 
threat from France, had not taken i t into account u n t i l 1776. Second 
that t h i s l e t t e r shows the sorry state of B r i t i s h planning, for 
P a l l i s e r , who vas Sandwich's right hand man and who would be the 
e f f e c t i v e director of a naval war, had only j u s t started to consider 
t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , and weis, i f h i s l e t t e r i s to be believed, ignorant as 
to whether or not a plan existed to meet a threat from France. This 
must be taken as a c l e a r indication that prior to t h i s time French 
involvement i n the struggle between B r i t a i n and America had not received 
serious consideration. 
Outside government c i r c l e s , such opinions were also commonly held. 
Lord George Germain, soon to replace Dartmouth as Secretary of State for 
the Colonies expressed the feeling among the p o l i t i c a l classes with 
regard to France when he wrote to h i s friend General Irwin on 21 June 
1774 
'The French King w i l l have enough to do at home 
for h i s amusement, and he w i l l not make var with 
us t i l l he has established economy i n the 
different branches of government, and has 
taught morality to the bishops and the people, 
I s h a l l hope for peace i n my time.'34 
Such opinions were commonly held and re f l e c t e d something of the 
complacent mood i n B r i t a i n following the crushing defeat of France in 
the Seven Years War. This attitude was sustained by the bland 
assurances of the Government made to Parliament through the medium of 
the King's Speech at the opening of each session of Parliament. As an 
example,-the speech of 13 January 1774 stated that 'other foreign 
powers continue s t i l l to have the same p a c i f i c dispositions with 
myself'^^ and went on to promise that i n the l i g h t of t h i s the ministers 
would have ' f u l l l e i s u r e to attend to the improvement of our internal 
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and domestic s i t u a t i o n ' , a promise which shows the great extent to 
which domestic matters-dominated the p o l i t i c a l scene. These assvirances 
of peaceful relat i o n s with foreign powers were accepted by Parliament 
with hardly any serious opposition and continued to be so for some time. 
Throughout these years then, Great B r i t a i n was hardly concerned by 
the prospect of an a l l i a n c e between France and the American colonists. 
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This perhaps i s not surprising i n the l i g h t of the fact that few 
Americans themselves had seriously thought that their troubles with 
England would lead to open war i n the period prior to 1774:-
»In 1774, very few Americans, however, seriously 
contemplated a complete break-away from B r i t a i n , 
and many were strongly opposed to the r a d i c a l 
and rebellious attitudes of men l i k e Samuel Adams'.37 
I f there were few Americans who had contemplated such a step i t i s 
perhaps hardly surprising that few Englishmen had thought of such a 
step; as the same author puts i t i n h i s very next sentence; 'Even 
fewer Englishmen believed that the colonists could separate from 
England even i f they would'. An a l l i a n c e between France and America 
seemed unl i k e l y to the minds of most Englishmen either on account of a 
general b e l i e f that France was in t e r n a l l y too weak, as expressed by 
Germain above, or else for reasons based on the personality t r a i t s of 
Louis XVI who, Stormont appeared hopeful, would be as great a force i n 
favour of peace as h i s grandfather had been:-
'His passion for Oeconomy, and dread of expence, 
give room to hope, that he w i l l not wantonly, or 
h a s t i l y , plunge into a War with England, to which 
the nation i n general i s certai n l y averse.'38 
Stormont himself was convinced that the chances of preserving peace 
were f a i r as long cis neither Choiseul nor Broglie were c a l l e d to power. 
I t seems unreasonable therefore to expect an eighteenth century 
government, confronted by t h i s apparently quiet scene abroad and by 
pressures at home to reduce both the l e v e l of taxation and the 
National Debt, to have foreseen that t h i s situation could soon turn into 
one i n which Great B r i t a i n would be involved i n a war of world wide 
proportions. I t i s even l e s s reasonable that we should expect the 
B r i t i s h , vinsvispecting of danger from the i r t r a d i t i o n a l enemy, to have 
r e a l i z e d the extent of the danger which threatened them from the far 
side of the A t l a n t i c . The Boston Tea Party had been l i k e the cloud the 
s i z e of a man's hand on the horizon. But t h i s incident, news of which 
was received i n London on 13 January 1 7 7 4 , d i d not make B r i t a i n aware 
of the strength of American feelings: rather i t was seen as merely 
another protest which needed harsh treatment. I t must be remembered 
that to the sophisticated Londoners of the age, the reports of a group of 
colonists, disguised eis Indians, throwing tea into a far distant harbour, 
would have appeared to have an amusing, even ridiculous, side to i t . The 
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Tea Party indeed, may have had the effect of making B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s 
even more scepticaiL of the serious nature of American feelings. Such 
an attitude of complacency Wcis shown by North when he summed up the 
debate on the Boston Port B i l l and said ' I t w i l l be enough to show that 
Great B r i t a i n earnest'4^, r e f l e c t i n g a feeling among B r i t i s h leaders that 
i f B r i t a i n were to crack the whip, the colonists vould come sw i f t l y to heel. 
Even the Opposition seems to have shared t h i s opinion for Barre, speaking 
of the same B i l l s a i d that 'he l i k e d i t , harsh as i t was; he l i k e d i t for 
i t s moderation.'41 
Although the t r a i n of events leading from the Stamp. Act to the 
Declaration of Independence may appear inevitable to the twentieth century 
observer, i t i s unfair to expect the same degree of insight of the 
p o l i t i c i a n s of the eighteenth century. To them the events i n America 
were merely colonial troubles: the American protests were viewed as 
i s o l a t e d responses to individual acts, and would not have appeared as a 
concerted movement. There had been colonial troubles before, and these 
had always been dealt with more or l e s s e a s i l y . Sometimes a compromise 
had been worked out, but there weis no doubt i n anyone's mind that i f a 
revolt was to break out, i t would be treated as such and that strong 
measures would be taken to put i t down. The Boston Tea Party weis an 
overt act against a piece of Parliamentary l e g i s l a t i o n , and as such, there 
was general agreement i n Parliament that action would have to be taken. 
The response of government, i n closing the port of Boston and c u r t a i l i n g 
the powers of the government of Massachusetts was certainly i n l i n e with 
eighteenth century ideas. I t i s not p r a c t i c a l to argue, as Valentine does, 
that the government ought to have stopped the sending of the tea, nor i s 
i t useful to use phrases which are deliberately derogatory to the B r i t i s h 
Cabinet:- '... i t was too l a t e for the ministers to have prevented the 
arrlyal of the tea at the American ports, even had they been wise enough 
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to do so.' Previous trouble had been calmed down by compromises, or had 
been suppressed or had simply blown over i n time; who was to say that the 
troubles a r i s i n g from the Tea Act would not soon fade into insignificance 
as well? 
B r i t a i n was not the only country to have colonies, nor was she the 
only one to experience d i f f i c u l t i e s with them. We have already noted that 
Spain and Portugal almost come to war over colonial disputes; previously 
the Corsicans had revolted against the French. I n such instances i t was 
not uncommon for a t h i r d party to aid the rebellious colonists against 
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t h e i r mother country. B r i t a i n had in fact given limited help to the 
Corsicans i n thei r r e v o l t . But i t was only i n extreme cases or for some 
ideological reason^^ t ^ ^ t such aid was given to the point of helping the 
colonists to achieve independence. I n the eighteenth century such aid was 
used as a way of dis t r a c t i n g and weakening r i v a l powers. This i s the 
type of si t u a t i o n that B r i t a i n must have f e l t she was facing i n these 
years between 1765 and 1774, a colonial disturbance which was a nuisance, 
but which was hardly l i k e l y to become serious. Unfortunately for B r i t a i n 
the American problem was to become .J.) serious, so serious i n fact that i t 
probably does deserve the t i t l e 'Revolution' that has sometimes been 
denied to i t . ^ 
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CHAPTER I I I : THE PROBLEMS: 1775 and 1776 
During the years 1775 and 1776 the problems that were to be posed 
to the world of the mid-eighteenth century by the War of American 
Independence were to become more c l e a r l y defined to the men of the time 
than they had hitherto been. I t was soon to become evident that the 
c o n f l i c t between B r i t a i n and America over t h i s issue was to cause 
problems to France and Spain and was to involve most of the other countries 
i n Europe. Many of the d i f f i c u l t i e s that arose were matters of simple 
p r a c t i c a l i t y . How, for example, could a European nation help the 
colonists i n distant America? How could a nation with no isval forces 
enter into commercial relat i o n s with the Americans?^ How could a nation 
i n Europe suppress a revolt i n colonies that lay over 3,000 miles 
distant? How could one colonial power j u s t i f y giving aid to the 
rebellioas subjects of another? Equally, many of the problems arose from 
a consideration of the possible effects of the various courses of action 
that could be followed. Would the subjects of a power which helped the 
rebels catch the infection and rebel themselves? Or would such a power 
be ostracised by her fellow nations i n Europe? These were issues that 
were very much edive for each nation that had a role to play in the 
coming c o n f l i c t . 
At the s t a r t of the active struggle, which may be dated as the middle 
of A p r i l 1775, the rebels were ce r t a i n l y beset by problems. They were 
short of powder, weapons, uniforms for their troops, and most importantly 
of a m i l i t a r y commander of high rank, reputation and experience. I n 
addition to these serious deficiencies they lacked a unified p o l i t i c a l 
structure and were comparatively inexperienced i n the art of government. 
I n consideration of the colonies during the early stages of the war i t 
must always be remembered that they had previously been thirteen 
individual colonies and not one unified nation. Each of the colonies had 
been governed by a separate governor and administration, and, apart from 
the Protestant faith, the colonies had l i t t l e i n common. These widely 
d i f f e r i n g and previously s e l f contained units had now to create i n a short 
space of time a cohesive governmental unity i f they were to confront the 
forces of a major world power such as Great B r i t a i n with any chance of 
success. The problems of such a hurried union would have been immense 
had a l l the colonies not been wholeheartedly behind the movement for 
independence. However, despite B r i t i s h hopes of support for the Royalist 
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cause i n c e r t a i n areas, notably North Carolina, none of the Colonies 
wavered from support of the rebellion, and the Government's troops were 
met almost everywhere with h o s t i l i t y . 
The newly formed Congress had to face a l l the problems that would 
be expected by a body formed to create unity out of disorgeUiization. 
There were wrangles over the control of taxation, the r a i s i n g of troops, 
the command of the troops once they had been ra i s e d arid many other 
teething troubles. As a r e s u l t of the slow procediires of the Congress, 
George Washington was often forced to wait i n i n a c t i v i t y while the 
p o l i t i c i a n s argued i n committees. But t h i s should not be seen as a 
source of surprise. A greater cause for wonder i s that, despite a l l 
these wrangles and debates, Congress took decisions that were often 
shrewd, and which did not hamper Washington to such an extent as to 
render h i s actions useless. Remembering the disputes that arose i n the 
early stages of the NATO a l l i a n c e over the issue of a European army, one 
can only admire the unity of purpose that i s reflected in the manner in 
which the American Congress faced i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
Much more serious i n the immediate sense was the grave shortage of 
the n e c e s s i t i e s of war which faced the Americans. Here, they lacked 
two things i n p a r t i c u l a r , f i r s t , the basic munitions of war, especially 
gunpowder; and second, a navy. The shortage of powder was especially 
acute at the beginning of the war. I n raids the Americans managed to 
seize approximately 80,000 lbs of gunpowder, but t h i s was soon squandered 
i n reckless actions by enthusiastic but untrained troops. I n the period 
prior to the Autumn of 1777 the colonists produced, from l o c a l l y 
extracted saltpetre, a t o t a l of approximately 115,000 lbs of powder, but 
t h i s went only a l i t t l e way towards making up the required quantity. I n 
fact the supply of powder completely f a i l e d in January 1776, and 
Washington was l e f t without any for almost two months. We have seen above 
that the Americans had approximately 200,000 lbs of powder which they 
either made with t h e i r own resources or captured from the B r i t i s h ; t h i s 
quantity, although i t sounds impressive, weis totedly inadequate for their 
needs. I n f a c t , however, the colonists had far greater supplies than 
t h i s at t h e i r disposal:- in the period before the surrender at Saratoga 
they had i n fact 2,347,455 lbs of gunpowder available. I t can be seen 
therefore that 200,000lbs was a mere drop i n the ocean here, and the 
question a r i s e s as to where the re s t of the powder came from. The vast 
majority of i t was imported into America i n the form of usable gimpowder 
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(approximately 1,500,000 l b s ) while the r e s t was brought to America as 
' 2" 
saltpetre and turaed into powder by the colonists themselves.- -
As for the navy, there was l i t t l e that the colonists could do 
immediately9 I t took both considerable time and considerable expertise 
to construct large naval s a i l i n g v e s s e l s . Therefore the Americans had 
need of a foreign edliance. This was the case because the naval 
supremacy of the B r i t i s h gave them the a b i l i t y to move their troops up 
and down the A t l a n t i c seaboard of America with almost conq>lete freedom. 
The only power bloc that could seriously challenge the forces of B r i t a i n 
at t h i s time was the Bourbon a l l i a n c e of France and Spain, As we have 
already noted, France had re-structured her navy under Choiseul and i t 
now had s u f f i c i e n t strength, when combined with that of Spain, to 
challenge the forces of Great B r i t a i n on terms of near equality. The 
French were the natural choice for the Americans to approach i n their 
quest for ways of evening the balance between the B r i t i s h forces and 
t h e i r own. The f a c t that the French were also h o s t i l e i n th e i r attitude 
towards B r i t a i n at t h i s time was a stroke of good fortune for the 
Americans, 
Despite the f a c t that France might have seemed an obvious a l l y , the 
Congress sent envoys to aXl the major powers of Europe. These envoys 
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were w e l l received only i n P a r i s , and so i t was that moves towards an 
a l l i a n c e were i n i t i a t e d i n earnest. I t should be noted that there was 
opposition i n Congress to the mission to France, especially from Adams , 
Indeed such a mission appeared, on the surface to be quite hopeless:-
'Here indeed was a spectacle to delight the Gods -
Smooth Ben, Sleek S i l a s and suspicious Arthur 
trying to s e l l revolution to the most absolute 
monarch i n Europe and a highly sophisticated court*. 
I n f a c t the mission was by no means as hard as t h i s appraisal would 
make i t appear. I n token of t h i s lack of d i f f i c u l t y i t should be noted 
that the vast majority of the imported powder and saltpetre which the 
rebels received before 1777 came from France.^ 
The timetable of events which l e d to seeret aid being sent from France 
to America and which f i n a l l y resulted i n the open al l i a n c e of 1778 i s 
somewhat confused. However i t seems almost certain that the f i r s t 
approaches were made by the Americans, Through their agents i n London 
they made overtures to the French charge d'affaires in the B r i t i s h 
c a p i t a l , with a view to possible assistance. This approach was reported 
to Vergennes by Garnier i n a despatch of 19th November 1774o This was, 
i t should be noted, w e l l i n advance of the creation by Congress of the 
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Committee of Secret Correspondence, which did not take place u n t i l 
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November of the following year. I f the approaches were a matter of 
necessity on the part of the Americans, the majority of whom di s l i k e d 
France and a l l she stood for, the sit u a t i o n i n France i t s e l f weis 
rather d i f f e r e n t . The imaginations of the French people had been 
caught by the Americans' struggle with B r i t a i n , and quite beyond any 
considerations of power-politics, the French wanted to help the 9 colon i s t s . 
I f the French as a nation were strongly i n favour of the rebels, 
the government was a good deal more cautious i n i t s approach. However 
in September of 1775 a certain Achard de Bonvouloir was sent from France 
to America by Vergennes. He Weis not armed with any o f f i c i e i l powers, but 
he was to glean information about the Americans' determination to win 
t h e i r independence and was also to encourage the colonists by giving 
them u n o f f i c i a l assurances of the friendly disposition of France. 
There i s among the Dartmouth papers an interesting report entitled 
'Information obtained from two French Officers, August 1775', and 
endorsed 'Rec'd 6th August.'"'"^ The report i s not signed, dated or 
addressed, but i s worthy of-note as i t concerns a person who i s referred 
to as 'M l e Comte de Beauvouloir' and another unnamed o f f i c e r . These two 
gentlemen, i t appears, were closely questioned by the writer of the report. 
I t appears that they have both.edready been to America, were present at 
Lexington, and were offered £40 per month by the rebels i f they would stay 
i n America. They C L L S O spoke of the rebels being i n need of powder, and 
sa i d that seven French vessels had come into American ports while they 
had been there, and that these had been CeU'rying supplies of powder. 
Later on i n the report the following paragraph appeared:-
'By stimulating the pride of M l e Comte de Beauvouloir 
in the moment that some vin de champagne produced the 
desired effect on h i s prudence, he told me that he had 
had two audiences of Le Comte de Guines; that h i s 
Excellency had made him great offers of service.... 
My opinion i s that the two French o f f i c e r s are at t h i s 
instant i n the service of the Rebel Americans, and are 
paid by them; that they came over either with proposals 
to the Courts of France and Spain... and that they mean 
to return to t h e i r employers by means of some English 
ship... (they) appeared well informed of every 
p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i v e to the a f f a i r s of America.' 
I t seems l i k e l y that the 'Comtede Beauvouloir' of the report was i n 
f a c t none other than Achard de Bonvouloir, and various other items of 
information point i n t h i s direction too. Two further l e t t e r s i n the 
same volume of papers are of in t e r e s t i n t h i s connection. These were 
46, 
written by a person who was known simply as »A«V,» to someone c a l l e d 
•Mrs T o l v e r S though both of these may well be pseudonyms. The f i r s t 
l e t t e r was dated '1775 Novembre 22», and stated that A.V, had been 
informed that Count de Bonvouloir had set out, by one of the l a s t 
boats, f u l l y authorized by the Court of France, The second l e t t e r , 
dated 5 Decembre 1775'reported that Bonvouloir had set out in October 
aboard the 'Charming Betsy', I t seems probable that 'A,V.' was a 
French agent i n England, and that these l e t t e r s were reports that were 
intercepted i n the mail and so ended up i n the papers of Lord Dartmouth, 
although they are not marked as intercepts as are some other l e t t e r s i n 
the same volume. I n addition to these indications, i t seems l i k e l y that 
BonvoTiloir had been i n B r i t a i n since 28 J u l y 1775» '^'" probably because a 
boat from England was the easieGft and safest:way to get to America. 
There can be no doubt that the French people were becoming interested 
i n the cause of the American colonists, and that the French government 
was beginning to show a cautious in t e r e s t too. But i t was the enthusiasm 
of the French people that was to cause problems for both the B r i t i s h and 
the French governments. We have already noted that Stormont had given 
h i s opinion at the s t a r t of Louis XVI's reign that the French 'nation i n 
general i s c e r t a i n l y averse' to war with Great B r i t a i n , (see above p39 
However, i n early December 1774, Rodiford who was then Secretary of State, 
wrote to Stormont that Shelbume had stated i n the Lords that the French 
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were planning a war, and asked for the ambassador's opinion on the subject. 
I n h i s reply, written f i v e days l a t e r , ( i . e . immediately he received 
Rochford's despatch) Stormont gave a succinct and detailed expose of the 
problems that were to face the two courts i n the i r dealings with each 
other i n the next three years. He wrote:-
' I w i l l not. My Lord, trouble you with a R e t a i l of the 
Reasonings of Our Wits, Philosophers, and Coffee House 
P o l i t i c i a n s , who are a l l to a Man warm Americans.' 
But despite t h i s statement, he then went on to do exactly that for a 
f u l l page and a h a l f . Such men, he reported, saw the Americans as a 
'brave people' who were struggling to protect th e i r freedoms against 
'violent and wanton Oppression'; he went on to say that this was ty p i c a l 
of the way the French talk with 'complacency' of the things that 'they 
l e a s t understand, making up i n petulance what they want i n knowledge,' 
He then drew attention to another section of the public;-
'There are Men of quite another Turn, who tho' they 
i n general admit that our right i s clear, believe 
or pretend to belielre, that i t would be wise i n us to 
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wave i t and rather give way... than bring on a Contest, 
by which we must be losers i n the End.' 
Those who put forward these views think that-the London government 
has acted f o o l i s h l y . By i t s past weakness to the colonists i t has 
added to the Americans' w i l l to win. Now, by trying to conquer the 
s p i r i t that t h e i r past-weakness has helped to create, the B r i t i s h can 
only increase i t and 
•by our own f a u l t accelerate that f a t a l period, which 
upon every P r i n c i p l e of P o l i t i c a l V/isdom, i t should 
be our utmost Endeavour to retard.' 
So f a r then we can see that Stormont »s impression of the feeling of 
French public opinion has changed to a considerable degree, for neither 
of these groups he has described could be considered as having a high 
opinion of B r i t a i n , while the open sympathy for the colonists expressed 
by the f i r s t group could well turn into a desire for war with B r i t a i n . 
But he then turned h i s attention to the attitude of the French ministers 
themselves:-
'As to the Ministers, My Lord, they are I belieYe 
pretty cautious i n the Language they hold upon 
our American Disputes. They never mention them 
to me...' 
Nevertheless, Stormont had a cle a r impression that the French government 
did f e e l that the colonial problem would cause B r i t a i n 'a good deal of 
disagreeable occupation.* F i n a l l y he summed up his feelings on the whole 
problem as follows:-
' I never have, yet, been able to discover any Traces of 
a secret I n t e l l i g e n c e between th i s Court and the 
Bostonians, and am inclined to think, upon general 
reasoning that such a Manoeuvre i s l e s s to be 
apprehended from the present Ministry than from the 
l a s t . However, My Lord, t h i s general Reasoning i s 
no secui?ity and... i t i s wise... not to forget that^^. 
whenever and wherever they can wound, they w i l l . ' 
This l e t t e r i s s i g n i f i c a n t as i t shows that Stormont was i n touch with 
a l l l e v e l s of p o l i t i c a l opinion i n France, from the frequenters of the 
coffee-houses, through the thinking classes of people and up to the 
ministers. He was evidently aware of the wave of pro-American sentiment 
among the French people i n general, as B r i t i s h Ambassador i t i s l i k e l y 
that the populace would have made the feeling clear to him. But the 
l e t t e r also shows us that Storraont was wary of trusting the enthusiasm 
of the ordinary French people to be a r e l i a b l e guide as to the policy that 
weis l i k e l y to be pursued by the French ministry. Shelbume appears to 
have been convinced that because the people favoured;, the .colonists r ; 
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so would government policy: Stormont realized that government policy i n 
France was even l e s s susceptible to influence by public opinion than 
was the case i n B r i t a i n , and he therefore f e l t that the important 
thing to be assessed was the attitude of the ministers, 
I n h i s eissessment of t h i s , Stormont was very careftil. He 'believes' 
that the ministers were 'pretty cautioiis i n th e i r Language', but was 
fa r from ce r t a i n as to what thei r actions would be, i f indeed they took 
any. The uncertainty was c l e a r l y expressed i n the l a s t sentence quoted 
from the despatch. He warned that h i s reading of the situation was 
based merely on a general appraisal, and he made i t clear that he had 
no concrete evidence about any course of action l i k e l y to be pursued 
by the French ministry. As a further cautionary note, he closed t h i s 
hesitant f i n a l paragraph with a t e l l i n g reminder of the tr a d i t i o n a l l y 
h o s t i l e attitudes of Prance towards Great B r i t a i n . 
However, i t must be r e c a l l e d that t h i s despatch was written before 
there was a general acceptance of the p o s s i b i l i t y that France might 
aid the rebels. I t must also be remembered that there Weis no reeil 
currency at th i s early date of any rumours of arms t r a f f i c between 
the colonists and the French. F i n a l l y i t i s of interest to note that 
t h i s i s the only despatch from Paris during the entire year of 1774 
that r e f e r s to the disputes between B r i t a i n and the colonists; and that 
i t was written i n reply to the only request for information that was 
made that year* I t would not seem unfair to eissume that an ambcissador 
as a l e r t as Stormont would have reported any developments which he 
considered worthy of note and also that, had the B r i t i s h government 
been ser i o u s l y worried by the p o s s i b i l i t y of French action, they would 
have made further requests for information. 
Unfair as i t may seem, there were serious attacks made by the 
opposition against both the ministers and the ambassador i n Paris 
during Parliamentary debates. Stormont was attacked as the dupe of the 
French ministers, and the B r i t i s h ministers were brought under f i r e 
for believing the reports that came from their ambassador. One of the 
most serious of these attacks came during the debate on the King's 
Speech i n October 1776, when both the Duke of Manchester and Lord 
Shelbume flayed the government for lack of information and i n a c t i v i t y , 
Shelbume even went so f a r as to claim that i t was common knowledge 
that France and Spain had been arming for months, and that they had 
been aiding the rebels to the l i m i t of thei r power,^5 
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The s i t u a t i o n which the opposition outlined i n their attacks was 
i n fact an oversimplification of the r e a l i t i e s . Although i t was true 
to say that there had been considerable shipments of aid - especially 
gunpowder, as i s shown i n Dr. Stephenson's a r t i c l e quoted above -
from France to the colonists by October of 1776, there was eis yet no 
proof that t h i s aid was coming from the French governmento I t must 
be remembered that smuggling was a common occurrence in the eighteenth 
century, and that the French government could, and did, take advantage 
of t h i s f a c t to claim that i t was beyond i t s power to control every 
French merchant who took advantage of the situation to make a handsome 
pr o f i t on a shipment of arms or powder to the colonists. This presented 
a knotty problem for i t was hard to c a l l the private actions of traders 
a casus b e l l i between two great powers i n the eighteenth centiiry, 
e s p e c i a l l y when neither power involved was anxious to see such a war 
break out. (War had broken out between B r i t a i n and Spain in 1742 over 
such an issue but then both sides had been i n warlike mood). 
The problems facing both sides i n this matter can be made a good 
deal c l e a r e r by understanding the d i f f i o i i t i e s of the French situation. 
There could be no doubt that, sooner or l a t e r , France vould have to act 
to restore her position which had been shattered by the B r i t i s h victory 
i n the Seven Years War, and i n t h i s respect the American revolt offered 
an apparently golden opportunity. But there were reasons that militated 
against the seizing of t h i s chance, as well as some that made i t appear 
to be an opportunity that France could not afford to lose. 
The arguments i n favour of taking the chance were obvious and 
powerful. F i r s t , the American revolt was a considerable drain on 
B r i t a i n ' s resources. Ships, men and money were needed i n profusion to 
wage a successful war on the f a r side of the A t l a n t i c i n a country the 
s i z e of even the small section of North America that was then populated. 
Second, the forces which the Americans had placed at Britain's disposal 
i n the Seven YeeU*s War were now not only withdrawn from the B r i t i s h 
side of the sca l e s , but were a c t i v e l y thrown onto the opposite side of 
the balance.' Why then with such powerful advantages for her i n the 
prevailing s i t u a t i o n did France hesitate? 
J u s t as there were powerful reasons for seizing the opportunity so there 
were\eighty ones for not doing so. There were both internal and external 
considerations that made the French ministers hesitate before they decided to 
j o i n the c o n f l i c t . Within France the most obvious argument stemmed from fina n c i a l 
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weakness. France had suffered even more heavily i n the Seven Years War 
than Great B r i t a i n , and the s t r a i n s which had been caused by her heavy 
commitments i n that war were s t i l l very evident. I n the spring of 1776, 
Turgot, i n h i s reply to a memoire from Vergennes recommending 
clandestine aid to the rebels, argued very strongly that although there 
was no doubt that the money could be found for a war i f France was 
forced to enter one, such a step should not be taken l i g h t l y . To embark 
wantonly on a repetition of the Seven Years war could be the ruin of 
the French f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n by delaying the much needed reforms. 
Such an argument could well have been one which would have obtained a 
sympathetic hearing from the economy minded Louis XVI. 
A second factor which would have influenced the French ministers 
to he s i t a t e before they embarked upon a war was that both her armed 
services were i n the process of reform. At the end of 1774 
Stormont wrote to Rochford:-
' I send Your Lordship an Ordonnance pour l a Marine, 
the prin c i p a l object of which i s to undo a l l Mr de Boines 
did whilst he held that Department, to which he was 
every way unequal. I t seems beyond doubt that He l e f t 
the French Marine i n a very bad state, ... Everybody i s 
convinced of Mr de Sartines' Zeal and Integrity, yet I 
understand the Navy are by no means p a r t i a l to Him«'17 
The reform of the Navy was soon accompanied by a reform of France's 
senior service, the amty. At the close of 1775 a despatch from Stormont 
to the new Secretary of State, Lord V/eymouth, reported the plans of the 
French Minister of War for a reform of the army. The aim of St Germain's 
measures was stated by Stormont to be to put France on a milit a r y footing 
that was at l e a s t equal to Austria and Prussia instead of her current 
position as only the third-ranking m i l i t a r y power i n E u r o p e . T h e need 
for these refoims w i l l be further discussed i n the next chapter, but as 
a factor i n deterring the French from active involvement i n the American 
war the f a c t that these reforms were taking place cannot have been 
neg l i g i b l e . 
There were then two very p r a c t i c a l r e s t r a i n t s upon French freedom 
of action i n the shape of the above two weaknesses of her position. 
I n addition to these there were other factors. To begin with, at the 
s t a r t of a new reign there was bound to be a period of p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t a b i l i t y . Such i n s t a b i l i t y was a constant theme of the despatches 
that were sent from P a r i s i n the f i r s t years of the new reign. Stormont 
wrote repeatedly of the atmosphere of the Coiirt as being dominated by 
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'Cabal and Intrigue*, and h i s despatches showed that he was constantly 
a l e r t to the s h i f t i n g p o l i t i c a l fortunes of the new ministers. His 
constant fear was that Choiseul would return to power, and he kept 
the ministers i n London well informed of any developments that threatened 
to hasten such a retux>n. 
Stormont's concern, the quantity of information which he collected 
and the d e t a i l s of the very complex situation which he reported to 
London may be best i l l u s t r a t e d by some examples. At the s t a r t of the 
reign, Stormont was c r i t i c a l of Maurepas. I n May of 1774 he reported 
that Louis XVI had summoned Maurepas, but went on to dismiss him with 
the cool phrase 'too old to think of being Minister'•'•^. I n Jxme, 
Stormont was s t i l l not impressed with Maxirepas. He reported that 
Maurepas was only concerned i n minor matters and that his friends were 
a r b i t r a r i l y dismissed from t h e i r o f f i c e s , a f a c t r e f l e c t i n g badly upon 
Maurepas' i n f l u e n c e . I n November i t was Vergennes' position that 
seemed to be crumbling, and i t was Stormont's fear on t h i s occeision that 
Vergennes would be replaced by B r e t e u i l , a man whose attitude towards 
England was f a r from a m i c a b l e . B y March 1775 the situation had 
altered again. S t . Paul, who was made Charge d'Affaires during 
Stormont's absence, wrote:-
'M* de Maurepas continues to enjoy the same 
degree of power and favour, and M. de Vergennes 
i s thought l i t t l e more than the ostensible 
Minister and t o t a l l y subordinate to him.'^2 
Maurepas was now seen as the dominant influence, whereas Vergennes 
was apparently regarded as l i t t l e more than a front for Maurepas' 
influence on foreign a f f a i r s . I n September, Maurepas' position was 
seen as being even more powerful:-
*M. de Maurepas continues i n high favour,... 
M. de Vergennes and M. de Sartines are known 
to act s o l e l y by the influence of M. de 
Maurepas'.23 
Then, quite suddenly, Vergennes appeared to assert himself and improve 
his position i n the ministry. St. Paul wrote that he had heard 
'from a very good quarter that he gains ground 
every day i n the Fr(ench) King's Opinion 
i am told likewise that he i s l a t e l y come into 
great favour with M. de Maurepas.'24 
I t was not, however, u n t i l May 1776 that Maurepas received a c l e a r 
mark of royal favour. I n that month he was created Chef du Conseil 
des Finances; although t h i s did not give Maurepas a dominant ro l e i n 
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the Ministry, i t was an indication of h i s importance and gave him 
pecuniary advantages. 
Thus i t can be seen that there was a long period when i t was 
f a r from c l e a r who was the most powerful figiire i n the p o l i t i c s of 
Louis XVI's reign. I n addition to t h i s unstable situation, there were 
disputes as to the nature of the policy which France ought to pursue 
towards the rebellious colonists, and so towards B r i t a i n , We know 
already that Vergennes was b a s i c a l l y h o s t i l e i n h i s view of Great 
B r i t a i n (see above pp 35 and 36), although he was not perhaps so 
v i o l e n t l y so as were many others among the French goveming c l a s s . 
His opinions however were not shared by a l l h i s colleagues i n the French 
government, and t h i s was a factor which was to make i t harder for France 
to make a c l e a r decision on the question of whether or not they should 
aid the c o l o n i s t s . 
I t seems c e r t a i n that both Maurepas and Turgot were f a r from keen 
to see a war. Their opposition to war had nothing to do with feelings 
of friendship for B r i t a i n , but stemmed rather from the fac t that they 
saw the dangers of a war at that point as far outweighing the 
advantages. The Abbe de Ver4., i n h i s journal for October of 1777» stated 
that Maurepas had r e s i s t e d the pressure for a war for more than a year, 
but that he had now decided to give way, Veri recoianted a discussion 
between Maurepas and himself i n which they considered the reasons in 
favour of avoiding a war, and he reported that they found these reasons 
to be of considerable weight. According to Veri, who knew Maurepas 
w e l l , the Minister was a f r a i d to shoulder the burden of responsibility 
for events on h i s own. 
The reason why Maurepas was alone at this stage was that Turgot had 
been dismissed i n May of 1776. This dismissal had taken place at l e a s t 
p a r t ly because Turgot was opposed to the plans for giving secret aid to 
the c o l o n i s t s . A question which springs to mind i s why did Maurepas 
not f i g h t to prevent Turgot's dismissal when th i s would weaken the 
anti-war faction i n the ministry? The answer to this question i s to be 
found i n Veri's journal where he recorded that Maurepas was jealous of 
Turgot's i n t e l l e c t u a l power. This jealousy appears to have grown into 
d i s l i k e , and Maurepas l a t e r admitted to V e r i , speaking of Turgot 
»I1 e t a i t trop fort pour moi'. According to Veri, Maurepas did a l l he 
could to bring about the f a l l of Turgot^^. I t i s interesting to 
speculate upon the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the anti-war faction i n France had 
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these two ministers been united i n thei r opposition to an aggressive 
policy. Further, i t i s of i n t e r e s t to note the attitude of the 
Americans to Turgot. Lee wrote to the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence thus:-
»The desire of the Court of France to a s s i s t may 
be depended on; but they are yet timid and the 
Ministry unsettled. Twgot, l a t e l y removed, was 
the most averse to a rupture with England; h is 
removal i s of consequence.'26 
The other important members of the French ministry were Sartines, 
the Minister of Marine, and S t . Germain, the Minister of War. Of 
these two, Sartines remains something of an enigma. He recreated the 
French navy as an e f f i c i e n t fighting-force a f t e r several years of 
neglect and he showed considerable energy and a b i l i t y i n doing so. Yet 
despite t h i s work which would make i t seem that Sartines would be i n 
favour of a war, S t . Paul could s t i l l report to Weymouth that he had 
heard on good authority 'that both M. de Maurepas and Sartines are 
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most strongly inclined to peace.' Doniol, however, argues that 
Sartines was i n agreement with the reasoning set out by Vergennes i n 
the memoires known as the Reflexions and the Considerations during the 
debate on secret a id that took place among the members of the 
administration during the spring of 1776. According to Doniol, St. 
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Germain vas also i n agreement with Vergennes ; t h i s created a situation 
where Turgot and Maurepas were indeed i n a minority, and that minority 
became even smaller with the dismissal of Turgot. 
However, even on h i s own, Matirepas was s t i l l a force to be 
reckoned with, since he was the c o n f i d a i t i a l minisfife and i t was through 
him that most business was conducted. Another powerful factor i n his 
favour was that those who were i n favour of aiding the colonists appear 
to have had considerable d i f f i c u l t y i n persuading the King of the j u s t i c e 
of t h e i r cause. Although t h i s was a help to Maurepas, i t created another 
problem for France. For, even i f we do not credit Louis XVI with the 
role of policy maker, he was ce r t a i n l y the f i n a l arbiter, and i f he did 
not approve of a measure i t was most unlikely that i t would be put into 
practice. 
Louis XVI's position on t h i s matter i s f a r from clear to the 
h i s t o r i a n . There i s l i t t l e d i r e c t evidence to show that he was either 
i n favour of aid to the rebels or against i t . The indications are that 
he Weis opposed to di r e c t intervention on the colonists' behalf, and 
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that he was not over enthusiastic about the sending of secret aid. I n 
the f i r s t place, Stormont believed that Louis XVI was opposed to war. 
He reported that he had had a conference with a confidant of Maurepas 
who had told him that Maurepas was being pushed, by the war-party and 
by h i s own fears of a repeat of the surprise attack made by B r i t a i n 
i n 175.6, towards acceptance of a war, Stormont wrote that Maurepas' 
ir r e s o l u t e nature and h i s age 
'.,. prevent him from taking Manly ground and 
standing firmly upon i t , which would be the 
easier for him to do, i n t h i s Respect, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as the King h i s Master i s 
naturally very steady upon t h i s point. He i s 
averse to War and averse to i t from motives that do 
him honour.'29 
Shortly a f t e r t h i s Stormont wrote again to London with a report of 
the proceedings at a French council meeting. Stormont wrote that 
Maurepcis had argued against any involvement with the rebels; he went 
on:-
'His Most Xn Majesty, not only adopts 
M« de Maurepas' Reasoning, but has always 
had a strong leaning against the Rebels and 
the i r cause, as thinking that a l l sovereigns 
are interested i n the support of Legal 
Authority, and that whenever they a s s i s t 
Rebels, to invade the Rights of Sovereignty, 
they endanger t h e i r own'30 
I f ife can be argued that Stormont, despite the excellence of his 
information services, i s not the best person to ref e r to for evidence 
of the opinions of the King of France, there are further pieces of 
evidence to support the impression that Stormont had received. F i r s t , 
we can see that the ministers who favoured war had to put a good deal 
of e f f o r t into persuading Louis XVI that they were right. Many of 
the arguments that they put forward were one-sided, while others were ' 
based on premises so f a l s e that i t must have been obvious that they 
were so, Vergennes concentrated on l i n e s of attack which he thought 
would appeal to Louis XVI; 
'Si Sa Megeste'^, s a i s s i s s a n t ime occasion 
unique que l e s s i e c l e s ne reproduiront ^ 
peut $tre jamais, r e u s s i s s a i t a porter a 
I'Angleterre un coup assez sensible pour 
f a i r e rentrer s a puissance dans des justes 
homes, e l l e m artriserait pendant bien des 
annees l a paix.... 
This i s Vergennes at h i s most appealing. He offers Louis XVI a golden 
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opportunity to secure a lengthy period of peace and security, not by 
crushing B r i t a i n , but by constraining her within ' f a i r l i m i t s ' . 
Vergennes knew that the idea of crushing B r i t a i n would not appeal to 
Louis XVI, but nevertheless the phreise ' f a i r l i m i t s ' Weis open to a 
wide v a r i e t y of interpretations, and i t - i s probable that Vergennes, 
Louis XVI and the B r i t i s h people would have had three very different 
opinions as to what ' f a i r l i m i t s ' were. 
Vergaines' entire object i n a l l the arguments he put forward 
appears to have been to f i n d those aspects of the case which would 
most appeal to the King. Another argument which he frequently used i n 
t h i s same vein, was that i t was inevitable that the B r i t i s h would 
attack the French and Spanish possessions i n the V/est Indies. Since 
the B r i t i s h would attack the West Indies French national interest 
demanded that the islands should be defended, arid the best form of 
defence was attack. The fa&t that the idea of such an attack on the 
French and Spanish possessions i n the West Indies was not mentioned by 
anyone i n B r i t a i n during the entire course of the American dispute up 
to 1778 did not concern those who used t h i s argument i n France. The 
inevitable conclusion to be drawn here i s that this argument was used 
simply to persuade the King, for the object of those who advanced i t 
32 
was not defence, but aggression. 
This highly improbable idea of an attack by the B r i t i s h on the 
French islands i n the West Indies appears to have germinated f i r s t i n 
the f e r t i l e mind of B^umarchais, and then to have been taken up by 
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Vergennes at a l a t e r date. This leads us on to the f i n a l factor which 
suggests that Louis XVI was reluctant to aid the colonists. This i s 
simply the length of time that i t took to persuade Louis XVI to take the 
decision and the strength of language which was used by Beaumcurchais, 
d i r e c t l y to the King, i n h i s attempts to force the issue. For a King 
with a reputation for weakness of w i l l , Louis XVI r e s i s t e d the forces 
that were pvishing him towards war for a long time. Beaumarchais f i r s t 
wrote to the King, as we have j u s t seen, before September of 1775 (see 
note 33), and from that time onwards for a period of over two years he 
bombarded the King with pleas, and, more often, demands that he should 
help the rebels, i n February 1776 he wrote 'Au Roi Seul' that the 
maintenance of peace depended upon one proposition alone, ' i l faut 
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s e c o u r i r l e s Americains'. 
There were then considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s within France which 
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prevented her from taking an early decision on the American issue. 
There were also substantial problems i n the external f i e l d , which 
were mainly centred upon two issues. F i r s t , France was a l l i e d to 
Spain, an a l l i a n c e which was broadly accepted as the cornerstone of 
a l l French moves i n foreign policy. The Spanish were, at t h i s time, 
involved i n a f i e r c e dispute with the P^Sr.tuguese over the question of 
colonial boundaries i n South America, and they wanted to involve France 
i n t h i s . The French r e s i s t e d this Spanish pressure, and so avoided 
the general european war which would almost certainly have followed i f 
they had backed Spain. However, the roles were about to be reversed, 
and France was now going to try to persuade the Spanish to enter a 
war against B r i t a i n . The Spanish had no more love for B r i t a i n than the 
French, but they were reluctant to j o i n the French for several reasons. 
F i r s t , the French had j u s t refused to help them, and t h i s had wounded 
the pride of the Spanish. Second, the King of Spain regarded himself as 
the senior partner i n the Family Compact since the death of Louis 
XV, and so he was unwilling that Spain should merely toe the l i n e l a i d 
down by France. Third, and most important, Spain was the European 
power that had the most to lose i f a movement for colonial independence 
should take root and spread: to support such a movement seemed to the 
Spanish l i k e a refined form of national suicide. Therefore there were 
considerable doubts as to whether the Spanish could be induced to j o i n 
the struggle. At the same time, the French knew that the Spanish 
possessed a considerable navy which could create a situation for the 
Bourbon powers in which t h e i r f l e e t s outnumbered those of Great B r i t a i n . 
This problem of the attitude of Spain was one cf considerable complexity, 
and i t gave considerable pause to those Frenchmen who were 
attenpting to secure active French participation i n the war.^^ 
The second megor problem for France, t h i s time even further away 
from her control, was the r e l i a b i l i t y of the colonists themselves. 
They were e s s e n t i a l l y an unknown quantity. Although some Americans 
had fought during the Seven Years War on the B r i t i s h side and so had 
some m i l i t a r y experience, they were a doubtful proposition as an a l l y . 
They might simply crumble when faced with the di s c i p l i n e d troops sent 
by B r i t a i n ; they might decide to give up the struggle when they saw that 
B r i t a i n was r e a l l y i n earnest; or, worse s t i l l , they might j u s t appear 
to be tough enough to lure the French to declare their hand, and then 
collapse leaving the French to face a B r i t a i n already mobilized for 
war. I f t h i s l a s t event were to happen, there was a considerable 
57. 
chance that France would find h e r s e l f i n a worse position after the 
war than she had been i n before i t . Thus there was a continued 
emphasis i n a l l the proposals which advocated secret aid, that the 
Americans must have given a convincing demonstration of their 
determination to succeed before any a l l i a n c e was formed. I n the 
Reflexions i t was stated that no a l l i a n c e would be formed u n t i l 
» o o . leur independence s o i t etablie et notoire', although arms and money 
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could be sent before that. 
Thus there can be no doubt that the situation facing those at the 
head of a f f a i r s i n France was fraught with d i f f i c u l t i e s . Some of these 
stemmed from thei r own intemed problems, others would have faced them 
in any case. There was, of course, one way i n which a l l those 
problems could have been avoided, and that was for the French to have 
refrained from any involvement i n the struggle. However, the point to 
grasp here i s that there were two factions involved i n t h i s dispute, 
one favouring a i d to and eventual edliance with the Americans, the 
other favouring a policy of i n a c t i v i t y i n the hope that the colonists 
would do the work of weakening B r i t a i n without any eissistance from 
France. These two groups struggled to have thei r views accepted for 
more than two years u n t i l the events at Saratoga decided that France 
would enter the war. 
The aim of t h i s detailed study of France's position and the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s that she faced was to throw further l i g h t on the problems 
that were faced by Great B r i t a i n i n attempting to formulate a policy 
towards France. The fac t i s that the long period during which the 
French were uncertain about thei r attitude to America was a period when 
i t was d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, for B r i t a i n to make a f a i r and 
reasonable policy decision about her attitude towcu^ds France. I t was 
easy enough for the opposition at Westminster to state categorically 
that France was planning war against B r i t a i n , but the fac t i s that for 
a considerable period of time, the French government was not certain 
what i t s policy would be, and i t seems they were not planning war u n t i l 
l a t e 1777. I f we remember Lee's l e t t e r of June 1776 (quoted above p. 53 
he described the French court at that date as 'timid' and 'unsettled', 
hardly what the Americans would have wanted to-hear,-so we-may suppose 
that i t was an accurate assessment. I n the l i g h t of this evidence, i t 
would appear that Shelburne's attacks on the government, relayed to 
Stormont i n December 1774, were very premature. 
58. 
This uncertainty on the part of the French was one very r e a l 
problem for the B r i t i s h government at t h i s tine, but i t was by no 
means the only one. I t has to be remembered during any discussion 
of t h i s period that of the three nations involved i n the events, 
B r i t a i n was the one with the l e a s t choice. While the colonists 
continued on a path of rebellion i t was the duty of the government 
to t r y to put down that rebellion, and th i s would remain the case 
u n t i l the war had been won or l o s t , or the colonies decided to give up 
t h e i r demands. I t was p o l i t i c a l l y impractical to suggest that B r i t a i n 
should concede to the col o n i s t s ' demands, and so, in respect of 
America the hands of the B r i t i s h government were t i e d . I n regard to 
France, B r i t a i n ' s position was no easier. For the French there was at 
l e a s t a choice, either they would j o i n i n the war or they would not do 
so. I f they chose not to j o i n the war then the i r problems were at an 
end. For B r i t a i n there weis no such easy option. I f Freince were to 
j o i n the war B r i t a i n would have to fight her too; above a l l , B r i t a i n 
had to be ready to fight France i f the need arose. Everyone i n 
England with any knowledge of p o l i t i c s knew that, and the members of 
the government were more aweO'e of i t than most. The d i f f i c u l t y was to 
tread the delicate l i n e between being prepared to fight France on the 
one hand, and on the other, driving the French into declaring war by 
undertaking preparations i n B r i t i s h poPts that were too great or too 
hurried. To drive France into the war did not seem to be a course 
that could serve B r i t i s h interests at a l l . 
There can be no doubt that the war was the major problem that 
faced the B r i t i s h government at the time. I t was a war of a type that 
was almost unknown - a n a t i o n a l i s t war. Simply because the lessons of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have shown us what a powerful 
force nationalism i s , we should not expect the p o l i t i c i a n s of the 
eighteenth century to be aware of t h i s . The Durham Report, India, Aden, 
Cyprus, Mozambique and Angola were long i n the future, and i t should 
come as no surprise that i t took the B r i t i s h government some time to 
r e a l i z e that t h i s was a serious war and not j u s t another colonial 
disturbance. Before we judge North and h i s colleagues too harshly, we 
should remember that with a l l the examples of the past 150 years at 
t h e i r disposal, and with a l l the technological aids at their command, 
present day governments s t i l l f i n d nationalism a d i f f i c u l t force to 
combat, and very often t h e i r e f f o r t s meet with l i t t l e more success 
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than did those of North. 
I f i t was the case, as we have seen, that France was beset by 
problems i n making policy decisons at t h i s time, i t i s rapidly 
becoming c l e a r that Great B r i t a i n ' s position was even worse. I n both 
the domestic eind foreign spheres,-Britain's position wsis one of 
danger. Strangely, one of the factors that had weakened B r i t a i n wets 
the Seven Years War. The effort involved i n winning this resounding 
victory over France had cost B r i t a i n dear. The f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n had 
been so great i n fact that B r i t a i n , l i k e France was s t i l l recovering 
i n the 1770»s| George Grenville even believed that B r i t a i n had been 
more severely damaged than France. He wrote 'France, bankrupt France 
had no such calamities impending over her'."" He f e l t that there were 
d i f f i c u l t times ahead for the administrators of B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l 
a f f a i r s . 
The heavy f i n a n c i a l s t r a i n on B r i t a i n , the vast increase in her 
national debt, and the desire of the government to avoid any r a i s i n g 
of the l e v e l s of taxation led to a period of economy. A popular target 
for cuts i n expendit\ire, since i t was one. of the major drains on 
revenue, was the armed se r v i c e s . With France adopting a more peaceful 
approach i n the early 1770's the trend towards cuts i n expenditure on 
the navy increased. These economies, combined with the negligence of 
o f f i c i a l s led to a d r a s t i c weakening of B r i t a i n ' s f l e e t s . As one 
h i s t o r i a n , 6. S. Graham, has written:-
'The unpardonable f a u l t ... lay i n the neglect 
of the navy during many years since 1763t and 
the condition of impotence to which i t had 
been reduced made i t impossible to f i t out 
e f f e c t i v e ships, or even when f i t t e d , to man 
them.'38 
Graham blames peace time economies d i r e c t l y for the navy's weakness, 
and claims that they, rather than tr a d i t i o n a l eighteenth-century 
'corruption' were at the root of the matter. According to Graham the 
Navy estimates were reduced by about one h a l f between 1766 and 1769, 
and he goes on: 
•Fear of costs held back repairs and 
construction and commissioning even during 
the three years preceding the declaration 
of war with France.'^9 
These reforms i n matters of expenditure can be seen to have had a 
very deleterious effect upon the B r i t i s h navy. The Falkland Island 
c r i s i s of 1770 exposed the weakeness to view, and as a r e s u l t , the 
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administration of the navy was changed. But even despite t h i s , Graham 
appears to be arguing that the trend towards economy continued even 
afte r t h i s . 
I f we can see that both B r i t a i n and France were faced with f i n a n c i a l 
wealcness and with d i f f i c u l t i e s i n regeird to t h e i r armed services, the 
s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two extend also to the p o l i t i c a l situation. 
For, as was the case i n France, there were deep divisions among the 
p o l i t i c i a n s i n B r i t a i n over the course of action which should be adopted 
i n the c r i s i s which confronted her. We have already seen in chapter two 
the nature of these divisions i n the cabinet, with Gower, Sandwich, 
Suffolk and Weymouth, ( l a t e r joined by Germain) i n favour of harsh 
measures, being opposed by North, h i s half-brother Dartmouth, and the 
Duke of Grafton; of these three who were i n favour of moderation, 
Dartmouth and Grafton did not remain i n the ministry for long. Despite 
the f a c t that a majority of ministers were i n favour of harsh p o l i c i e s 
towards America, they were unable to implement thei r desires, for North, 
whether alone or assisted, was s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful to be able to dilute 
t h e i r aggressive intentions. Thus the peace proposals of 1774, and the 
peace commission of 1776 were approved by Parliament almost solely on 
the i n i t i a t i v e of North and by means of his energy and i n i t i a t i v e i n 
the House of Commons. 
North's position i s analogous to that of Maurepas. Both men were 
the key figures i n t h e i r respective ministries, which i s to say that they 
were both the confidential ministers of the i r masters. The correspondence 
of George I I I i s , for by f a r the greater part, addressed to North; there 
are only a few l e t t e r s addressed to other ministers, and the majority of 
these are to Lord Sandwich about naval matters. As well as being the 
most important figures i n each government, the two men were of similar 
disposition; both were indecisive. We have already seen that t h i s was 
so i n Maurepas' case, and we have ample evidence that North too was 
hesitant. But-Maurepas• hesitant nature probably had more opportunity to 
influence policy than did North's, for Louis XVI was young and 
impressionable and weis not anxious toppltinge h i s country into a war; 
George I I I , on the other hand had no doubts about the j u s t nature of h i s 
cause. For the B r i t i s h King, the Americans were rebels, and rebellions 
had to be crushed. His energy and conviction never wavered. Even after 
the di s a s t e r at Saratoga he was not d i s p i r i t e d . He wrote to Lord 
Sandwich ' I f others w i l l not be active, I must drive'. I n fact, one of 
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the a c t i v i t i e s to which the King devoted considerable energy was h i s 
attempts to r a i s e North's s p i r i t s from the frequent bouts of gloom to 
which the minister gave-way. At about the same period as h i s l e t t e r 
to Sandwich he wrote to North: ' I do not despair that... the 
provinces w i l l even now sutanit. '^^ 
However, despite the fact that North's moderate views often 
disagreed with the King's ideeis, and despite the fact that North 
appeared to have doubts about the a b i l i t y of the B r i t i s h to win, the 
position which North had carved out for himself was one of neeu:* 
indispensability. He had succeeded i n rescuing the King from the 
opposition, and i n so doing he had stripped the opposition groups of 
many of t h e i r most talented figures; Burke wrote that North had "picked 
out a l l that was worth taking' from the opposition factions 'and that 
nothing was l e f t to us but the c h a f f . I n addition to t h i s . North was 
probably the only man i n Peurliament who could have led and held together 
a cabinet of men that was drawn from such disparate groups, and even he 
was only able to do t h i s by means of t i r e l e s s energy i n the Commons. 
Between 1768 and 1774 North addressed the House 904 times, that i s to 
say almost twice as often as any other member save the Speaker A 
further testimony to North's indispensability comes when we see the 
tremendous reluctance of George I I I to countenance any suggestions of 
resignation by North, frequently though the Minister asked to be 
allowed to r e t i r e . 'You are my Sheet Anchor and your ease and comfort 
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I s h a l l i n the whole transaction t r y to secure' , he wrote to North i n 
a frequently quoted l e t t e r . The King vas prepeired to consider including 
anyone i n the ministry i f i t would strengthen the government's position, 
but he was adamant that North should remain as the confidential minister. 
He would even contemplate Shelbume or Barre' 'who personally perhaps I 
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d i s l i k e as much as Mr. Wilkes'. 
Perhaps i t i s surprising, i n view of h i s strong support for North, 
to find that the King favoured harsh measures towards the rebels, and 
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that he threw h i s influence behind Lord George Germain. His 
unswerving intention had always been to subdue the revolt. I n early 
1775 he had written:-
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'Where violence i s with resolution repelled i t 
commonly y i e l d s , and I own, though a thorough 
friend to holding out the olive branch, I have 
not the smallest doubt that i f i t does not 
succeed then once vigorous measures appear to 
be the only means l e f t of bringing the 
Americans to a due submission to the mother 
country, the colonies w i l l sulanit'.45 
Again, i n August of 1776 he wrote that i f h i s proposals to s t a r t 
r e c r u i t i n g i n the early summer had not been rejected by the ced^inet, 
then the army would have been 'two or three thousand men stronger 
at t h i s hour'.^6 
However, i f the cabinet was divided against i t s e l f and the 
opinion of the King on the American issue was different to that 
of h i s ch i e f minister, the King and the cabinet were lanited on one 
question at l e a s t . This was t h e i r t o t a l r e j e c t i o n of the way i n 
which the opposition wanted to treat the situa t i o n . 
The opposition was numerically weak and had only a few leaders 
with experience of m i n i s t e r i a l o f f i c e , but i n t e l l e c t u a l l y they 
were quite a formidable group, including such men as Chatham, 
Burke, Fox and Shelbume among thei r numbers. The factions which 
made up the opposition were caught i n an luienviable dilemma by 
the war with the Americans. On the one hand they loathed the 
government and distrusted i t s policy, but on the other, they 
coxild not blind themselves to the fact that the majority of the 
nation-:wanted to see the revolt put down. Thus the government's 
policy was also a policy supported by King and coiantry. To 
oppose a policy which was so generally f e l t to be desirable 
wo\ild have been a very dangerous step for any group that hoped 
to gain power. This dilemma hampered the effectiveness of the 
opposition to a considerable degree. 
They were further hindered by the fact that their aim was 
e s s e n t i a l l y the same as that of the government. Both wished to 
r e t a i n th? colonies iinder B r i t i s h sovereignty; but they differed 
widely about the best way i n which to achieve t h i s aim. The 
government, divided between those who favoured harsh measures 
and those who did not, adopted a h a l f hearted policy of mil i t a r y 
coercion, watered down at intervals by attempts at conciliation 
which always seemed to offer too l i t t l e too l a t e . The opposition, 
while; they agreed that 
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'The moment the independence of America i s 
agreed to by our government, the sun of 
Great B r i t a i n i s set, and we s h a l l no . 
longer be a powerful or reputable people'. 
wanted to see a policy which was centred upon con c i l i a t i o n . The 
difference might be expressed thus:- the King wanted to reduce 
the colonies to obedience, while the opposition wanted to r a i s e 
them to i t . What the opposition envisaged was a situation i n 
which the Americans vovild be a s e l f governing unit with power 
to control a l l a f f a i r s except trade, customs duties and defence 
which would be reserved to the mother country. The reasoning 
behind the opposition's desire for a conciliatory policy was 
based upon fear of France. This i n turn stemmed from the fact 
that Chatham, who was the leading l i g h t of the opposition, was 
obsessed with the danger that threatened B r i t a i n from the far 
side of the Channel. He argued that this opportunity was too 
good for France to pass up, and therefore, since B r i t a i n was too-; 
weak to fight both America and France, i t v/as the government's 
duty to come to terms with the colonists so that B r i t a i n could 
renew her struggle with France on equal terms. 
However, there are powerful factors which suggest that t h i s 
policy was l e s s r e a l i s t i c than the government's. F i r s t , the 
Americans rejected a l l attempts at conc i l i a t i o n which were made. 
They showed no i n c l i n a t i o n to accept the proposals of 1774 which 
allowed them to r a i s e t h e i r own taxes, and they were to r e j e c t 
the peace commission of 1776. How r e a l i s t i c was i t to suggest 
that the colonists should leave trade and customs duties under jlhe 
control of the B r i t i s h goverment? Second, i t has already been made 
cl e a r that the French were not prepared to commit themselves to an 
a l l i a n c e with the colonists, or to open war with Great B r i t a i n , 
u n t i l the rebels had shown that they were determined to achieve 
t h e i r independence, and that they were capable of doing so. I f , 
therefore, the opposition's plan had been pursued, and the 
colonial struggle had been terminated, at any price short of to t a l 
independence, there would have been no war with France because the 
French were not prepared to fight B r i t a i n without the American 
d i s t r a c t i o n . Thus, had such a policy been adopted, B r i t a i n would 
have surrendered vited rights i n America on account of a threat of 
Wcir with France, and t h i s threat would not have been carried out. 
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I t i s also worthy of note that i f a war did break out between 
B r i t a i n and France, the scales were l i k e l y to be heavily weighted 
against B r i t a i n . Not only would the support of the American 
colonies be l o s t , but also whereas i n 1756 B r i t a i n had possessed a 
powerful continental a l l y i n the form of Prussia, she now had no 
a l l y i n Europe except Portugal. Thus the entire burden of war 
would f a l l upon B r i t a i n , a prospect that was far from appealing to 
a countiy whose f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y situations were both weak. 
The ef f e c t s of t h i s period on the state of a f f a i r s at home was 
far from fonunate for Lord Nath's government. I t i s sometimes the 
case that a period of s t r a i n such as t h i s has the effect of 
strengthening determination and creating a feeling of national 
unity. I n t h i s instance, however, t h i s was not the case. The 
ef f e c t was rather to divide the nation further and more deeply as 
the c o n f l i c t became more serious. The bitterness that had been 
created during the struggle was c l e a r l y to be seen when North's 
government came to an end and h i s followers were routed with a 
ruthlessness that was far from usual i n the eighteenth century. 
I f i t i s triie to say that the war with the Americans was the 
basic problem which iinderlay a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s faced by the 
government i n t h i s period, then i t i s also true to say that this 
basic problem was greatly enhanced by the attitude of the French. 
During the entire period between 1775 and 1777 there was no clear 
indication of which way the French decision on t h i s matter would 
go. The indications which could be obtained from the French 
government seemed to suggest that France would not take any decided 
or d e f i n i t e part i n the dispute. But at the same time i t was clear 
that the French people at a l l l e v e l s , were wild with enthusiasm for 
the American cause. This enthusiasm was what led Shelbume and the 
opposition to claim that the French were planning to attack B r i t a i n . 
However, the r e a l i t y of the situation was that i t was the French 
government which would decide whether or not France would to to 
war, and throughout the years up to 1777 i t remained the case that 
the statements which that government put out to the B r i t i s h envoys 
in P a r i s were p a c i f i c , often strongly so. These repeated assurances 
can he represented by one example at t h i s stage. I n October 1775, 
Maurepas assured Stormont of France's peaceful disposition i n the 
following terms:-
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'Be assured we do not and w i l l not, d i r e c t l y or 
in d i r e c t l y give them (the American colonists) any 
sort of assistance'.4° 
Such assurances were so repeatedly and strongly made that they might 
have been convincing had i t not been for another complicating factor. 
This was that during 1776 evidence weis discovered by the B r i t i s h 
government of a defi n i t e and sustained arms./^ t r a f f i c between 
France and America. This led to awkward parliamentary clashes 
with the opposition. I n the King's Speech at the opening of 
Parliament i n October 1776 the government announced that they 
were i n receipt of friendly assurances from the continent, which 
was true; but they also annoiinced t h e i r intention to put B r i t a i n 
i n a state of preparedness to meet a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The 
opposition seized upon t h i s . Why, they wanted to know, did the 
government want to take defensive measures when Europe was 
peacefully disposed towards us? North, who as usual bore the 
brunt of the attack, replied- that although the government had 
f u l l confidence i n the eissurances they had received, they could 
not vouch for the si t u a t i o n i n s i x months time. Barre pounced 
on t h i s statement. The ministry, he contended, ought always to 
be able to forsee the intentions of France for at l e a s t s i x 
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months i n advance. 
However, although t h i s weis imdoubtedly a t e l l i n g point to 
score i n debate, i t weis not the l e a s t b i t r e a l i s t i c . The plain 
fa c t of the matter was that i t was quite impossible for anyone to 
predict French intentions s i x months i n advance at that stage, 
because the French themselves had not made a decision as to what 
actions they would take. We have already seen Lee describing the 
French as wanting to help the rebels but afrai d to do so. I n th i s 
s i t i j a t i o n i t was prudent of the B r i t i s h government to prepare for 
a l l e v e n t u a l i t i e s . To have embarked upon f u l l scede preparations 
could have brought on a war that might have been avoided; to have 
done nothing would have been exceptionally foolhardy. I t can be 
convincingly contended that the attitude adopted by the government, 
of cautious preparation, was eminently sensible i n a very dangerous 
s i t u a t i o n . I t obtained for them an advantage which they would have 
l o s t had they provoked an immediate c o n f l i c t - time. Given the 
state of the B r i t i s h f l e e t , that advantage was c r u c i a l . Whether 
the government put the time to good use w i l l be discussed l a t e r . 
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The point to be grasped at th i s juncture i s the enormnity of the 
problems which faced the B r i t i s h government. The government was 
aware, i n Stormont»s words, that France would wound B r i t i a n 
whenever and wherever she could. Yet the government was aware 
at the same time of i t s own weakness, and Weis also bound up i n 
a s e m i - c i v i l war at long range that was already proving to be a 
s t r a i n on i t s resources. I t i s th i s background pressure on 
B r i t a i n that must be taken constantly into account when looking 
at the p o l i c i e s adopted by her government. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE ARMED FORCES 
This Chapter i s not e s s e n t i a l l y concerned with the familiar 
aspects of the m i l i t a r y history of the American War of Independence, 
that i s the history of Strategy, t a c t i c s and events on the American 
mainland. The reasons for t h i s are, f i r s t because these aspects 
have already been studied exhaustively elsewhere, and second because 
they are not s t r i c t l y relevant to the subject under discussion. Our 
aim i s to study the policy of B r i t a i n towaurds the a l l i a n c e between 
the French and the Americans, and so events i n America can only be 
of i n t e r e s t to us i n so f a r as they affected the a b i l i t y of B r i t a i n 
to meet the threat of war from France. Two questions have to be 
answered. F i r s t , were the forces of B r i t a i n s u f f i c i e n t to support 
the addition to her burdens of a war with France? Second, i f they 
were not s u f f i c i e n t for such an eventuality, what steps were taken 
to put them i n a state of readiness? 
One must define the scope of t h i s enquiry, and this definition 
w i l l involve a consideration of exactly what i s to be examined under 
the heading 'armed forces'. The answer here may l i e i n a consideration 
of the different ways i n which France could e f f e c t i v e l y attack Great 
B r i t a i n . There were three ways i n which t h i s could be done. F i r s t l y 
she could attack B r i t a i n i n d i r e c t l y by means of an attack on Hanover. 
This policy seemed unlikely to find favour, partly because i t would 
involve France i n a land war i n Germany, and thus would probably 
incur the wrath of Frederick the Great, and partly because Hanover 
was now of l e s s importance to Great B r i t a i n . While George I and 
George I I had been bom i n Hanover and were strongly tied to the 
Electorate, George I I I had l e s s feeling for i t ; so an attack in t h i s 
quarter would have considerably l e s s effect upon him than upon 
either of h i s predecessors. 
The other two modes of attack that Freuice could adopt were 
largely dependent upon naval power. The f i r s t was a direct invasion 
of the B r i t i s h I s l e s , while the second was an attack upon B r i t i s h 
colonies and trading posts throughout the world. I n the event, both 
these strategies were attempted, and neither was to r e s u l t in complete 
success. I n either event the key to success or f a i l u r e was to be 
found i n the r e l a t i v e naval strengths of the two nations. To mount a 
successful invasion of B r i t a i n i t was essential for France to achieve 
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dominance in the English Channel, while the importance of sea power 
in a colonial war i s self-evident. 
Thus, i f there was to be a war between B r i t a i n and France i t 
would be of a different nature from their previous encounters. 
France would have made a conscious choice to take on her old enemy 
i n a war which would be decided i n the s p e c i a l i s t sphere of her 
r i v a l . Therefore t h i s would be a break with French tradition 
because whereeis she had primeirily been a land power, she would now 
be attackirig the dominant naval power of the age at sea. B r i t a i n 
would be faced with a new situation because she would be required 
to adjust from a colonial war fought on land to a new c o n f l i c t 
which was to be fought at sea i n a l l the oceans of the world. 
Before we pass on to a detailed examination of the developments 
of the Franco-British situation, i t i s important to note the 
increased s t r a i n s that were imposed upon the B r i t i s h f l e e t by the 
demands of the American c o n f l i c t prior to 1778. I n spite of the 
fact that the commanders on the spot always complained cf the 
inadequacy of the forces at the i r disposed, considerable efforts 
were made to increase the numbers of ships on the American station 
i n these years: 
TABLE I 
IN NORTH AMERICA TOTAL IN PAY 
SHIPS MEN SHIPS MEN 
December 1774 24 2,835 103 17,731 
June 1775 30 3,435 110 16,301 
January 1776 51 7,555 146 23,914 
By the summer of 1776 when Lord Howe took over as the naval 
commander i n America, t h i s number had further increased to seventy 
vessels,'^ 
This table c l e a r l y demonstrates that i n the eighteen months 
between December 1774 and June 1776 there had been a determined 
ef f o r t to increase the B r i t i s h naval strength i n American waters. 
However i t also reveals two alarming aspects of the defensive 
position at home. F i r s t l y the t o t a l numbers of men i n pay were 
nowhere near s u f f i c i e n t to man the ships in home waters. (See note A 
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at the end of t h i s chapter). Even more alarming was the fact that 
the t o t a l number of men i n pay actually f e l l i n the f i r s t s i x 
months of 1775. Since i t was during these months that i t became 
c l e a r that the Americans were i n f u l l scale revolt, t h i s was a 
development which should have given r i s e to concern. However there 
were, as we s h a l l see, p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l motives behind t h i s 
cut, though whether these were an adequate j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t , 
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must remain doubtful. 
Before we turn to the naval a f f a i r s of France and B r i t a i n , we 
ought to look b r i e f l y at the B r i t i s h Army. After a l l , the 
withdrawal of many troops from B r i t a i n to fight sin America rendered 
the position of the navy of paramount importance i n the defensive 
strategy of B r i t a i n i t s e l f . I n 1775 the tot a l of Bri t a i n ' s land 
forces was j u s t over 48,500 men. These forces were scattered 
throughout the world. 15,000 were stationed i n England, Scotland 
and Wales; 12,000 were stationed i n Ireland; there were about 8,000 
i n the whole of North America, while the remaining 13,000 were 
divided among B r i t a i n ' s other overseas possessions such as the 
Carribean islands and Gibraltar. But by 1777 the position had 
changed dramatically. There were 40,000 B r i t i s h troops i n the 
American colonies and a further 3,000 in Canada. I t seems clear 
that many of these troops must have been drawn from the units that 
had been stationed i n the B r i t i s h i s l e s , despite considerable efforts 
to r a i s e fresh troops both at home and by means of agreements with 
foreign r u l e r s for the supply of mercenary armies. Thus we can see 
that the B r i t i s h government made substantial efforts to r a i s e troops, 
and to f i t out, equip and send further naval forces for service 
against the Americans. This e f f o r t was to create new strain s for 
the government, both i n i t s relat i o n s with the opposition and i n 
regard to relationships between individuals within the ministry. 
France's attitude during the years between 1775 and 1778 was to be a 
factor-that constantly added to these tensions. 
I t has alred^y been noted that the most l i k e l y method of attack 
for the French to adopt was by sea, and thus that the burden of 
defensive action was bound to f a l l upon the Royal Navy, The s t r a i n 
of t h i s knowledge f e l l especially hard upon Lord Sandwich, then 
F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty. He was under constant pressure, both 
from the opposition i n parliament who charged that the French were 
preparing war and that B r i t a i n would be unable to respond, and from 
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the naval commanders i n American waters who were always demanding 
reinforcements. His position was rendered more d i f f i c u l t s t i l l by 
the f a c t that h i s demands that a l l ships sent to America should be 
replaced by f i t t i n g out others at home, were consistently refused by 
the King and Lord North. This re f u s a l , which was made on grounds of 
economy and for diplomatic reeisons - (to avoid pushing the French 
government into a war that might yet be averted) - made Sandwich's 
position exceedingly d i f f i c u l t . 
Sandwich had been brought to the Admiralty after the Falkland 
I s l a n d c r i s i s , which had revealed serious weaknesses i n the Navy. 
He had been brought i n with the task of recreating an e f f i c i e n t navy, 
a task which most people at the time agreed that he was well 
q u a l i f i e d to undertake. Horace Walpole wrote of him:-
his peission for meu^itime a f f a i r s , h i s 
a c t i v i t y , industry, and flowing complaisance 
endeared, him to the profession. H'O man i n 
the administration weis so much master of his 
business, so quick or so shrewd...'5 
From 1774 onwards. Sandwich Weis assisted at the Admiralty by Vice-
Admired S i r Hugh FeiLliser, who has been described as *a man of 
r e a l capacity*.^ These two men had overall control of the B r i t i s h 
navy, and thus much attention w i l l be given to them in our attempt 
to evaluate i t s strength. 
This attempt at an evaluation presents several d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
F i r s t , there i s a considerable difference between the figures for 
naval strength that were given by the ministers i n parliament, and 
those which they gave i n l e t t e r s and despatches. Second, there was 
a great difference between the paper strength of the navy and i t s 
actual fighting strength. 6. S. Graham has written that, even after 
the s t a r t of the American War, B r i t a i n s t i l l 
retained a delusive 'two power' 
supremacy on paper. O f f i c i a l figures for 
1777, gave a t o t a l of 102 ships of the 
l i n e , but actually only about 40 were f i t 
for sea'.' 
Graham also makes the point that a l l B r i t a i n ' s frigates, t o t a l l i n g 
60, were i n foreign waters, which l e f t 'only-some twenty sloops and 
other small c r a f t which could be gathered i n European waters'. This 
meant that the entire burden of domestic defence f e l l upon the force 
of ships of the l i n e , vessels which were f a r from suited to chasing 
the f a s t s a i l i n g American privateers. The third d i f f i c u l t y i n 
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evaluating the strength of the navy i s that there often seems to be 
an element of doubt as to whether a ship should or should not have 
been included among those on the active l i s t . 
L et us begin by examining the proceedings i n Parliament. Here, 
as we saw i n the previous chapter, the government was under attack 
from the opposition because i t had increased the precautions i t weis 
taking against attack from France, while at the same time i t had 
assured Parliament that the European powers were all peacefully 
disposed towards B r i t a i n , Under questioning from the opposition, the 
government remained evasive and t r i e d to r e l y on vague assurances to 
calm parliamentary fears, while giving as few figures as possible. 
However, on the occcisions when the government was forced to 
state figures, these showed considerable variations. On 21 January 
1774 Lord North stated i n a debate on the Navy Estimates that there 
were '70 ships of the l i n e i n good repair, and 12 more would be 
launched i n the course of the year'. From that date u n t i l 1777, 
the government was not tempted to give o v e r a l l figures, although 
they did give figures for the American station. This Weis done on 
12 December 1774 when there were stated to be 19 vessels in 
American waters, and again i n November 1773 when i t was announced 
that Admiral Shuldham was to have command of 78 ships of a l l s i z e s . 
I t was only on 18 November 1777 that the government was again 
induced to give a figure for the toteil strength of the f l e e t at home. 
I n reply to harsh c r i t i c i s m of the state of the navy by the 
opposition, Lord Sandwich stated that B r i t a i n had 42 ships of the 
l i n e i n commission, and that 35 of these were mazined and f i t for 
se r v i c e . He concluded;-
'My Lords, from what I have now submitted to 
you, I am authorized to ciffirm.^that our navy 
i s more than a match for that of the whole 
House of Bourbon. 
• I should. My Lords, be extremely sorry... 
i f I permitted at any time the French and 
Spanish navy united to be superior to the 
navy of t h i s country'.^'^ 
Apart from these occasions, the government sheltered behind i t s 
large parliamentary majority, and r e l i e d upon that majority to avoid 
having to answer the opposition's questions too precisely. The 
government's t a c t i c s were to make general statements which played up 
B r i t i s h naval strength while making l i g h t of the extent of French 
naval preparations. For example, i n October 1776 Sandwich blandly 
assured Parliament that B r i t a i n could put a force to sea that was 
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• f u l l y s u f f i c i e n t for our defense and protection.'^^ This 
statement, as w i l l shortly be made clear, was sharply at variance 
with the tone of Sandwich's own l e t t e r s to the commanders in 
American waters. I t was also misleading to Parliament. 
These statements were designed to a l l a y fears and to eliminate 
the danger of further searching questions. The success of t h i s 
t a c t i c can be seen by the f a c t that the government had l i t t l e 
d i f f i c u l t y i n persuading Parliament to adopt i t s proposals on 
defense, and by the fac t that the opposition had l i t t l e success 
i n sowing doubt i n the minds of the government supporters. But, 
although the government had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n retaining the 
support of Parliament, these v i c t o r i e s i n the debating chamber merely 
hid the r e a l i t i e s of the situa t i o n . The f a c t • was that the 
condition of the navy was very weak indeed. That this was the case 
can be seen from an examination of severed sets of documents, but 
most c l e a r l y and r e l i a b l y from the papers of Sandwich himself. He 
was, as he should have been, i n close touch with the condition of 
B r i t a i n ' s naval defences; and at the same time the Admiralty spy 
network kept him informed as to the development of the French navy. 
I t w i l l soon become apparent that Sandwich was considerably 
disturbed by what he knew of the condition of both f l e e t s . 
The f i r s t indication of a lack of preparation came in a 
memorandum from P a l l i s e r , written i n J u l y 1775, i n which he showed 
that the number of ships i n American waters was c l e a r l y inadequate. 
At the time. Admiral Graves had twenty seven vessels under h i s 
command i n America, but P a l l i s e r estimated that Graves needed f i f t y 
ships to perform h i s duties e f f i c i e n t l y . I f the war were to spread 
to new areas i n America, then P a l l i s e r f e l t that this force of f i f t y 
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ships would need to be increased 'considerably*. I n fact, as we 
have noted, the force Wcis raised to f i f t y by the winter of 1775-76, 
and again to seventy by the summer of 1776. 
But, i f action weis promptly taken to remedy the deficiencies 
of the f l e e t i n American waters, t h i s served only to increase the 
s t r a i n on the resources available at home. These increased s t r a i n s 
are c l e a r l y shown i n the l e t t e r which P a l l i s e r wrote to Sandwich i n 
January 1776 (quoted above pp37&38 ) in which he referred to the 
desperate situation which B r i t a i n would face i f she were attacked 
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'whilst we have so many seamen in almost 
the whole of our f r i g a t e s employed at 
such a distance, and such a body of our 
troops i n such a s i t u a t i o n ' . 
The l e t t e r also made i t c l e a r t h a t - P a l l i s e r did not know whether 
or not a plan had been dravna up to deal with a possible attack by 
the French while B r i t a i n was involved i n America: 
'Indeed a plan of measures to be adopted 
i n case of such an event i s necessary, 
and I hope i s prepared against i t may 
happen', ^3 
Since P a l l i s e r was the man who was responsible for the day to day 
running of the war, we may be sure that h i s statements accurately 
r e f l e c t e d the position. This l e t t e r makes cleeir the s t r a i n s of the 
American sit u a t i o n upon B r i t a i n ' s naval resources, and also betrays 
the f a c t that l i t t l e or no consideration had been given by the 
Admiralty to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a war with France, up to the 
beginnimg of 1776. 
However, from t h i s time on, the actions of France and Spain were 
to play an increasing role i n the thinking of the Admiralty, and 
Sandwich himself became quite alarmed. Late i n 1775 he twice wrote 
to Lord Howe, the commander i n America, refusing Howe's requests for 
more ships of two gun-decks. I n h i s f i r s t l e t t e r we find him 
promising to send more ships i n the spring, and blaming his i n a b i l i t y 
to send any at that time on the French and Spanish preparations. He 
wrote: 
'.., i t i s much to be wished that a l l our 
l i n e of battle ships should be kept at home'. 
I n the second l e t t e r , t h i s consideration s t i l l concerned him:-
'... the conduct of France and Spain i s so 
mysterious that i t i s impossible to say 
what demands we may have for l i n e of 
ba t t l e ships i n the course of the winter.'^^ 
Sandwich's refused to comply with the demands-of Lord Howe 
annoyed Lord George Germain, now Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
and for many months to come these two ministers wer,e to be on bad 
terms. I n f a c t , i n August of 1777f Sandwich appears to have thought 
that he was about to be dismissed at the instigation of Germain, for 
Robinson wrote to him:-
'... I am confident that every thought of. 
your being s a c r i f i c e d to the intrigues of 
Lord George Germain i s t o t a l l y groundless'.^ 
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Here we can see the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the Admiralty's situation which 
stemmed from the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Bourbon threat. - Had this not 
existed, greater naval forces could have been sent to America; but 
after the s t a r t of 1776 Sandwich was aware of the p o s s i b i l i t y and 
so r e s t r i c t e d the numbers of ships made available for American duty. 
Conversely, had he been able to send more ships to America, relations 
between himself and Germain would have been easier, and competition 
for support i n the cabinet between them would not have existed. 
However, we must now turn to an examination of the steps which 
Sandwich took to try to meet t h i s danger. 
To begin with, Sandwich urged a precaution that was eminently 
reasonable i n the circumstances. He endeavoiired to have every ship 
that was sent to America from the home f l e e t replaced by the 
commissioning of another ship of the same strength. But this attempt 
was r e s i s t e d by North who feared that the French would become anxious 
over the increase of B r i t a i n ' s naval forces, and further expand their 
own. North Weis worried that such a situation would provoke a WGU* 
which might be avoided by a more t a c t f u l approach from B r i t a i n . 
However, Sandwich did get important and powerful support on t h i s 
issue from the King, at an early stage; in J u l y 1775 George I I I 
informed Sandwich that he had instroated North that the crews of a l l 
s i x of the 50 gun ships that were to be sent to America had to be 
rais e d afresh since no further men could be spared from the 
establishment at home."''^  This step was taken even before the r e a l i t y 
of the French threat became apparent. 
Barnes and Owen state that from the s t a r t of 1776 Sandwich was 
•... more anxious about what was going on 
i n the ports of Brest, Toulon and Cadiz 
than he was about the course of events i n 
North America*. 
but that 
'Lord North flinched from the cost of 
preparation, he also thought of i t s effect 
on the minds of the ministers i n France 
and Spain, fearing l e s t by meeting the 
danger face to face we should bring i t 
nearer'.^7 
By June of-1776 Sandwich knew that France was preparing a force of 
18 ships of the l i n e and 12 frigate s at Brest, and that registered 
seamen were being c a l l e d tcthe port. I n addition to this report 
from an admiralty spy, the government was also informed by Stormont 
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that the French were preparing 23 ships of the l i n e at Brest with a 
further 7 at Toulon. At the same time he reported that Spain had at 
l e a s t 10 ships of the l i n e i n commission. Although these reports do 
not t a l l y exactly they were a clear indication that the Bourbon 
powers were making preparations. The exchange of l e t t e r s between 
Sandwich and North on t h i s subject c l e a r l y displayed the former's 
anxiety about t h i s state of a f f a i r s . Sandwich wrote to North: 
*.,. I dread the consequences, and cannot 
help thinking we s h a l l have much to answer 
for i f they are allowed to have a f l e e t of 
50 s a i l i n Europe ready to receive men, when 
we have not above h a l f that number i n the 
same degree of preparation'. 
This passage again stres s e s the weakness of the home f l e e t , and shows 
that Sandwich was well j u s t i f i e d i n refusing to send further ships to 
America without eissurances that he would be given replacements. 
North's reply to t h i s l e t t e r took the form of an attempt to a l l a y 
Sandwich's fears 
'... Lord Suffolk and Lord Weymouth seemed 
to think the Assurances of M. de Vergennes 
s a t i s f a c t o r y ' . 
This v;as not what Sandwich had wanted to hear at a l l , and he wrote 
again to North:-
•The declaration of M. de Vergennes seems 
to me to mean nothing more than to t e l l 
you that they do not mean war but must put 
themselves i n a condition to go to war i f 
the circumstances require i t ; i f they have 
a f l e e t ready for service double to ours, 
t h e i r advantage and our danger w i l l be such 
as I tremble to think of i t ' . 
He added: 
»I am sure your Lordship w i l l forgive my 
troubling you so much upon th i s important 
business but I know so much of the state 
of the f l e e t from want of preparation at 
the time of the dispute about the Falkland 
Islands that I think i t my duty, as a firm 
friend to your Lordship's administration, 
to point out the danger of agam being 
taken i n the same s i t u a t i o n ' . ^ " 
These l e t t e r s not only show Sandwich's anxiety about the situation, 
but they also show the great d i f f i c u l t y that he experienced in 
getting a response to h i s anxiety from North; Sandwich expressed 
himself very f o r c e f u l l y i n these l e t t e r s , and there i s perhaps even 
76. 
a hint of a threat of resignation i n the l a s t quoted passage. 
Another point to note about these l e t t e r s i s that they cleeo'ly give 
the l i e to the bland assurances of B r i t i s h naval superiority which 
were served up by the Ministers i n Parliament. 
These assurances: are again shown to have been f a l s e by another 
very s i g n i f i c a n t l e t t e r written by Sandwich, j u s t over a year after 
the previous exchange, on 3 August 1777. This l e t t e r began by 
expressing Sandwich's agreement with the idea of sending some ships 
of the l i n e to the V/est Indies; an idea which had been put forward 
by North. But, although Sandwich agreed that the idea was a good 
one, he went on to i n s i s t that any ships that were to be sent under 
t h i s plan should be immediately replaced by commissioning other 
ships of a s i m i l a r type. He j u s t i f i e d t h i s by setting out h i s basic 
p r i n c i p l e , which was that B r i t a i n should have a f l e e t which was at 
l e a s t equal to the combined navies of France and Spain. He then 
siimmarized the position of the B r i t i s h home f l e e t as follows:-
'... 36 Ships of the l i n e (are) i n commission 
and f i t for service, but some men (peu^ticularly 
marines) are wanting to make them a l l complete 
to t h e i r establishments; and as some of these 
ships must always be i n harbour for cleaning, I 
should think that upon a sudden emergency we 
should not be able to get more than 30 of them 
at once to sea*. 
The Bourbon powers, by contrast had a f l e e t that Sandwich placed at 
'... at l e a s t 36 of the l i n e , a l l commissioned 
and ready for service'. 
As France and Spain had only s i x ships away from Europe they would 
be able to put a force of 30 ships of the l i n e to sea with l i t t l e 
d i f f i c u l t y . Sandwich weis made more anxious s t i l l by the fact that 
he believed that the French and Spanish had as many vessels i n the 
category 'ready to receive men' as B r i t a i n had, but that in t h i s 
department the French and Spanish had an advantage because they 
could r a i s e the men for these ships more quickly than could Great 
B r i t a i n . Therefore, Sandwich concluded that to send further ships 
abroad without replacing them would leave B r i t a i n i n 'a defenceless 
s i t u a t i o n at home', with'csur army almost e n t i r e l y i n America, and 
our f l e e t c r u c i a l l y weakened. He fiirther contended that:-
'... nothing i n my opinion would be more 
l i k e l y to i n v i t e an attack, and be more 
, unpardonable i n those who are apprised of 
the danger, than to leave t h i s country 
open to such a calamity'.•';^ 
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Despite the strength of the language he used i n these l e t t e r s . 
Sandwich made l i t t l e progress. I n December 1777 he was s t i l l vainly 
writing to North trying to impress upon him the strength of the 
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French and Spanish position. 
We have already noted that these l e t t e r s are i n stark contrast 
to the Cedm eissurances that were given by the ministers when they 
were i n Parliament. I t i s c l e a r that the ministers were 
misrepresenting the facts to Parliament, as there can be no doubt 
that they were aware of the r e a l situation. There can be no excuse 
for Sandwich, apart from the explanation that he was the victim of 
the lack of attention to the f l e e t of h i s predecessors, and that any 
admission on h i s part would have worsened the situa t i o n . But i n 
the case of Lord North, the position appears to be rather different. 
I t can be argued that he was partly responsible for the weakness of 
the f l e e t because he refused to heed the repeated weO'nings that were 
sent to him by Sandwich, However, h i s position Weis more complex. 
I t seems to have been the case that North was not only misleading 
the House of Commons, but that he was also misleading himself. This 
can be seen by the f a c t that on 2 March 1778, barely more than a 
fortnight before the formal declaration of war between B r i t a i n and 
France, he could write to Sandwich: 
• I f the French mean to go to war with us 
i t w i l l be i n the Spring, and we ought to 
be prepared'. 
North ended the l e t t e r by saying that he was totally pre-occupied 
with the r a i s i n g of a new loan. The tone of t h i s l e t t e r seems to 
suggest that even at t h i s l a t e stage. North doubted the intention of 
France to j o i n the war. He seemed t o t a l l y uninterested in making any 
preparations for such an eventuality. Such preparations should be 
s e t t l e d i n a cabinet meeting which, he wrote, 'ought to be held soon', 
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but he proposed no date for such a meeting. Thus North appesirs to 
have been gu i l t y of ignoring facts of which he was well aware, to 
such a degree that he could almost be accused of 'fiddling while Rome 
burned'. 
F i n a l l y , a comparison of the information from the Sandwich papers 
and from the King's correspondence provides us with some interesting, 
i f c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t i s t i c s . I n the Sandwich papers there are l i s t s of 
the r e l a t i v e strengths of the navies of Great B r i t a i n , France and 
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Spain i n the early months of 1778 (the figures for B r i t a i n are taken 
for 1 January, while those for the Bourbon powers are for 10 March). 
These figures confirm that Sandwich was t o t a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n the 
concern and anxiety which he showed about B r i t a i n ' s naved position. 
The figures are summarized i n the following table:-
TABLE 2 
Ships of 60 guns and over 
Ships of between 20 and 50 gxuis 
Other ships (Sloops, bombs, 
cutters etc.) 










Total 256 211 144 
From t h i s table i t i s evident that, at the outbreak of the war, the 
B r i t i s h f l e e t was superior to that of France and to that of Spain, 
individually; but when the Bourbon f l e e t s were taken as one, the 
B r i t i s h navy was heavily outnumbered. I t i s also clear that 
Sandwich was right to demand replacements for any l i n e of battle 
ships sent to America or the Carribean, as i n t h i s department both 
the E'rench and the Spanish outnumbered B r i t a i n . F i n a l l y t h i s table 
also makes i t quite plain that Sandwich had u t t e r l y f a i l e d to achieve 
h i s objective of ensuring that the B r i t i s h f l e e t was equal to the 
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combined strength of the Bourbon powers. 
I f we turn now from the Sandwich papers to the King's 
correspondence, we find a picture that i s almost as confused as that 
r e f l e c t e d i n the peirliamentary debates. At the end of the 
correspondence for 1775 a document i s to be found en t i t l e d 'Ships i n 
Ordinary, a l i s t i n the King's Hand*. This shows, xmder the heading 
'Active Strength', that the navy was made up of 84 vessels of more 
than 50 guns, and 54 vessels of l e s s than 50 guns, making a t o t a l of 
138 naval c r a f t of a l l kinds. However, the accuracy of t h i s l i s t 
must be i n doubt because a comparison with the figures i n Table 2 
shows that, two years l a t e r , there were only 58 ships of 60 guns 
and over, while the information from which the Table i s compiled shows 
that there were a further 12 ships of between 50 and 60 guns. 
Therefore i n 1778 the t o t a l of vessels carrying 50 or more guns v/as a 
79. 
mere 70 14 l e s s than i n 1775. Following the l i s t of 'active 
strength' there i s a l i s t e n t i t l e d 'Ships building and repairing', 
which t o t a l s 40 v e s s e l s . But this second l i s t includes 6 vessels 
which also appear in the l i s t of 'active strength'. So, when we add 
together these two l i s t s we have a total naval strength of 172 ships. 
F i n a l l y the document went on to state that there were 19 'Guardships' 
- that i s to say ships of 64 guns or over which were f i t for sea and 
three f i f t h s manned. However, i t f a i l s to make i t clear whether these 
ships have been included i n the figure given for active strength; 
i f they have not been so included the f i n a l t o t a l was 191. 
But, whether the to t a l was 191 or 172, several conclusions can be 
drawn from these figures. F i r s t , whatever the King understood by the 
term 'active strength', i t i s evident that the effective force was 
confined to the Guardships, and therefore the 'active' figure of 84 
ships of 50 guns and over i s misleading. Second, the figure for ships 
being b u i l t or repaired i s a very high one, for i t amounted to 
approximately one f i f t h of the t o t a l . This was a large proportion of 
the navy to have i n dock on the eve of a war which was to require a 
greater naval e f f o r t than B r i t a i n had ever had to make before. 
I t i s also quite evident that t h i s l i s t i s a gross oversimpli-
f i c a t i o n of the f a c t s . Apart from the contrast that we have already 
noted with the figures i n Table 2, other comments made at the time 
point to t h i s . I n October of 1776 Sandwich proposed a series of eleven 
very r a d i c a l measures, including a general "press", which would bring 
the navy up to a state of readiness. He estimated that i f these 
measures were immediately put into effect, B r i t a i n would have the 
following forces available: 23 guardships i n commission, 2 ships of 
the l i n e i n America, 1 ship of the l i n e i n the East Indies, and 1 
ship of the l i n e i n the Mediterranean; which made a total of 27 ships 
ready for service. To t h i s t o t a l there could be added a further 12 
ships of the l i n e that were ready to receive men but which were eis 
yet unmanned; 27 on the 'Serviceable l i s t ' , 12 which coiild be made 
ready within a year, and 5 which could do foreign service 'in an 
emergency'. When a l l these figures are added together they make a 
t o t a l of 83 ships of the l i n e . But i t i s quite clear that many of 
the vessels included here were f a r from 'active', indeed t h i s l i s t , 
which was compiled by Sandwich nearly a year a f t e r the King had 
drawn up the l i s t quoted above, shows that, even i f Sandwich's 
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eleven proposals were immediately adopted, the r e a l strength of the 
navy i n home waters was made up of the 23 Guardships, to which 12 
24 more vessels could be added when crews had been raised to man them. 
I n the l i g h t of the f a c t that B r i t a i n knew that France alone had a 
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f l e e t of 27 ships cf the l i n e i n preparation i n June of 1776 , i t 
i s again plain to see that Sandwich had not only f a i l e d to give 
B r i t a i n an over a l l superiority i n every type of ship to the 
combined forces of France and Spain, but that he had also f a i l e d to 
ensure that Great Britedn had more capiteiL ships ready for action 
than the Bourbon powers. The f a i l u r e of Sandwich's attempts to build 
up the strength of the home f l e e t can be demonstrated by Admiral 
Keppel. On his a r r i v a l at Portsmouth i n March 1778 to take command 
of av;Squadron which, he had been assured, would number 35 vessels, he 
wrote i r a t e l y that he had found only 'six ships f i t to meet a 
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seaman's eye'. Even when allowance-has been made for the fact that 
Keppel was a politicalsopponent of the government's policy towards 
the American rebels, t h i s i s a t e l l i n g c r i t i c i s m . -
There are also some figures that are of interest which are to 
be found among the North papers. These r e l a t e to ships that were 
being b u i l t i n naval dockyards up to the outbreak of the war, and 
also to the expenditure of the B r i t i s h government on the navy i n 
these years. These figures have been expressed i n Tables 3 and 4 
below, and those which r e l a t e to expenditure have been compared to 
some figures for France which have been drawn from various different 
sources^^:-
TABLE 3 
Ships Building i n Naval Dockyards 
DATE TYPE OF SHIP, CLASSIFIED BY NUMBER OF GUNS CARRIED 
IOC 90 80 74 7 0 64 6 0 50 44 30 28 20 SLOOP BOMB ANNUAL TOTAL 
1769 - 5 - 4 • - 4 • - 1 - 1 — — 1 _ 16 
1770 - 2 - 5 -- 6 -- 'r- - 2 - - 2 - 17 
1772 1 3 - 6 • - 5 -• 1 - - 3 - — 20 
1774 1 2 - 6 -- 6 . • 1 1 - 2 1 - — 20 
1776 1 4 - 7 -• 5 -• - - - - 4 4 - 25 








1774 274,828 27,500,000 
1776 293,951 35,000,000 
1?77 296,239 -
1778 - 101,153,000 
1779 334,426 156,639,840 
1780 - 168,998,500 
1782 - 200,000,000 
From these tables i t can be seen c l e a r l y that neither ship 
building nor naval expenditure underwent any considerable increeise 
i n B r i t a i n during these v i t a l years. Indeed naval expenditure was 
actually reduced i n 1774. This again tends to show that Sandwich 
f a i l e d i n h i s efforts to convince h i s cabinet colleagues of the 
danger of an attack from France. I n the French figures, however, 
we can see a marked increase in the money that weis devoted to naval 
purposes cis Sartines began h i s work of reform. This i n turn makes 
two things very c l e a r : f i r s t , that the French were paying a great 
deal of attention to t h e i r navy, thus j u s t i f y i n g Sandwich's alarm; 
second, i t proves that the B r i t i s h effort to improve their navy i n 
these years was f a r l e s s concentrated than the effort being made by 
the French. 
I t i s 6£ course possible that Prance needed to make considerable 
ef f o r t s to put her navy into a condition to go to war with B r i t a i n 
with any r e a l prospects of success. I t i s often suggested that 
France weis deliberately prepeiring for war i n th i s period28^ an^j 
indeed the figures for thei r naval expenditure would seem to j u s t i f y 
t h i s . However, i t must be remembered that Choiseul had reformed the 
French navy between 1763 and 1770 but that t h i s reform had not led 
to war: i t could have been argued that there need be no war following 
Sart i n e s ' reform. Therefore we must now examine the French 
prepcirations to see whether they r e a l l y did furnish grounds for fear 
i n B r i t a i n . 
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There are two questions which must be answered about the 
French navy. F i r s t , why was i t that the navy was i n need of further 
reform so soon after Choiseiil had completed h i s restoration of the 
f l e e t s , and why was t h i s new reform necessary on so large a scale 
as i s indicated by the s i x - f o l d increeise i n naveil expenditure i n 
the years between 1774 and 1779? Second, with a navy thus 
strengthened, why was i t that the French f a i l e d to derive a greater 
advantage from t h e i r strength and B r i t a i n ' s weakness? 
We saw e a r l i e r that Choiseul had increased the number of ships 
of the l i n e and f r i g a t e s i n the French navy and also that he had 
established new ports and training schools, why then was t h i s new 
reform needed? I t i s usual to explain Sartines' reforms as a r e s u l t 
of the neglect of the f l e e t by h i s predecessor Bourgeois de Boynes 
between 1770 and 1774. However, even allowing for the damaging 
ef f e c t s of neglect upon timber b u i l t ships i t seems possible that 
Choiseul's reforms may not have been as effective as has sometimes 
been thought. 
I f we allow t h i s to be the case, then we must now look at the 
effects of Sartines' reforms. Choiseul l e f t behind him i n 1770 a 
f l e e t of 64 ships of the l i n e and 50 f f i g a t e s , an impressive t o t a l . 
Yet, by 1778, i n spite of vastly increased expenditure, France 
possessed only 60 ships of tiae l i n e , and by 1780, when Sarttoes 
was dismissed, t h i s figure had only r i s e n to 79. So i n terms of simple 
numbers, Sartines' expenditure appears to have achieved l i t t l e (see 
note B at the end of t h i s chapter). But when the French and Spanish 
f l e e t s were united they possessed approximately 30 more ships of the 
l i n e than Great B r i t a i n . Hence, the French f l e e t was numerically 
strong, and perhaps represented a more serious threat to B r i t i s h naval 
power at t h i s time than ever before. Nevertheless, i t i s possible to 
fin d indications that the French f l e e t lacked training and preparation. 
I n 1777 f Joseph I I of Au s t r i a paid an incognito v i s i t to France and 
v i s i t e d the ports. He wrote to h i s brother Leopold:-
'Brest est un grand port... mais l e s 
magasins sont vides et l e s navires mal 
armees». 
V/hile of Toulon he wrote:-
'C'est l e plus beau port que j ' a i ^ vu,... 
Malgre cela, j e ne s a i s ce que c'est, mais 
l a marine francaise ne m'inspire aucune 
confiance. Ses equipeiges sont mauvais et 
mad exerces...•30 
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These comments by the Emperor, are i n stark contrast to a l e t t e r 
from du Chaffault, the commander at Brest, who wrote at the time 
of Joseph's v i s i t that his f l e e t had been ready to s a i l »il y avait 
huit rnois'. 
These are c r i t i c a l comments and provide serious cause for doubt 
as to v/hether the French navy was i n a condition to fight a war with 
Great B r i t a i n . Such doubts are incresised by some comments made by 
Maurepas and recorded by the Abbe de Veri i n h i s journal. I n October 
1777 V e r i recorded that he discussed with Maurepas the reasons for 
avoiding war with B r i t a i n , Maurepas gave the opinion that there were 
weighty reasons for avoiding such a c o n f l i c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y he 
questioned the capacity of the French armed forces to win such a war. 
He expressed doubts about the a b i l i t y of the army's commanders and 
turned h i s attention to the navy. Here he had doubts as to whether 
the French and Spanish f l e e t s were either s u f f i c i e n t l y well trained 
or numerically strong enough to undertake a war against Great 
B r i t a i n , He then went on to say that while France had grown richer 
i n the previous three years and B r i t a i n had been impoverished by 
colonial struggles, t h i s need make no difference i n a war:-
'Cela n'emp^che pas que l a haine Anglaise 
contre l a France ne puisse encore f a i r e 
f a i r e a l a nation, pendant deux ans des 
e f f o r t s d» argent t r ^ s sup^rieures i. ceux 
que l e r o i poaarrait exiger en France de 
tout 1'opulence de ses s u j e t s ' . 
Maurepas concluded h i s gloomy summary by casting grave doubts on 
France's a b i l i t y to win a war at a l l . I f the means of waging war 
were weak, he said, they were weakened s t i l l further by the men who 
would command them, Maiirepas' opinion i s of weight, not only 
because he was the Chief Minister, but also because he had been 
Secretaire de l a Marine e a r l i e r i n his career. Not only was he i n a 
position to influence events at the time, but he Weis also familiar 
with naval a f f a i r s . Therefore h i s opinion may be assumed to have been 
an informed one, and i t i s evident that he was entirely pessimistic 
about the French chances of victory. 
I f we accept that the French navy was not as strong as i t has 
often been made out to be, t h i s helps us to explain why i t f a i l e d to 
make more gains i n the war than i n fac t i t did. However, the reasons 
for i t s f a i l u r e may also l i e elsewhere. The attitudes and expectations 
of the French were wrong. They entered the war i n a state of 
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uncertainty; they were embarking on a war i n the naval sphere, a 
sphere i n which they had always had the worst of any struggle with 
B r i t a i n . The opinions of Maurepas, cit e d above, are a good 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of such 'defeatist expectations'. This anxiety and lack 
of confidence was not only expressed i n conversations such as t h i s , 
and i n the anxiety of the French that B r i t a i n might again launch a 
surprise attack as she had done i n 1756, but was also to be found i n 
the controversy about the peace treaty. The French navy performed 
quite s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n the Weir, achieving successes i n the Far East 
as w e l l as o f f the coasts of North America where their presence 
proved decisive at Yorktown i n 1781, but i t lacked the confidence to 
continue the war and press home the advantages i t had gained. The 
f a i l i i r e of the inveision attempt of 1779 was a blow to their confidence, 
and Admiral Rodney's victory at the Battle of the Saints swept away 
any lingering thoughts the French might have entertained about 
continuing the var. But there were many i n France who regeu?ded the 
Peace of 1783 as a humiliation for France and as bringing only poor 
rewards for the e f f o r t of the war. I n the council, this faction 
was l e d by C a s t r i e s , who had replaced Sartines, and by Segur who had 
replaced S t . Germain eis minister of war. Lack of confidence and lack 
of finance forced France to a peace treaty which did not do j u s t i c e 
to the success of her navy. 
The B r i t i s h also had expectations. J u s t as the French had become 
accustomed to defeat by the B r i t i s h navy - so the B r i t i s h had come to 
expect success. Sandwich and P a l l i s e r were both well informed of the 
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state of both the B r i t i s h and French navies, and thus their moods, as 
we have seen, were f a r from confident. But the expectation of the 
B r i t i s h people that the navy would defend them successfully, made i t 
hard for Sandwich and P a l l i s e r to bring home to the B r i t i s h the extent 
of t h e i r danger and even harder for them to admit to the weak 
condition of the navy. This mood of confidence weis well reflected by 
a l e t t e r from Suffolk to Sandwich of June 1777. He wrote that i t 
would be greatly to B r i t a i n ' s advantage to preserve the peace with 
France u n t i l the end of the year, by which time he hoped that 
Bvirgoyne's campaign would have been successful, thus putting more 
cards i n B r i t a i n ' s hand. But he went on to say:-
85. 
»The event, however, does not e n t i r e l y depend 
upon us, for i f our natural enemies are 
determined upon war, they need not declare i t 
to force us to f i g h t : a nati*on l i k e an 
individual, may be made to fight notwithstanding 
h i s mild temper and earnest wishes to the 
contrary. I f such s h a l l be the fate of England, 
i t i s a comfort to r e f l e c t on the state of the 
f l e e t ; i t constantly has had your di l i g e n t 
attention, and when the hour of t r i a l comes, I 
am sure t h i s w i l l appear*.^3 
Such bland confidence makes one wonder whether the l e t t e r s from 
Sandwich "to North pointing out the wealcness of the navy had any 
ef f e c t at a l l . 
Enough has been said here to give an impression of the balance 
of naval forces between B r i t a i n and France. V/e can see that the 
B r i t i s h f l e e t was undoubtedly weak and that Sandwich's pl&as for 
action to remedy the sit u a t i o n went largely unheeded. I n France, 
however the navy was i n a strong position, and though i t was not 
perhaps as strong as has sometimes been thought, i t i s probable that 
the French had a greater chance of successfully challenging the 
B r i t i s h navy at t h i s period than at any other. Thus i t can be 
concluded that the B r i t i s h made poor use of the time they gained by 
ignoring the French aid to the rebels; the reeisons for t h i s , and the 
influence of the r e l a t i v e strengths of the two navies upon policy, 
w i l l be considered i n the next chapter. 
Note A 
This may appear a strange deduction to make when viewed 
mathematically. The average crew of each ship i n America works out 
at j u s t l e s s than 120 men i n December 1774 and June 1775» and has 
r i s e n to approximately 150 men per ship i n January 1776. Therefore 
i f one manned the 103 ships in pay in 1770 with 120 men each the t o t a l 
number of men that would be required i n pay would eunount to only 12,360, 
a smaller figure than that act\ially given, 
Ho\-/ever, i t must be borne i n mind that the majority of the ships i n 
America were small vessels - f r i g a t e s , sloops and cutters - requiring 
l e s s men than the ships of the l i n e , which were mainly at home. Thus, 
Graves i n Jvme 1775, had 27 ships under h i s command of which only 3 
were l i n e of battle ships and one a 50 gunned ship. The proportion 
of ships of the l i n e i n the home f l e e t would have been much greater. 
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and so the manning requirements would have been higher tooo The 
gradual increase i n the numbers of c a p i t a l ships i n American waters 
accounts for the slow r i s e i n average crew s i z e . A ship of the l i n e 
would have required neeirer 500 men for a f u l l complement than 150. 
Note B 
S a r t i n e s ' expenditure upon the navy seems excessively high in 
proportion to the r e s u l t s which he achieved. While i t i s possible 
that the money was spent on other things than ship-building - e.g. 
training and port f a c i l i t i e s - there may also have been another 
explanation for the high l e v e l of expenditure by the ministry of 
marine. 
Although no d i r e c t evidence has been found, i t seems possible 
that Beaumarchais may have draim his funds through the ministry of 
marine. He had been associated with Sartines during 1774^^, and 
when he was sent to London i n 1776, h i s "cover"' was that he was 
working for Sartines^^, what then would have been more natural than 
for him to have been paid by Sartines? 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV 























These figures are drawn from Sandwich Papers... 
Ed, Barnes and Owen i , pp. 42 and 45-56. 
See the debates on the Navy Estimates and the 
Budget i n 1774 and;„1775 i n Parliamentary History... 
v o l . x v i i , pp.945» 1330-1341; and v o l . x v i i i , 
pp.54, 55 and 305-306. 
The figures here are drawn from Valentine A. 
Lord George Germain p.124. (There are some figures 
i n Parliamentary History v o l . x v i i , p.948, 
which give a different impression for 1775). 
Despite Frederick II»s ban on troops passing 
through Prussia to fight for B r i t a i n i n 
America, many German soldiers did fight i n 
America. The ban was l i f t e d i n 1777. See Haworth 
PoL. •Frederick the Great and the American 
Revolution* ArHeR. i x , p.472 
Sandwich Papers... Ed. Barnes and Owen, v o l . i , 
p . x i i i . 
Graham G.S. 'Considerations on the war of 
American Independence'. i n B u l l . I n s t . H i s t . Res. 
x x i i p.27. 
i b i d , p.25 
Parliamentary History... v o l . x v i i , p.945 
i b i d , v o l . x v i i i , pp.54 and 841. 
i b i d , v o l , xix, pp.376-378. 
i b i d , v o l , x v i i i , p,1380, and see P a l l i s e r ' s 
statement of 11 March 1777 i n vol.xix, p.97. 
Sandwich Papers... Ed. Barnes and Owen v o l . i , p.65 
ib i d , v o l . i , p.90 
i b i d , v o l . i , pp.160 and 163. 
i b i d , v o l . i , p.239. 
i b i d , v o l . i , p.63. 
i b i d , v o l . i , p.201 
i b i d , v o l . i , pp.213-216. A l l three l e t t e r s 
written on 21 Jvly 1776. 
i b i d , v o l . i , pp.235-238. 
i b i d , v o l . i , pp,242-245 and 327-335. 
i b i d , v o l . i , p.347 
ib i d , v o l . i . Appendices A & C, on pp.422 and 426. 
I t should be noted that the B r i t i s h figures are 
taken from the column headed 'At Sea', although i t 
seems highly unlikely that such numbers would have 
been at sea, or seas/orthy, i n the l i g h t of the above 
l e t t e r s . I t should also be noted that l e t t e r s 
accompanying the French and Spanish l i s t s say that 
these may be exaggerated to give an impression of 
greater strength. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV (CONT'D) 
^^9^' Reference No. Number 
79 23 Correspondence of King George I I I . . . 
Ed. Fortescue, v o l . i i i pp. 306-311. 
80 24 i b i d , v o l . i i i p.396 
80 25 i b i d , v o l . i i i p.380 
80 26 Graham G«So 'Considerations on the war of 
American Independence' i n Bull.Inst.Hist.Res. 
x x i i , p.27 
80 27 Figures for B r i t i s h shipbuilding and expenditure 
are drawn from North MSS i n the Bodleian 
Collection, B.49-»55. Those for French expenditure 
are drawn from various sources, as follows; 
Figures for 1778, 1779 & 1780 from Lacour 
Gayet G. L a Marine M i l i t a i r e de l a France sous 
l e rigne de Louis XVI. p.60. Figures for 1776 
and 1682 are drawn from Graham G.S. 'Considerations 
on the war of American Independence'. 
Bull.Inst.Hist.Res.xxii p.29. Figures for 1774 
are quoted i n Lacour Gayet, op.cit., p.15 
from Turgot's report while he was Secretaire de 
l a Marine. 
81 28 Graham G.So 'Considerations on the V/ar of 
American Independence', i n Bull.Inst.Hist.Res.xxii, 
P.29. 
82 29 i b i d , p.29 (But see also, Lacour Gayet G. 
La Marine M i l i t a i r e de l a France sous l e Regne de 
Louis XVI. p.56, where he states that the French 
and Spanish have only 18 more ships of the l i n e ) . 
82 30 Lacour Gayet G. Op.Cit. p.7. 
83 31 'L'Abbe' de Veri et son Journal' Ed.de Witte J . 
in Rev. d'Hist.Dipl. xxxix pp. 134-135. 
32 The figures i n Sandwich Papers... v o l . i , p.245 
agree exactly with those i n Lacovir Gayet G. 
Op.Cit. Appendix I I I pp.609-611. 
85 33 
86 
Sandwich Papers... v o l . i , pp. 226-227. 
34 Morton B.No (ed.) Beaumarchais Correspondence 
v o l . i , p.xiv. 
86 35 Doniol H. Histoire de l a Participation. 
v o l . i , p.377. 
87. 
CHAPTER V: BRITISH POLICY 
Up to t h i s point we have examined the circumstances that 
surrounded the period under consideration and the problems4 
which faced B r i t a i n , France and America, to see how these 
problems affected the attitude of each country towards the 
American Revolution. I n doing so, attention has been drawn 
to the great dangers which faced Great B r i t a i n , and to the fact 
that, by ignoring the signs that France was preparing for war, 
B r i t a i n gedned time to put her own eirmed forces i n order. 
However, i n the l a s t chapter i t was found that B r i t a i n took few 
steps i n t h i s direction, ; and i t was also noted that, on the 
eve of war, the chief minister appeared to be unaware that the 
danger to B r i t a i n was r e a l and immediate. 
I t i s now time to turn to a detailed examination of the 
policy of Great B r i t a i n towards the eiLliance which was signed 
between France and America i n the early'.'months of 1778. We 
have already noted that B r i t a i n faced great danger should such 
an a l l i a n c e be formed because the majority of her army and a 
IcU^ge proportion of her navy were engaged i n America. The 
h o s t i l e attitude of France, s t i l l seeking revenge for her 
defeat i n the Seven Years War, only served to increase B r i t i s h 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . The attitude of the French towards B r i t a i n at 
t h i s time i s frequently expressed i n contemporary documents, 
but there i s no more cogent example, than the following 
quotation, which i s dra\m from the 'Reflexions', the f i r s t 
of three documents written at the beginning of-1776 to urge 
the French King to attack B r i t a i n while the colonial dispute 
v;as s t i l l i n progress:-
'L.'Angleterre est I'enemi naturel de l a 
France, e l l e est un enemi avide, ambitieux, 
i n j u s t e , et de mauvaise f o i ; I'objet 
invariable de s a politique est, sinon l a 
destruction de l a France, du moins son 
abaissement, son hiuniliation et sa mine'. 
French policy towards the American Revolution has been 
f u l l y studied, and as a r e s u l t we can define the objectives 
of French policy quite simply. They had two aims v;hich were, 
i n order of importance; f i r s t , to regain the prestige which 
France had l o s t i n the years since her defeat i n the Seven Years 
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War. To achieve t h i s the French saw i t as necessary that 
B r i t a i n ' s prestige should be reduced, and they f e l t that the 
operation would be most e f f e c t i v e l y performed i f France was 
responsible for that reduction. France's second aim weis 
commercial gain. The French r e a l i z e d that i t would be f u t i l e 
to t r y to gain t e r r i t o r y i n North America, but i t was hoped that, 
cifter France had a s s i s t e d the colonists to gain their independence, 
the Americans, who would need a trading partner i n the old world, 
would tvim to France. AS-in the case of prestige, t h i s v/ould 
be a doubly e f f e c t i v e blow, as i t would both diminish B r i t i s h 
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power and increase that of France. 
Thus the French were looking to B r i t a i n ' s colonieJ. 
d i f f i c u l t i e s to provide them with the opportunity to take 
revenge for t h e i r defeat i n the l a s t war. They were not, 
however, prepared to give open assistance to the colonists m t i l 
the l a t t e r had shown that they had both the w i l l and the a b i l i t y 
to r e s i s t the B r i t i s h forces with some hope of success. This 
attitude on the part of the French i s to be found clearly-. 
stated i n the t h i r d of the three documents written at the 
beginning of 1776, e n t i t l e d 'Reflexions sur l a necessite de 
secourir l e s Americains et de se preparer a l a guerre avec 
1'Angleterre' • No a l l i a n c e was to be concluded with the rebel 
colon i s t s , according to t h i s memorandum. 
'jusqu'a ce que leur independence s o i t 
etablie et notoire'.3 
Therefore we can sum up-the policy of France very simply. 
She was prepared to give clandestine aid to the colonists, which 
was s e c r e t l y encoxiraged by the government, but which had to be 
publicly disavowed; the continuation and possible growth of this 
aid was dependent upon the success of the colonists i n their 
struggle with the B r i t i s h . I t was also the case that, knowing 
how powerful Great B r i t a i n was, the French were extremely anxious 
to avoid a sit u a t i o n i n which they were l e f t to fight B r i t a i n 
alone. This i s the reason why the French refused to declare the i r 
support for the rebels u n t i l the l a t t e r had shown their 
determination to break with B r i t a i n . I t i s also the reason why 
the French were so quick to conclude the a l l i a n c e with the 
Americans eifter the nevs of Saratoga reached Europe. They saw 
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that at Saratoga the colonists had shovm th e i r determination 
and they also r e a l i z e d that the Americans had an opportunity 
to make a favourable peace with B r i t a i n . Were th i s to happen, 
the opportunity for France to achieve her aims would be l o s t . 
This determination of the French to achieve t h e i r aims i s 
shoT,m by the fac t that they refused Joseph I I »s offer of the 
Austrian Netherlands i f they would a s s i s t him-in Bavaria, 
prefering to undertake a naval war against B r i t a i n . 
B r i t a i n ' s position was far more complex than that of 
France. The s i z e of the national debt, the long-range war with 
the American rebels, and the fac t that t h i s war was not popular 
with the nation as a whole, a l l meant that B r i t a i n had to 
tread very warily i n foreign a f f a i r s ; t h i s inspite of her 
position as the most powerful country i n Europe after her 
recent defeat of France. Our task now i s to examine the 
policy adopted by B r i t a i n towards the French, and towards their 
growing involvement i n America, during the period between 1775 
and 1778. 
I n contrast to the sit u a t i o n i n France, where the historian 
has ready evidence of French intentions i n those three 
documents from early 1776 and i n the l e t t e r s from Verg4nnes 
to the French ambassadors i n Madrid, there i s no c l e a r l y 
defined statement of policy i n B r i t a i n . The histo r i a n who 
wishes to fi n d the B r i t i s h attitude, has to r e l y upon 
inferences drawn from the documents of the period, rather than, 
upon d i r e c t exposition of policy. I t i s possibly due to this 
s i t u a t i o n that the B r i t i s h government has received such scant 
attention, and has been assumed to have no policy at a l l upon 
thi s matter. 
F i r s t of CLLI an attempt must be made to find out exactly 
how w e l l informed the B r i t i s h government was about the aid 
which France sent to the Americans, On t h i s matter, the records 
cire very p l a i n , and i t i s evident'; from study of the diespatches 
from P a r i s i n t h i s period that the B r i t i s h ministry had every 
indication i t could have required that the French were as s i s t i n g 
the c o l o n i s t s . Lord Stormont, the B r i t i s h ambassador i n Paris 
at the time weis only?, absent from France for two short periods: 
f i r s t from March 1775 to October 1775 and second from March 1776 
90. 
to l a t e June 1776. During these absences the B r i t i s h Embassy 
was l e f t i n the hands of Mr. Horace St. Paul. Both these men 
were diplomats of s k i l l and experience, and t h e i r reports 
kept the ministers at home well informed of developments i n 
France. 
However, as was noted i n Chapter I I I , the problems which 
they faced i n assessing the intentions of the French ministers 
with regard to America were very great. Not only was the 
position of the ministry, at the s t a r t of a new reign, unstable, 
but there were eilso c o n f l i c t s about the policy which should be 
adopted. These c o n f l i c t s took place within the ministry, 
between those who favoured involvement and those who did not, 
and beti/een the ministry as a whole and French popular opinion 
which was f a r l e s s cautioiis i n i t s approach than any member of 
the ministry. The problem of giving an accurate assessment of 
French attitudes was as cleeir to Stainont eis i t i s to us. Late 
i n 1775 he wrote:-
»I am well aware. My Lord of the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of my s i t u a t i o n here - no Foreign Minister 
ever stood upon more dangerous grovind. I f 
I am too hasty to catch, and give an Alarm, 
I may with the best intentions do e s s e n t i a l 
mischief; i f on the other hand I am l u l l e d 
into security, by the Professions of t h i s 
court, which never were more friendly, and 
any Blow should be struck of which I had not 
forewarned you, I should necessarily stand 
exposed to the Imputation of that easy 
credulity which i n t h i s Profession i s so 
great a disgrace'.^ 
A l i t t l e over three months l a t e r , Stormont again wrote to London 
outlining the d i f f i c u l t i e s of h i s s i t u a t i o n : -
'.... I w i l l assure your Lordship i t would 
be much easier to f i l l volumes with a l l 
one hears than to s e l e c t a l i t t l e truth 
from the M u l t i p l i c i t y of Falsehood with 
which i t i s blended'.5 
As Ambassador, we can see that Stormont was well aware of his 
r o l e as the transmitter of information about the attitudes and 
opinions of the French to the government i n London. He Weis the 
expert on the spot, and as such he was not only expected to report 
the f a c t s i b u t also to give an expert opinion on them, especially 
upon matters which affected B r i t a i n . I n this role, both Stormont 
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and St, Paul were extremely conscientious, and we can see that 
Stormont was c e r t a i n l y aware of the heavy weight of. 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which lay upon h i s shoulders i n the taking of 
B r i t i s h policy decisions towards France. He knew that, as the 
o f f i c i a l channel of information, with access to the French 
Ministers, h i s infomiation was l i a b l e to be given most weight 
i n the deliberations of the B r i t i s h government. To be misled 
either into believing every wild rumour or into a f a l s e sense 
of s e c u r i t y could lead equally to disaster for h i s country and 
for h i s own reputation. I t i s possible that t h i s knowledge 
led him to temporize more often than he should have done i n 
h i s despatches: to balance the opinions of the French public 
against those of the ministers; to give greater weight to the 
opinions of the ministers than was j u s t i f i e d by the facts of 
the s i t u a t i o n . I t i s also possible that t h i s tendency to 
temporize f a i l e d to make the danger of the situation 
s u f f i c i e n t l y c lear to the London government, despite the fact 
that the majority of Stormont's advice was cautionary. 
There were two major items about which the envoys i n 
P a r i s had to keep the B r i t i s h government informed. F i r s t , 
the French Navy; any increase i n a c t i v i t y i n the naval 
dockyards, esp e c i a l l y those at Brest and Toulon, could 
generally be interpreted as representing a threat to B r i t a i n , 
Second, they had to report on any a c t i v i t y in French ports 
which showed that assistance was being sent to the rebel 
colonies i n America, These two items were of great importance, 
and together they occupy much of the correspondence between 
London and P a r i s i n the years between 1775 and 1778, I t i s 
perhaps surprising to note, i n view of the evidence produced 
by Dr, Stephenson,^ that the B r i t i s h government and i t s envoys 
were more concerned about French naval preparations than they 
were about the p o s s i b i l i t y of aid being sent to the Americans. 
From the very beginning of Louis XVI»s reign, naval 
a c t i v i t y was on the increase i n French por^ts. I n contrast to 
the rather lax administration of Bourgeois de Boynes i n the 
l a s t years of Louis .XV, Sartines brought a nev; enthusiasm to 
the Marine. This nev/ approach, and the speed with which 
Stormont became aware of i t eire reflected by two l e t t e r s , both 
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written on 21 September 1774, approximately a month after 
S a r t i n e s ' appointment. I n the f i r s t , Stormont reported a 
large quantity of shipbuilding material recently arrived at 
Toulon; he went on:-
'This I n t e l l i g e n c e i f true . . . . . s u f f i c i e n t l y 
shows that France now means to pay great 
Attention to Her Marine, which ce r t a i n l y was 
much neglected ... I do not think t h i s i s 
done with any' immediate h o s t i l e view'.7 
In the second despatch, he wrote:-
'For my Part, I must own that I cannot but 
wish that Maurepas' Ministry may continue, 
as I am persuaded i t w i l l be gentle, moderate 
and p a c i f i c , not uiisimilar to that of 
Cardinal Fleury .... (except that) great and 
constant Attention w i l l be given to Naval 
A f f a i r s . Since t h i s i s to be the case, 
i t i s fortimate that i t happens at a Time 
when our attention and a c t i v i t y w i l l at 
l e a s t keep Pace with Theirs'.° 
Storment's attitude remained the-same throughout much of 
h i s correspondence with h i s superiors i n London. I n spite of 
the naval preparations which he knew f u l l well were being 
undertaken, he s t i l l remained convinced that France did not 
intend to embark on a war with Great B r i t a i n . This attitude 
persisted as l a t e as 1776 i n a s e r i e s of despatches from Paris 
to London. These began when S t . Paul reported that orders had 
been sent on 3 June 1776 to Brest, Rochefort and Toulon for 
the preparation of a f l e e t of f i f t e e n ships of war.^ I t i s 
possible that these orders may have been connected with the 
quarrel between Spain and Portugal, but whatever the cause, 
these events were not regarded as threatening, S t . Paul 
reported to ^Weymouth that Vergennes had, as usual, stated 
that these orders had been issued with a view to restoring 
the French f l e e t to a proper state of repair. But St. Paul 
did add the following warning:-
' I w i l l not pretend to say. My Lord, that 
c i l l t h i s i s a Blind, But I beg leave to 
express my apprehensions that there may be 
some ho s t i l e design i n these Preparations, 
tho» according to the nearest calculation I 
understand that very few ships could be got 
i n readiness to put to sea t i U towards the 
end of August'.^° 
Even t h i s warning was of the mildest kind and attempted to 
play down the danger as much as possible. 
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I n a l e t t e r written from Dunkirk f i v e days prior to the 
above despatch. Captain Frazer, the resident B r i t i s h 
Commissioner there, OTOte on the same subject. He drew 
attention to the extraordineiry demands that were being made 
for naval workmen to be sent from Flanders to Brest, But 
even he could find no f a u l t with t h i s . He wrote that he f e l t 
t h i s was due to the neglect of the French navy i n recent years, 
and that there was nothing to 'indicate Warlike Preparations', 
Lord Stormont returned to h i s post i n the midst of this -
alarm, and i t seans that he investigated i t i n considerable 
d e t a i l . He eventually wrote an immensely long report on the 
subject, which ran to sixteen manuscript pages, i n which he 
attempted to take a balanced view of a f f a i r s . He had found 
that the naval preparations were being pushed forward with 
great energy, indeed they 'could not be pushed with more 
Vigour at the Eve of a War', But, inspite of these 
preparations, the other signs seemed to point away from a 
war. Stormont's friends i n the diplomatic corps informed 
him that France was not capable of undertaking a war. I n 
addition there were no signs i n society or from the trading 
companies that a war was l i k e l y . Stormont»s d i f f i c u l t i e s 
were further increased by the f a c t that he-was constantly 
receiving peaceful assiirances from the French Ministers, 
and that he was aware that France was f i n a n c i a l l y and 
m i l i t a r i l y weak. These factors together with the apparently 
unambitious personality of Louis XVI appeared to make a war 
u n l i k e l y . At the end of h i s report, Stormont t r i e d to 
form a balanced opinion from the pieces of conflicting 
evidence:-
».,,.if the Intention of France should be 
to protract the War i n America, by Raising 
the Hopes of the Rebels, and alarming us, i f 
we are hasty i n catching the alarm, we help 
her to work the very mischief she designs. 
Perhaps a Middle Way may be found, by 
preparing i n secret for the worst that may 
happen, and by using every endeavour to 
discover the exact state and progress from 
Day to Day of these Armaments of which I can 
never hope to send you more than GenereLL 
Information'.^2 
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The correspondence from P a r i s i s f u l l of despatches such as 
t h i s , which contained large quantities of information but which 
f a i l e d to come to any definite conclusion. I n f a c t , when i t 
came to the point where Stormont f e l t obliged to give an 
opinion, i t was almost always the case that he concluded that 
France had no h o s t i l e intentions towards B r i t a i n , V/e must now, 
therefore t r y to fi n d out why t h i s was the case, when, looking 
back on these events, i t seems evident that France was planning 
war and was preparing her naval forces for i t . 
The f i r s t and most important factor which affected the 
views of the B r i t i s h envoys i n Paris was the constant and 
very strong assurances, which they both received from 
Vergennes and Maurepas, that the court of France had no 
aggressive intentions towards Great B r i t a i n . Examples of these 
assurances and the i r effect upon the attitudes of the envoys 
can be found throughout the period. 
After a naval scare i n A p r i l of 1775 which was reported 
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by S t . Paul he went on to report that Vergennes had assured 
him »sur son honneur' that France was preparing nothing but a 
small squadron of f r i g a t e s . 
'A l l he (Vergennes) could say, was, that 
they had no intention whatsoever to arm 
any ships of the l i n e and that I might 
be persuaded of His Most Chri s t i a n 
Majesty's p a c i f i c dispositions'.-'•'* 
After the naval scare of June and J u l y 1776 (see note 13) 
the same type of assurances were given to the B r i t i s h envoys. 
On t h i s occasion the despatch was from Lord Stormont, who had 
j u s t returned to France. He reported that he had been to an 
audience with Vergennes and had been impressed by h i s 
'appearance of openness and c o r d i a l i t y ' . Vergennes had told 
him that he hoped B r i t a i n would not be-cilarmed by the i d l e 
reports i n the newspapers; Storment's report of the i r 
conversation continued:-
'Be assured My Lord, said he, that you 
f i n d us i n the same p a c i f i c disposition 
i n which you l e f t us, and that what we 
are doing i n our ports has no ho s t i l e 
view'. 
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Vergennes also assured Stormont that France was 'making no armament', 
and he went on to say 'positively that the King h i s Master wished 
and meant Peace'. These assurances so impressed the B r i t i s h 
ambassador that he concluded h i s report as follows:-
'There Seems to me no s u f f i c i e n t Reason 
to believe that France has ordered or 
means to order any great immediate Naval 
Annament neither do I think that the 
present French Ministry have formed any 
design of disturbing the public Tranquility 
by a wanton unprovoked attack upon Great 
B r i t a i n ' . 
But again Stormont could not trust himself s u f f i c i e n t l y to leave t h i s 
as h i s fineil word. He went on to hedge th i s statement about with 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . He did not mean that France would never attack B r i t a i n , 
nor that she would not take advantage of circumstances to do so; but 
he did f e e l that, i n the present situation, and granted the 
continuation of the present ministry, France would not attack B r i t a i n 
without a reason.-^5 
Such assurances that France was not anxious to disturb the peace 
of Europe continued unabated into 1777 and were very desirable from 
the point of view of the B r i t i s h government. These declarations of 
peaceful intent were especially useful i n the domestic sphere eis a 
counter to the opposition's accusations that the government was 
badly informed about the intentions of the French ministry. Indeed 
as early as 1774 the Secretary of State wrote to Paris with a request 
for information on the intentions of France, giving the reason for 
h i s request:-
'As the scene of the new Parliament i s now 
opening where the Discussion of the American 
A f f a i r s w i l l be brought on, I have only to 
add at present that I s h a l l be glad to be 
informed from your Excy of the Language that 
i s held upon them at the court where you 
reside'.16 
I n a second despatch which was sent shortly after t h i s , Rochford 
again requested information and detailed the claims that had been 
made by Shelbume when he had said that France was preparing weir. 
Stormont's reply, of 7 December 1774 (quoted above pp 46 & 47 
formed the basis of the government's reply to these accusations; i t 
Weis upon such reports from P a r i s that the government depended in order 
to be able to counter the opposition attacks. 
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Apart from these strong and sustained assurances from the French 
ministers, what other factors persuaded Stormont and St. Paul that 
France had no ho s t i l e intentions towards B r i t a i n ? The second reason 
for t h i s conviction was the apparently h o s t i l e attitude of Spain, 
During the early part of the period the Spanish appeared to be more 
threatening to England than the French, and Stormont and St. Paul 
both seem to have been convinced that any ho s t i l e moves on the part 
of France were only undertaken at the instigation of the Spanish. 
Thus i t seemed that the French were the reluctant partners i n t h i s 
aggression and therefore that any j u s t i f i e d anxiety ought to be 
directed at Spain. 
Indeed there was some evidence for t h i s during the period when 
Strain and Portugal were i n dispute over the i r South American colonies, 
and Spain had been very keen to draw France into the dispute. 
However, at that stage, a war would not have served French interests 
at a l l , and they refused to become involved. This refusal had the 
e f f e c t of persuading the B r i t i s h envoys i n Paris of the peaceful 
intentions of France, because she had restrained the belligerent 
Spanish from plunging Europe into a general war. This impression Weis 
played upon by the French to good e f f e c t . I n July of 1776 Vergennes 
declared to Stormont 
' with a very grave Look and Melancholy Tone 
of Voice, I wish to God that the General Tranquility 
may continue u n t i l i t i s disturbed by you or us, Ce 
n'est n i de vous n i de nous que J ' a i peur',^7 
Vergennes was expressing fears for the continuation of peace because 
he f e l t some thi r d power might cause a wari i n the context of the time 
such a t h i r d power could only have been Spain. 
I n addition to these factors, Stormont and St, Paul were further 
convinced of the b e l l i c o s e nature of Spanish policy by the personality 
of the Spanish ambassador i n P a r i s , D'Aranda. D'Aranda's approach was 
indeed aggressive, and he would have li k e d nothing better than to see 
France and Spain fight a war against B r i t a i n . B u t he was often 
out of sympathy with the feelings and intentions of the Spanish 
government i n Madrid, Under Grimaldi's leadership Spanish policy 
moved very slowly, and af t e r h i s f a l l i n February 1777, the policy 
of the Spanish government d r i f t e d away from D'Aranda's approach. 
Indeed under i t s new leader, the Count of Florida Blanca, the Spanish 
ministry wais h o s t i l e to any schemes for open involvement with the 
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rebel colonists i n North America. Spain was certainly no friend to 
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B r i t a i n , but she did not, under the new ministry, want to go to war. 
Her intention weis to humble Great B r i t a i n by giving encouragement to 
the rebels i n secret, thus prolonging the war and causing exhaustion 
to both B r i t a i n and the colonies. Such a r e s u l t would have served 
Spain we l l , by hiimiliating B r i t a i n and by demonstrating to colonial 
areas how hard a struggle i t would be to win freedom. 
The t h i r d factor which prevented the B r i t i s h envoys i n P a r i s from 
reporting French intentions accurately Wcis that everything in the 
internal situation of France suggested that a war was far from 
desirable for her. France appeared to be f i n a n c i a l l y weak, m i l i t a r i l y 
disorganized and, as a colonial power herself, i t seemed unlikely that 
she would openly sympathise with the rebellious colonists of another. 
I t has already been noted (see above pp 38) that these ideas had 
influenced the thinking of some p o l i t i c i a n s at home; they were also 
expressed i n the despatches from P a r i s , I n the early months of 1776 
S t . Paul wrote to Lord Weymouth that he was hopeful that the French 
government had decided i n favour of peace. He based t h i s opinion on 
the f a c t s that St, Germain was i n the process of reforming the army; 
that the financieil reforms of Turgot would require some considerable 
time to take effect; that the sum of 8, to 10,000,000 l i v r e s which 
would be needed to prepare a f l e e t was more than France could afford; 
and l a s t l y that the o f f i c e r s of the French navy were very poor:-
' I declare I do not know they have s i x sea o f f i c e r s 
capable of commanding three ships'.20 
The in t e r n a l situation of France certa i n l y did appear to indicate 
that France would not wish to become involved i n a war; however th i s 
was an appearance which was to prove deceptive. There can be no 
doubt that, e s p e c i a l l y i n the e a r l i e r part of the period, the B r i t i s h 
envoys i n P c i r i s did tend to be too re-assi^ring i n their reports to 
the B r i t i s h government. 
I f the majority of despatches from Paris contained re-assuring 
phrases about French intentions, there were two occasions, as we 
have already noted, when fears were expressed that a wair was about to 
break out. These took place i n A p r i l 1775 and June to July 1776 and 
we must now look to see how the B r i t i s h government reacted to these 
alarms. .There are three major sources which we can consult to 
discover these reactions. F i r s t , the reports of Parliamentary debates 
w i l l show whether the government showed signs of anxiety in public. 
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whether they informed Parliament of the armaments in France and 
whether the opposition was either aware of these alarms or more 
concerned by them than the government. Second we may look to the 
King's correspondence to see whether this showed concern on the part 
of the King or Lord North. Thirdly we may examine the Sandwich papers 
to see what moves were made by the Admireilty to take account of these 
reports. 
The news of the naval armament of A p r i l 1775 which was reported by 
St. Paul hardly caused a ripple on the calm surface of Parliamentary 
debates. The only occasion on which the p o s s i b i l i t y of a danger from 
France was discussed i n the Spring of 1775, weis during the debate on 
the Navy Estimates v;hich was held on 13 February, some two months 
before S t . Paul reported the French armament. I n this debate the 
government requested permission to r a i s e an additional 2,000 men to 
enable them to enforce the mesisures which they had pi armed for America 
d\iring that year. I n reply to t h i s , Captain VJalsingham for the 
opposition, agreed that the force i n America Weis i n s u f f i c i e n t , but he 
contended that i f a large enough force were sent the coast l i n e of 
Great B r i t a i n would be derived of defences. He said he was r e l i a b l y 
informed that France had 75 ships of the l i n e , more than h a l f of which 
were armed, and i n that s i t u a t i o n he f e l t that a l l the ships B r i t a i n 
possessed i n the world would not 'defend us at home shoiild we rush 
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blindly into a c i v i l war'. Although this was a speech which was 
made to oppose the government's policy towards the Americans, i t i s 
notable that i t did so on the-ground of the dire consequences which 
wotild follow at home. Fear of France weis the basis of t h i s objection, 
but Walsingham f a i l e d to make any e f f e c t on the Members of Parliament 
with t h i s speech, and the motion was passed without so much as a 
d i v i s i o n . 
During the second naveil aleinn of June and J u l y 1776, Parliament 
was i n recess, and so there was no opportunity for the opposition to 
attack the government at the time. However, although the government 
was aware of French naval preparations, there was no mention of them 
i n the King's Speech which closed the Parliament i n May, nor i n that 
which opened the new session i n October. I n May the King was pleased 
to announce:-
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•No a l t e r a t i o n has happened i n the state of foreign 
a f f a i r s since your meeting; and i t i s with pleasure 
that I inform you that the assurances which I have 
received of the dispositions of the severed powers 
i n Europe, promise a continuance of the general 
t r a n q u i l l i t y ' . 2 2 
I n October the general tone of the Speech remained re-assuring, but 
a cautious note weis sounded i n the section which related to foreign 
a f f a i r s : -
• I continue to receive assurances of amity from 
the several courts of Eurppe I think -
nevertheless that, i n the present situation of 
a f f a i r s i t i s expedient that we should be i n a 
respectable state of defence at home'.23 
Although t h i s Statement avoided any reference to a s p e c i f i c threat, 
and although the precaution which i t advocated was certainly a sensible 
one, i t provoked a storm of protest during the debate i n the Hoiise of 
Lords on the address of thanks to the King. The opposition brought 
t h e i r f u l l weight to bear on t h i s Statement. The Dukes of Manchester, 
Richmond and Grafton and Lord Shelbume a l l attacked the government in 
the strongest possible terms. The Duke of Manchester began the attack:-
•His Grace remarked on that passage i n the 
Speech r e l a t i v e to assurances of amity said 
to be received from the severeil courts of 
Europe, i n a very pointed manner. He said 
i t contained the most improbable information 
that could well be conceived, unless we 
supposed that the framers of the speech, and 
those who advised the present naval armaments, 
thought d i f f e r e n t l y on the same day or were not 
the same persons. I f , he said, such assurances 
were given and could be depended upon, why were 
we resorting to a "Press" to man the Navy? I f 
on the other hand, those assurances of amity 
were not to be r e l i e d on, why deceive the 
public and Parliament i n so gross and flagrant 
a manner? Way delude them into dangerous repose? 
Why t e l l them on the eve of a rupture that we 
were i n a state of perfect t r a n q u i l l i t y ? ' 
Manchester then v/ent on to point out that France was widely rumoured 
to be carrying on an open commerce with the rebels, which, he f e l t , 
proved that she was i n the f i r s t stages of open enmity with Great 
B r i t a i n . I n addition he pointed to the ho s t i l e intentions of Spain 
towards Portugal, and concluded that whether Spain attacked Portugal 
or France a l l i e d with the Americans, the r e s u l t would be the same, 
namely that B r i t a i n would be at war with the House of Bourbon. 
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The Duke of Richmond spoke next and he reiterated many of the 
points which had already been made, but he also gave a more detailed 
analysis of the situation which might face B r i t a i n . He envisaged a 
time when B r i t a i n would be involved i n a war with the colonies and a 
war with France and Spain and he also drew a bleak picture of the 
domestic p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n : -
• our only natural defence at the mercy at 
t h i s instant of our enemies, an accumulating debt 
divided councils, and a distracted people on the 
verge of despair'. 
Richmond's solution to t h i s apparently desperate situation was to 
effect an immediate r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with the colonists 'upon any 
terms'.25 
To t h i s speech Lord Sandwich f e l t duty bound to reply. He said 
that l e s s than h a l f the men i n the navy v/ere serving in America, and 
that the naval forces i n home x^raters v;ere quite s u f f i c i e n t for the 
defence and protection of B r i t a i n ' s coasts. He also asserted that 
B r i t a i n had received the f u l l e s t assurances of peace from France and 
Spain, but that the government f e l t i t would be wise to prepare for 
the worst. He u t t e r l y rejected Richmond's proposal 
'recommending a .ireconciliation v/ith America 
upon any terms, even upon grounds of admitting 
t h e i r independency, he could not endure the 
thought ...he would r i s k everything rather 
than accede to i t ' . ^ ^ 
The Duke of Grafton then joined the attack on the ministry, but 
he pursued rather a different l i n e . After he had drawn attention to 
the positive information which he had received about the naval 
preparations at Cadiz and Brest, he went on to blame the present weak 
position of Great B r i t a i n on the lack of information furnished by the 
ministry to Parliament. He f e l t that the nation had been l u l l e d into 
a f a l s e sense of security and that i f the naveil forces at present in 
B r i t a i n were too small, then the nation had been misled. However, 
Sandwich re p l i e d to t h i s protest by saying that the squadron at Brest 
consisted of only s i x ships of the l i n e and that even had i t been 
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larger, B r i t a i n was ready for i t . 
Lord Shelbume then laiinched the most vehement assault of a l l 
upon the governmenti He claimed that i t v/as commonly knovm that 
France and Spain were planning war; that there was a formidable 
squadron f i t t i n g out at Brest; that the French and Spanish ports 
were openly used by the American privateers, both i n Europe and the 
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West Indies; that supplies of arms were sent every day from France 
to the colonists; and f i n a l l y that three representatives from the 
rebels were now i n residence at V e r s a i l l e s ; He l a i d the blame for 
t h i s state of a f f a i r s at the door of the minister who was responsible 
for knowledge of French a f f a i r s because he had f a i l e d to procure 
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accurate information. From t h i s evidence, Shelbume told the Lords, 
he was forced to come to the conclusiong 'that we do not continue to 
receive assurances of amity' from European courts, and that i t was 
f o o l i s h to t e l l Parliamenti; to r e l y upon such assurances even i f they 
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had been received. Hov/ever, inspite of this prolonged and b i t t e r 
attack, the House of Lords accepted the speech and approved an 
address of thanks which declared that they were well s a t i s f i e d with 
the assurances which the ministry had given them. 
Thus i n the Parliamentary context the government was concerned to 
play down the potential danger of which, as the despatches from Paris 
show, they were well aware. At the same time the ministers were 
anxious to give the impression that they were well i n control of the 
si t u a t i o n at home and that a l l the necessary measures were being taken 
to combat any possible dangers from the Bourbon powers. I t i s also 
p l a i n from these exchanges that, by October 1776, the opposition had 
become aware of the threat that loomed from across the channel, and 
that they were doing t h e i r best to make the B r i t i s h aware of i t . 
Before we turn to an examination of the reasons why the opposition 
f a i l e d to convince the B r i t i s h of their danger, eind an examination of 
the government's hopes and intentions, we must now look at the King's 
correspondence and at the Sandwich papers 
I n the King's papers v/e would expect to see a measure of concern 
at the disturbing news which the Secretary of State had received from 
P a r i s . However, i t i s surprising to find that the naval scare of 
1775 does not receive any attention i n the l e t t e r s written to the King 
or by him u n t i l a f t e r i t was over. On the 18 A p r i l 1775 St. Paul 
reported that the rumours of the armament v/ere groundless and i t i s 
not u n t i l 20 A p r i l that the f i r s t reference to this edarm appecu:*s in 
the King's papers. On that date Lord North wrote to the King:-
•»Lord North begs leave to return to his majesty 
h i s most grateful acknowledgements for the 
communication of the good news from P a r i s . 
He came to to\-m t h i s morning, after reading 
Mr. S t . Paul's dispatches very melancholy, 
and almost convinced that i t would be necessary 
to s e t speedily upon prepsirations for our defense'.^^ 
102, 
Lord Rochford, who was s t i l l the Secretary of State at that time, mote 
the next day. He appeared to have doubted whether the French had ever 
been arming, and gave i t eis h i s opinion that an agent should be sent 
to France to discover whether the French v/ere prepeo'ing for war or 
not; i f they were arming, then Rochford's opinion was that t h i s was 
l i k e l y to be at the inst i g a t i o n of Spain and with h o s t i l e intentions 
towards Portugal. Whatever the r e a l i t i e s of the situation, Rochford 
Wcis convinced that no steps should be taken u n t i l the agent's report 
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had been received. 
The same day as Rochford wrote t h i s l e t t e r . North wrote to the 
King a second time. I t i s evident that, by t h i s time, North had 
completely recovered h i s nerve. He wrote, with a good deal of s e l f -
s a t i s f a c t i o n , that he could not help but 'commend myself for having 
deferred taking any steps u n t i l the former bad accoiaxt should be 
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confirmed'. These three comments are a l l the attention that was 
given to t h i s naval alarm i n l e t t e r s to the King. The King himself 
does not appear to have written on the subject. Therefore, although 
North was somewhat disturbed by the f i r s t r e p o r t s , ^ i t i s evident that 
he quickly recovered h i s nerve, and t h i s particular scare passed away 
v/ithout causing any r e a l or prolonged anxiety among the B r i t i s h 
ministers. 
The c r i s i s of June and J u l y 1776 shows a different pattern of 
events. This was f i r s t reported by S t . Paul i n a despatch to the new 
Secretary of State, Lord Weymouth on 12 June 1776. He-wrote that 
orders had been sent to Brest on 3 Jvine, for the preparation of 15 
ships of the l i n e . This despatch would have reached London on 
approximately 17 June, However there are no l e t t e r s from either.North 
or Weymouth to the King at t h i s date. Instead we find l e t t e r s from 
Sandwich i n which he was trying to obtain approval of measures to 
strengthen the navy. There appears a document, written on 20 June, 
e n t i t l e d 'Remarks on the State of His Majesty's F l e e t ' , i n which i t 
was stated that there were at that time 29 ships of the l i n e f i t t e d 
as Guardships (see note A at end of chapter) which could be got to 
sea i n two weeks with the aid of a "Press". I n addition to these 
there Wcis one other 74 gunned ship being prepared. Later i n the 
document i t i s stated that i n the event of a war 20 ships of the l i n e 
could be counted as f i t for service within a year of thei r receiving 
orders to f i t out, assuming that men could be found for them. The 
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document concluded by making a l i s t of s i x recommendations as to the 
actions which B r i t a i n ought to take i f i t should be f e l t that the 
preparations of France and Spain demanded attention. F i r s t , an 
extra guardship shovild be f i t t e d out at each of the ports. Second, 
immediate orders should be issued to prepare a further 12 ships of 
the l i n e : t h i s would put B r i t a i n on an equal footing with the f l e e t 
at Brest although France v/ould s t i l l be at an advantage because she 
could r a i s e crews more quickly. Third, the workmen in the yards 
should be allowed to work double tides. Fourth, the Marines should 
be increased from 90 to 100 per company. F i f t h , volunteer seamen 
should continue to be raised. Sixth and Isist, though this measure 
was eventually to cause most d i f f i c u l t y , secret preparations should 
be made so that a "Press" could be put quickly and ef f e c t i v e l y into 
action i f the answers that were received from foreign powers were not 
s a t i s f a c t o r y . The document ended by drawing attention to two 
unpopular consequences of adopting these measures. F i r s t l y the number 
of seamen voted by Peirliament would be exceeded; secondly considerable 
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expenditure v/ould be caused. Although this document i s not signed 
i t seems evident that i t must have been drawn up by Sandwich, or by 
one of h i s s t a f f , to impress upon the King the weak condition of the 
navy, despite the appearance of strength on paper. 
That i t was not only v/ithin the Admiralty that there was considerable 
alami i s shown- by the fac t that a cabinet meeting Wcis held on the 
evening of that same day. At t h i s meeting i t was agreed that five of 
the s i x measures put fon^ard above should be put into operation; 
the exception was the th i r d proposal i n regard to the workmen in the 
ship yards. This decision, i t was recorded, was taken as a res u l t 
of 
'the l a t e intelligence received r e l a t i v e to 
the armaments i n the Ports of France and Spain'. 
Further indication of warlike preparations i n the French and 
Spanish naval bases must have reached London shortly after this meeting 
in a document printed i n the King's correspondence under the t i t l e 
'A paper of In t e l l i g e n c e ' , dated 20 June 1776. This document, which 
Weis compiled from information which had been received from Rotterdam 
and other sources, stated that the French had sent orders to their ports 
that great preparations v;ere to be made, and for a squadron to be sent 
to the East Indies, while m i l i t a r y reinforcements were to be sent to 
104. 
the West Indian i s l a n d s . Spain also v/as reported to have undertaken 
a considerable programme of preparations. This paper came to the 
concliision that France and Spain had, or soon v/ould have, more ships 
i n commission than Great B r i t a i n \«iless steps were taken to keep 
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pace v/ith t h e i r preparations. This paper, which must almost 
c e r t a i n l y have arrived eifter the cabinet meeting would have served 
to strengthen the convictions of the ministers that the actions they 
had ordered were correct. I f i t should have been read before the 
meeting, i t would have acted as a further spur to the taking of 
precautions. 
This c r i s i s was evidently treated much more seriously than that 
of 1775, and, bearing t h i s i n mind, i t i s surprising to find no 
written comments by either the King or Lord North on this matter. 
The succeeding eight documents printed by Fortescue have no r e l a t i o n 
to either France and Speiin or America, but are concerned with 
discussions betv/een the King and North over court appointments. I t 
was not vintil the end of August that there was another communication 
on naval a f f a i r s , and again the subject was raised by Sand\-/ich. This 
time he requested permission to equip 6 extra ships of the l i n e , and 
36 
again there was no written reply from the King. 
V/amings that France and Spain might be preparing for war continued 
to reach London throughout the l a t e summer and autumn of 1776, and i n 
October, Sandwich, who was evidently s t i l l very anxious, wrote to the 
King proposing a s e r i e s of eleven measures which ought to be taken 
v/ithout delay. These included a General "Press", the manning of the 
Guardships to the i r f u l l v/artime l e v e l s , employing more workmen i n the 
shipyards and making them work longer hours, warning Gibraltar and 
Minorca to be on t h e i r guard and pressing ahead with the construction 
and provisioning of the ships in the ports. Sandwich concluded t h i s 
despatch by making two very interesting requests. F i r s t that Lord 
Howe should be asked to send back from America a l l the petty o f f i c e r s 
that had been sent to him; second that the Treaisury and the Ordnance 
should be advised that no more petty o f f i c e r s could be spared from 
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the home f l e e t . 
This whole paper i s of great i n t e r e s t . I t c l e a r l y shows that the 
B r i t i s h navy was i n a weakened condition, and i t also shows that, by 
contrast to the complacent attitudes of the other ministers, Sand\/ich 
v/as very anxious about t h i s state of a f f a i r s . I f these measures had 
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been put into operation immediately, there would have been 39 ships 
of the l i n e either at sea or ready to put to sea when manned. Of these 
39, four would have been outside Eviropean waters - two in America, 
one i n the Mediterranean and one i n the Far East - giving a strength 
i n home waters of 35, of which twelve would have been ready to 
receive men. This l e f t an e f f e c t i v e l y active strength of 23 l i n e 
of b a t t l e ships which were guardships. This force faced a French 
f l e e t , reported i n the I n t e l l i g e n c e report of 20 June, to number 
24 ships of the l i n e , and a Spanish f l e e t which, the same report 
stated, contained 7 ships of the l i n e f u l l y prepared and a further 
15 being made ready. 
As well as giving a c l e a r impression of the danger which stemmed 
from the weakness of the Royal Navy, the paper i s also of i n t e r e s t ! 
because i t shows Sandwich's attitude towards America. He was prepared 
to v/eaken the f l e e t i n America i n order to create a safer situation 
at home; the withdrawal of petty o f f i c e r s and the refusal to send 
others were serious steps to take, for the petty o f f i c e r s were the 
backbone of the navy, e s p e c i a l l y during a war when large niimners of 
men were newly recruited and lacked experience or knowledge of the 
sea. This r e s t r i c t i o n on the American f l e e t may have stemmed from 
personal animosity between Sandwich and Howe, but i t seems f a r more 
l i k e l y that i t r e f l e c t e d a genuine fear on Sandwich's part of the 
consequences of weakening the Home f l e e t too greatly. F i n a l l y t h i s 
document shows the d i f f i c u l t y which Sandwich v/as having i n persuading 
North of the dangers of the s i t u a t i o n . This i s to be seen i n 
Sandwich's request to the King that he advise the Treasury and the 
Ordnance that no further petty o f f i c e r s could be spared. 
However, there were some indications that the ministers were 
becoming av/are of the dangers of the s i t u a t i o n . Apart from the 
Cabinet minute which has been noted above, there were two other signs 
which indicate that action was being taken. F i r s t there i s the 
reference i n the Duke of Manchester's speech, quoted above, to the 
f a c t that a "Press" v/as being put into operation. Second there i s the 
passage i n the King's Speech, where i t was stated that, despite the 
assurances from foreign powers, His Majesty considered that i t v/ould 
be proper to put B r i t a i n i n a respectable.condition of defence at 
home. These points make i t appear l i k e l y that the government was 
planning to take steps to ensure against attack. 
106. 
This impression i s confirmed by a l e t t e r from Lord Weymouth to 
Lord Stormont w i t t e n at the end of October 1776 i n which he wrote:-
•The very strong and seemingly sincere assurances 
given by the French Ministers, that these^ 
arihaments v/ere no more than to restore their navy 
from the neglected state i n which i t had long 
l a i n , to that i n which i t ought to be maintained, 
give no svifficient cause to take any preparatory 
steps on our part; and His Majesty, ever sincere 
i n h i s own professions was unwilling to doubt the 
truth of t h e i r s . 
Yet the a c t i v i t y and diligence with v/hich they 
have continued t h e i r warlike preparations 
makes i t e s s e n t i a l l y necessary that His Majesty 
should take some steps, that he may not be 
unprepared i f any motive should prompt the 
Court of V e r s a i l l e s to depart from that system 
of peace. They have so industriously proclaimed 
i t was t h e i r wish to maintain'. 
However, even i n t h i s l e t t e r , when a new and firmer note appeeirs to;-
be entering B r i t i s h policy towards France, Weymouth added the following 
cautionary note:-
•At the same time that your Excellency acquaints 
M. de Vergennes and M, :de Maurepas with His 
Majesty's resolution to prepare Himself for 
defense i f attacked; you are to renew i n His 
Majesty's name h i s declarations of the most 
earnest and sincere desire of maintaining the 
general peace'. 
This l a s t point, Stormont was instructed to make very forcefully. He 
was also told to assure the French ministers that any preparations 
made by B r i t a i n had no r e l a t i o n to the dispute between Spain and 
Portugal. Stormont*s f i n a l instruction was to 'carefully avoid any 
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phrase that s h a l l convey either menace or offence'. 
The news that B r i t a i n was j u s t beginning to take precautions may 
have come as something of a shock to Stormont, who had been urging for 
some time that B r i t a i n ' s best defence lay i n vigilance and her own 
state of preparedness. However, i f i t was a svurprise to him, he did 
not show i t . Five days l a t e r he reported to Weymouth that he had 
told Vergennes that B r i t a i n weis about to make some preparations. He 
wrote that Vergennes seemed unconcerned at t h i s news and had even 
remarked that i t was very natural that B r i t a i n should want to prepare 
her navy. Vergennes also t r i e d to minimize the armaments which France 
was making, though he gave no s p e c i f i c figures. According to Stormont, 
Vergennes li s t e n e d to the eissurances of B r i t a i n ' s peaceful intentions 
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'with p a r t i c u l a r pleasure', which was not surprising because 
Vergennes did not want a war with Great B r i t a i n u n t i l he was ready 
for i t . F i n a l l y , Stormont wrote that he was pleased with the measures 
which B r i t a i n was taking, and gave h i s opinion that the French 
ministers were too wise to attack B r i t a i n when she was thus 
prepared. 
At t h i s point there i s c l e a r evidence that action was taken over 
the manning of the navy. On 8 November 1776 Mr Buller put forward a 
motion i n the Commons for the r a i s i n g of 45,000 Seamen, including 
10,129 Marines, for the year 1777. This was a considerable increase 
over the establishment voted i n November 1775, to cover the year 1776, 
of 28,000 Seamen, of whom 6,665 were to be marines. This large 
increase i n the numbers of seamen reflected both the government's 
concem at the French preparations and the growth of the B r i t i s h 
navcuL Squadron i n American waters. The fact that t h i s incre£ised 
establishment was requested for 1777 also r e f l e c t s well on Sandwich, 
who was well aware that the French could r a i s e crews for their ships 
more quickly than B r i t a i n i n an emergency, and who therefore took 
t h i s measure to remove some of the p e r i l s of a surprise attack by 
France.^^ 
Lord Sandwich's concern over the naval preparations of France can 
be c l e a r l y seen i n those papers quoted above i n which the B r i t i s h 
navy was compared with the navies of France and Spain, and i n which 
Sandwich urged that action should be taken to remedy the situation 
(see above pp. 102-103 and p. 104). His concern i s also evident i n 
many passages that eire to be found among h i s ovm papers; for example 
the strongly worded exchange of l e t t e r s between Sandwich and North 
in J u l y 1776 (quoted above pp.75 - 77 ) . That this concern on the 
part of the F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty continued into October i s shown 
by the following l e t t e r , also written to North:-
'My Dear Lord - S i r Hugh P a l l i s e r came to see 
me t h i s morning by appointment that we might 
consider what steps are necessary to be taken 
i n the present alarming situation. The accounts 
of the French armaments multiply so fa s t that I 
must t e l l your Lordship that every hour i s 
precious, as the French are certainly greatly 
ahead i n t h e i r preparations, and I dread the 
consequence of t h e i r being at sea before us, I 
enclose some fresh accounts I have j u s t received 
from Lord Weymouth, as also one paper sent me by 
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your Lordship's order, by which you w i l l see that 
everything i s going on i n the French ports with 
the utmost a l a c r i t y ; i f you w i l l give S i r Hugh 
P a l l i s e r and me leave, we w i l l wait on your 
Lordship presently to talk the matter over and 
consider what i s advisable to be done. I f we 
have not our cabinet meeting t i l l Thursday, we 
s h a l l lose four or f i v e days, which as we have 
l o s t so much time already i s a matter of great 
importance'.^1 
Thus i t can be seen that the naval preparations which were 
undertaken by France i n th i s period had a variety of r e s u l t s . I n 
Peurliament they led to clashes between the government and the 
opposition, which the government weis i n general able to surmount 
without great d i f f i c u l t y ; i n the cabinet they led to increased 
s t r a i n s and tensions between Lord Sandwich and Lord North and between 
Sandwich and Lord George Germain; at the Admiralty the preparations 
caused considerable anxiety which at times verged on panic, as i s 
shown i n the f i n a l sentence of Sandwich's l e t t e r to North quoted 
above. However, for the purposes of this study, the important thing 
to notice i s that these preparations, for a l l the reactions which 
they caused i n B r i t a i n , were not allowed to disturb the diplomatic 
re l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and France, and that both countries seem 
to have been anxious that they should not do so. 
At the beginning of t h i s chapter i t was stated that both the 
naval preparations of France and the aid sent by France to America 
would be examined to see what effects they had on B r i t i s h policy 
towards France, I f we can see that the naval preparations had few 
re s u l t s i n t h i s f i e l d , i t i s now time to turn to the question of 
secret aid. Here we s h a l l find a very different picture, for i t was 
over the question of French assistance to the rebels that Vergennes 
and Stormont exchanged thei r strongest language; and i t weis on th i s 
question, not that of naval preparations, that the open breach between 
the two countries f i n a l l y came about. 
I n Chapter I I I , while we were examining the problems which faced 
Great B r i t a i n i n t h i s period, we noted the length of time which 
elapsed between the outbreak of revolt i n the American colonies and 
the date on which the French Ministry f i n a l l y resolved to pursue a 
policy of clandestine a i d to the colonists. Some of the factors 
which caused t h i s delay were also noted: lack of support from Louis 
XVI; the opposition of two leading ministers, Maurepas and Turgot; 
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and a lack of enthusieism for the venture by the King of Spain and 
h i s Ministers. However, the fact that the Ministry had not decided 
to send help to the colonists did not mean that no assistance was 
sent. I n fact , quite large quantities of aid were sent from France 
and other European countries, mainly from private sources. Such 
private trading was a common occurrence in such situations in the 
eighteenth century, and a government, such as that of France, which 
was well disposed towards the rebels, could e a s i l y connives at such 
a trade. 
I n the spring and siunmer of 1776 two events changed the nature 
of the s i t u a t i o n . The f i r s t event was the decision of the French 
ministry to adopt the plans drawn up by Vergennes under which aid was 
to be sent to the American rebels. The second event was the a r r i v a l 
at V e r s a i l l e s , in Jime, of the American agent S i l a s Deane, These 
two events put the aid which weis going from France to America on an 
o f f i c i a l footing, and t h i s i n turn meant that, i f the B r i t i s h were, 
to discover t h i s new situation, they would have good reeison to go to 
war with France, 
This decision by the French ministers to send aid to the 
colonists was not taken for a l t r u i s t i c reasons. Vergennes had two 
aims; f i r s t , the humiliation of B r i t a i n , which he f e l t would r e s u l t 
i n a corresponding elevation of France; second, commercial benefits 
which he f e l t would accrue from the fac t that France had been prepared 
to help the rebels. I t i s important to remember that Vergennes had 
no t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions, his aim was to obtain 'the commercial 
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benefits without the headaches of Einpii'e'. Beaumarchais, who was 
the ins t i g a t o r of the whole project, was equally clear i n his aims and 
he had no hesitation i n expressing these very forcefully for Louis' 
consideration. I n l a t e 1775 he wrote to the King urging him to 
provide 2,000,000 l i v r e s to supply money and c a p i t a l to the rebels. 
He wrote:-
'The j u s t i c e and protection which a King owes 
to h i s subjects i s a s t r i c t and rigorous duty; 
while that whichie offers to other states i s 
never more than conventional. Hence i t follows 
that the natural policy which governs states 
d i f f e r s almost wholly from the c i v i l morality 
which governs s t a t e s . . . I t i s the English, 
S i r e , which i t concerns you to weaken and 
humiliate... (America i s ) a formidable weapon 
i n your hand, and one you can use without 
s t r i k i n g a blow so as to weaken and abase your 
natural enemies,.,' 
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I n the same l e t t e r , Beaumarchais shows that he knew that i h i s l e t t e r 
would not appeal to a King, such as Louis XVI, with a strong sense 
of r i g h t ; he excused the suggestion he was making with the words 
',,. were men angels, p o l i t i c a l ways might undoubtedly be disdained'; 
and then, to sweeten the p i l l , he went on to s t r e s s 
'the f a c i l i t y of doing, the certainty of 
success, and the immense harvest of glory 
and Tranquility...• 
which would r e s u l t from a decision to aid the rebels^^. Such 
r e s u l t s , e s p e c i a l l y the prospect of peace, would have appealed to 
Louis XVIo 
Whether or not Beaumarchais believed, as he professed to here, 
and again even more strongly i n the so-called 'Peace or War 
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Memorandum' , that by aiding the rebels the French could avoid a 
war with B r i t a i n , or t h i s was for him, eis i t was for Vergennes, a 
mere stratagem to make h i s suggestion more palatable to Louis XVI, i s 
not p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant to t h i s study. The important fact i s that 
i n May 1776, at the i n s t i g a t i o n of Beaumarchais and with the active 
assistance of Vergennes, the French government decided to give help 
to the American colonists i n t h e i r struggle against B r i t a i n . The 
d e t a i l s were l e f t i n the hands of Vergennes who, on 22 May submitted 
a resolution to the King 'qui doit m'autoriser a fournir un million 
de l i v r e s pour l e service des Colonies Anglaises'.^^ We must now 
look to see how soon the London government became aware cf this 
i l l i c i t trade, and what attempts were made to prevent i t . 
The f i r s t sign that the B r i t i s h government was aware of a trade 
between France and America i s to be found well before the French 
ministry had resolved to send aid. I t i s to be found i n a l e t t e r 
from Lord Rochford to Lord Stormont:-
'We have ce r t a i n Intelligence that a very 
i l l i c i t Trade i s carrying on to His Majesty's 
Colonies i n America, as well by B r i t i s h eis 
foreign ships, and as i t becomes so necessary 
i n the present juncture to prevent as much as 
possible the continuance of i t , Orders have 
been sent to the Commanders of His Majesty's 
ships i n the American Seas to be p a r t i c u l a r l y 
attentive to intercept and seize any B r i t i s h or 
foreign ships which may be found with 
p3?ohibited Goods or Warlike Stores destined for 
His Majesty's colonies i n America. I have not 
thought i t improper to mention th i s to Monsr 
Gcumier and your Excellency may take an 
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opportunity of giving the same notice to 
Monsr de Vergennes, as i t w i l l be much easier 
to prevent Mischief than to apply a Remedy to 
i t afterwards'.46 
Stormont reported that when he acquainted Vergennes with this 
information, the French minister 'readily admitted that such a 
precaution was very proper, at t h i s time' biit he added that he 
doubted if French Ships would indulge in sMch a trade. Stormont also 
stressed that these actions were taken by B r i t a i n as precautions 
and were not intended as threats or accusations against France.47 
Thus we can see that the B r i t i s h government was aware of the 
existence of such a trade from an early date; and we can aUso see 
that they had grasped the f a c t that prevention of the trade would be 
much easier than attempts to stop cargoes being landed i n America. 
Bearing t h i s in mind i t might be expected that the B r i t i s h government 
would have made a sustained effort to prevent aid from leaving the 
ports of France. However, as time passed these sound and positive 
intentions were pursued with l e s s vigour. After several further 
exchanges upon t h i s subject between Stormont and Vergennes i n which 
the ambassador was given strong eissurances that the French King 
'Would c e r t a i n l y never authorize His subjects 
to carry on any i l l i c i t Trade, or protect them 
i n i t and (Vergennes) added that the S t r i c t e s t 
Orders had already been given on that head'48 
the matter was allowed to drop. There v/as no further mention of 
arms t r a f f i c k i n g or eissistance of any kind \mtil J u l y when Rochford 
wrote to S t . Paul that he had been informed that the American 
General Putnam had deposited a lairge sum of money with a Paris bank. 
He asked S t . Paul to fi n d out whether i t weis intended to use t h i s 
money to buy eirms or whether i t had simply been lodged i n Paris for 
greater s e c u r i t y . S t . Paul however could not find anything about this 
at a l l . 
I n September 1775 the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the situation began to 
become apparent to Great B r i t a i n . Rochford wrote to St. Paul that 
'... the general Opinion entertained here ( i s ) 
that the American Rebels are constantly 
eissisted by the French nation, as well from 
Europe as from thei r American islands'. 
He instructed S t. Paul to obtain an audience with Vergennes i n order 
to acquaint him with a report which Rochford had received from the 
Port Master at New York. This report stated that 30 tons of gunpowder 
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had been sent by the governor of the French colony of Santo Domingo 
to the rebels at Philadelphia. Rochford pointed out that i f t h i s 
operation had been ceirried out by a private merchant for the sake of 
p r o f i t , i t would not have caused such an outcry, 
'... but i t must e a s i l y occur to Monsr de Vergennes 
that when a French Governor acts in that manner, i t 
cannot but convey very different ideas, and 
therefore the King makes f u l l reliance that the 
Court of France without delay will cause the 
necessary enquiries to be made about i t , and renew 
such orders as there i s reason to expect i n 
consequence of th e i r repeated friendly declarations'.^^ 
This incident smouldered on u n t i l the end of September, St, Paul, 
as he had been' instructed, complained to Vergennes, and Vergennes 
returned evasive answers; he was certain that the B r i t i s h government 
had been misinformed, and he assured S t . Paul that no aid was sent 
to the rebels with the consent of the French government. Rochford 
however showed that he remained unconvinced by these statements. He 
wrote that B r i t a i n was 'much disposed' to believe the French gave no 
assistance to the rebels 
'But, not withstanding the Language that Monsr de 
Vergennes held to you i n his conversation on that 
subject, i t i s not possible but he must know, i f 
he ever makes the enquiries he promises, that 
very considerable Quantities of Arms and Ammunition 
have been sent from France and the West India 
Islands to several of our colonies in America, 
These practices w i l l not be discontinued unless the 
Intendants and ether o f f i c e r s i n the French Ports.,, 
be not absolutely prohibited from conniving at 
those Embarkations, and do not receive orders to 
present them', 
Rochford then gave d e t a i l s of some of the ships which were known by 
the B r i t i s h government to be i n French ports loading cargoes of 
wcirlike stores for America, He went on:-
'This i s publickly known to- be an i l l i c i t trade 
at a l l times, and at t h i s juncture i n particular 
i s of great prejudice to Great B r i t a i n ' , 
St, Paul was instructed to report these matters to Vergennes as 
occasion offered 'that he may at leeist knov/ that we are apprised of 
what passes,' Rochford concluded that i t was for the French, ' i f 
t h e i r declarations have any meaning' to put the situation right 
v/ithout a formal protest, 
I n h i s reply to t h i s l e t t e r , St, Paul made a very s i g n i f i c a n t 
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observation. Having given d e t a i l s of his conversation with Vergennes 
about t h i s , during which Vergennes repeated h i s assurances, St. Paul 
went on:-
'As your Lordship does not allow me to make a 
formal complaint, I can only mention narratively 
to M. de Vergennes the circumstances which you 
have been pleased to communicate to me, and I 
am therefore a f r a i d ( i f i t i s the intention of 
the French court to connive)- at this i l l i c i t 
commerce) that such language w i l l not have the 
desired effect of putting a stop to it'.51 
St. Paul had, i n t h i s passage, put h i s finger on the basic weakness 
of the B r i t i s h approach to the question of arms t r a f f i c between 
France and the rebels. I f the French were determined to a s s i s t the 
colonists, then mild and informal protests such as St. Paul had been 
instructed to make, would have no e f f e c t . I f , as appeared to be the 
case, Rochford weis convinced that the French court was trying to 
deceive B r i t a i n , then firmer action should have been ordered either 
at t h i s point or shortly afterwards. Instead both St. Paul and 
Stormont, aft e r he returned, continued to make informal complaints 
which Vergennes and Maurepas peirried with l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y . I n 
his f i n a l despatch before Lord Stormont returned, St. Paul again 
stressed that there were many ways i n which the French could help 
the rebels without B r i t a i n ' s knowledge, and he concluded: 
' I am now a f r a i d that there i s some duplicity 
i n the action of t h i s court'.52 
Lord Stormont returned to P a r i s at the end of October and 
immediately had an audience with Vergennes, At this meeting Stormont 
was subjected to the f u l l force of Vergennes' persuasive powers. 
Vergennes used the strongest language i n his denial of any intention 
on the part of France to see B r i t a i n ' s problems increesed. Stormont 
was impressed. He reported that Vergennes had spoken 
'with the A i r and Manner of a Man who speaks 
h i s Real Opinion'. 
Stormont also had an interview with Ma\u<epas, who gave him similar 
assurances.53 However, although Stormont was i n i t i a l l y impressed by 
the apparent s i n c e r i t y of the French ministers, he was not deceived 
for long, and soon eifter h i s return he was relaying reports of 
American ships i n the ports of France. 
I n addition to the return of Stormont to P a r i s this period also 
witnessed p o l i t i c a l changes i n B r i t a i n . These occured as a r e s u l t of 
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the cabinet c r i s i s of November 1775 which led to the replacement of 
Rochford and Dartmouth by Weymouth and Germain respectively, Rochford, 
who had held h i s post since before the French had begun to show an 
in t e r e s t i n the Americans, was well acquainted with the attitudes of 
the French ministry and knew that they were playing a devious game. 
His replacement. Lord Weymouth had an aggressive reputation, acquired 
during the Falkland Island C r i s i s of 1770; he was dislike d and 
distrusted by the French - 'un Anglais fougueux, ferme' a toutes 
/ \ 54 considerations contraires a 1'ambition de son pays'. Yet at the 
same time i t i s possible that Weymouth, who had been the scapegoat 
for the c r i s i s of 1770, had taken t h i s lesson too much to heart and 
Wcis now reluctant to launch England upon another c r i s i s . As we s h a l l 
see, h i s - l e t t e r s to the ambassadors i n France were generally far 
from aggressive i n tone. 
I f i t i s beyond doubt that aid was being sent from France before 
the government's decision to sanction i t , then there can equally be 
no doubt that t h i s aid assumed far greater proportions after that 
decision was taken on 10 May 1776, There were at le a s t four companies 
that were known to be sending m i l i t a r y supplies and equipment to the 
rebels. These were:- Roderigue Hortalez and Company, the fictitioiis 
trading company founded by Beaumarchais with the backing of the French 
and Spanish governments; the Montadouin Brothers; Pilame Pennet and 
Company; and the House of Benson at Bourdeaux, I n addition to these 
trading companies, there were private individuals who took i t upon 
themselves to send supplies. The best known of these i s probably 
Dr, Dubourg, a friend of Benjamin Franklin, who had hoped to f i l l 
Beaumarchais' role as the o f f i c i a l channel of aid from the French 
government. The extent of t h i s aid can be seen by the fact that in 
the year 1777 over 80 ships l e f t Bourdeaux for America, while many 
others would have taken t h e i r cargoes to the West Indies where i t 
would have been sold to Americans or smuggled into America on smaller 
v e s s e l s , 
I t i s then, p l a i n that many valuable cargoes of supplies and 
equipment were sent by the French to the rebels. I t i s also clear, 
from a reading of the correspondence between London and Pa r i s , that 
the B r i t i s h government knew that these supplies were being sent. 
Throughout the period from 1775 to the end of 1777 there were constant 
despatches from Stormont and St, Paul i n Paris and from Captain 
Frazer at Dunkirk which reported t h i s . However, as with French naval 
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preparations, a l l three -generally qucilified t h e i r reports by stating 
t h e i r opinion that, although France was helping the rebels, she 
would not go so f a r as to a l l y with them. They argued that France 
would not r i s k a war on an issue that had nothing to do with French 
i n t e r e s t s , at a time of f i n a n c i a l wealoiess and military and naval 
reforms, and because they f e l t that France, l i k e Spain, would be well 
served by a long and exhausting war between B r i t a i n and the colonies. 
Nevertheless, i n spite of t h i s b e l i e f that France would not openly 
j o i n the rebels, both Stormont and St. Paul were always counselling 
vigilance and attention to B r i t a i n s defences:-
'You know how l i t t l e we can depend upon anything 
but our own Vigilance, which at a l l Times, but 
es p e c i a l l y while so able and active a Minister 
presides at the Admiralty Board, w i l l I am sure, 
guard against the p o s s i b i l i t y of a siirprise'.56 
The following month, Stormont wrote again on the same theme:-
•Indeed, My Lord, after a l l v/e know of the 
present insidious policy of t h i s court i t 
i s impossible to place the l e a s t Dependence 
upon th e i r Friendship or Good Faith . We can 
operate upon Nothing but the i r Fears and trust 
to nothing but our own Vigilance and superior Naval 
Strength'.57 
I f the envoys i n P a r i s were hopeful that France would not actually 
j o i n the Americans i n the weir, they l e f t the B r i t i s h government in no 
doubt that they were aware of the deceitful nature of French policy 
towards the rebels:-
'Tho' I repeat, as i s my Duty, the assurances 
I receive from t h i s Court, tho' I give them 
cre d i t to a degree, for their p a c i f i c wishes 
and Intentions; yet I hope your Lordship w i l l 
not think that I am of such easy Credulity, as 
to believe that they do not coniriiVe. at the 
Succours being sent from t h i s country to 
America::.'.5 8 
I t can therefore be c l e a r l y seen that the B r i t i s h government was 
informed that aid was being sent by the French on a large scale to 
the rebel colonists: i t i s also c l e a r that the B r i t i s h envoys stressed 
the need for vigilance and preparation of the defences of Great 
B r i t a i n , and also that they had pointed out that informal protests 
were u n l i k e l y to change the policy of France. Equally i t i s evident 
that the envoys knew that the French government knew about t h i s 
t r a f f i c i n arms and supplies and encouraged i t , i f they were not 
actually involved i n i t . There i s no need here to make a detailed 
116. 
catalogue of the types of aid that were sent by the French to the 
rebels or of the assistance that was given to American privateers 
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i n French ports, for these can be found elsewhere. We must now 
examine the response of the B r i t i s h government to these moves by 
France, and t r y to see why the steps which they took were not more 
ef f e c t i v e . 
The position of the B r i t i s h government appears to have been 
extraordinarily simple. Except for Lord Sandwich, whose anxiety has 
already been noted, the cabinet was almost wholly concerned with the 
s i t u a t i o n i n America and paid l i t t l e attention to the preparations i n 
France and Spain or to the aid that was sent from those countries 
to America. Both the government and the opposition f e l t that the 
Key- to the s i t u a t i o n l a y i n America, although they each approached 
the problem from a different angle. The government was divided 
between those who favoured t o t a l suppression of the revolution", 
and those who favoured a degree of compromise which would r e s u l t i n 
a settlement which did not constitute a surrender for either side. 
The opposition f e l t that the B r i t i s h ought to come to an agreement 
with the rebels at any price short of actually granting the Americans 
independence. Both sides therefore agreed that America must remain 
within the Empire, and i t was the government's methods which 
attracted the support of the majority of Members of Parliament. 
The American war was an actual problem, i t was happening at the time 
and therefore i t appeared to be the most in5>ortant factor. 
A further reason why American a f f a i r s took up so dominant a 
position i n B r i t i s h policy i s to be found i n the personalities i n 
the cabinet. With the appointment of Lord George Germain, i n 
November 1775, as Secretary of State for the colonies, the cabinet 
acquired a man of energy, a man of considerable debating s k i l l , but 
also a man who had been courtmartialled for cowardice. The f i r s t 
two factors i n Germains character were certai n l y those which made 
him seem to be a desirable acquisition for the cabinet, which r e l i e d 
almost s o l e l y on North himself to defend i t i n the House of Commons. 
However, Germain's reputation for cowardice made him an ideal target 
for opposition attack, and also gave him tremendous determination to 
push the American war through to a successful conclusion, i n order 
to redeem himself. Germain's instructions, which f i t t e d i n well with 
th i s wish, were: 
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'to pursue with dogged i n f l e x i b i l i t y h i s 
forceful punitive p o l i c i e s towards those 
"misguided children" the Americans'.^0 
Germain came into the cabinet i n the face of opposition from the two 
old established Secretaries of State, and he very soon managed to 
create an atmosphere of h o s t i l i t y i n h i s deedings with Lord Scindwich 
at the Admiralty which persisted right through into 1777. But, 
despite these apparent handicaps, Germain also had certain factors 
i n h i s favour. F i r s t , he drew strong support from the King, whose 
approach to the American problem was similar to Germain's. Second, 
Lord North's weak leadership i n cabinet l e f t the f i e l d open for these 
meetings to be dominated by a man who had strong opinions and was 
prepared to express them. Third, the American war became, at about 
the time of Germain's appointment the most important issue in 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , which i t had not been u n t i l then. These three 
factors 
'and h i s own positive personality resulted in 
h i s directing for several years a major B r i t i s h 
war, more single-handed by than any man of his 
time except P i t t ' . ^ l 
There can be no doubt that the major factor i n the creation of 
Germain's position of strength was the personality of Lord North. 
To argue, as has been done by Robson i n his a r t i c l e on North, that 
North vas not "prime minister" in any meaningful sense and that the 
doctrine of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y did not e x i s t in the 1770's 
i s not a proposition that w i l l stand examination. I t was true, as 
North himself pointed out, that the eighteenth century system of 
government provided for l i t t l e more than a loose co-ordination of 
policy by the f i r s t minister, but such a system was t o t a l l y unsuited 
to a wartime s i t u a t i o n . That t h i s was known at the time i s shown 
the f a c t , which Robson himself points out, that both ministers and 
c i v i l servants expeeted North to give a positive lead. Wair called 
for firm leadership, as had been shown by P i t t between 1757 and 1761; 
North's government, more talented i n i t s individual parts than P i t t ' s 
had been, collapsed under the s t r a i n because i t lacked a leader. 
For t h i s r o l e . North had 'neither aptitude nor a b i l i t y ' , and the 
r e s u l t s were catastrophic. Instead of concentrating upon a vigorous 
prosecution of the war, the ministers f e l l to bickering; Robinson 
described them as 'hating I may say, but I am sure not loving each 
other', and portrayed them as azixious to leave cabinet meetings as 
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soon eis possible. 
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North's position as f i r s t minister was further complicated by 
two other factors. The f i r s t of these, which may have accounted for 
North's reluctance to give a firm lead i n cabinet, was that he was 
personally opposed to the plans for the m i l i t a r y subjugation of 
America. He believed that the f i n a n c i a l and commercial losses which 
would be incurred by t h i s operation would feir outweigh any military 
v i c t o r i e s which might be won. However, here as in many other areas, 
men of stronger v w i l l prevailed upon North to act as they f e l t was 
right and not according to h i s own wishes. The second complicating 
factor i n North's position was h i s relationship with the King. 
Despite the fact that North's views on the American problem were 
different from those of George I I I , the King refused North's requests 
to be allowed to resign. Whether or not Lord North wanted-to resign 
i s not material here, the fact was that he asked to be allowed to do 
so on several occasions, but each time h i s request was rejected. The 
King saw Lord North as the focal point of the government, and the 
government as the focal point of the American policy. I f North had 
been allowed to resign, the King foresaw surrender to the Americans 
as the l o g i c a l consequence. That was a prospect he could not 
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tolerate. 
Both the government and the opposition concentrated on the 
American problem, and both had reeiLised i t s great importance for 
B r i t a i n ' s world position. There can be no doubt too, that both groups 
knew of the danger which threatened from across the channel, and that 
both gave serious consideration to the p o s s i b i l i t y of French 
intervention. The government knew of the p o s s i b i l i t y from the 
despatches sent by i t s envoys i n P a r i s and also from the information 
which was gathered by i t s agents throughout France. Any one who had 
seen these despatches and reports could be i n no doubt that, despite 
i t s assurances to the contrary, the French government was at best 
doing nothing to prevent aid from being sent to the rebels, and at 
worst was preparing to give them open assistance. -J/Even Germain, 
who derided the suggestion that France would help the rebels i n h i s 
speeches to Parliament, admitted i n h i s l e t t e r s to Generals Howe and 
Clinton that t h i s was a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y . The opposition, 
although denied access to the o f f i c i a l reports, was also well informed 
about the assistance which was sent from France to America, Many 
opposition members were i n sjonpathy with the colonists and had either 
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d i r e c t or indirect channels of communication with the colonial 
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representatives and t h e i r friends i n France. 
The opposition favoiired a policy of concessions to the Americans 
for two reaisons. F i r s t , as what might be termed the more libereil 
group i n p o l i t i c s , they sympathised with the colonists. They were 
prepared to admit that there had been a certain amount of i n j i i s t i c e 
i n the way the colonists had been treated. But, they were vehemently 
opposed to any idea of granting independent to the colonies. Second, 
they favoured concession through fear of France. They were afraid 
that the colonists, unable to achieve independence on the i r own, 
would turn to France for help. This would, lead to a situation where 
B r i t a i n would lose the colonies and at the same time France would 
gain i n terms of m i l i t a r y prestige and trade. To avoid such a 
s i t u a t i o n the opposition advocated a policy of concession to a l l 
American demands short of independence i n order to restore harmony 
within the Empire and so leave B r i t a i n free to concentrate upon a 
war with France, i f that country should decide to s t a r t one. Such 
a policy seemed to be highly desirable. I f France did not choose to 
attack B r i t a i n , then the objects .would have been achieved; America, 
placated by concessions, would remain within the Empire of her own 
free w i l l ; no troops would be required from B r i t a i n to hold down the 
s u l l e n colonists which the opposition foresaw i f military conquest 
should succeed; and Great B r i t a i n would re t a i n her trading l i n k s with 
the Americans. I f the French should choose to attack, then the 
B r i t i s h , without the American diversion would be more than a match for 
the House of Bourbon. 
However, there were two factors which made such a policy quite 
impracticeil.. F i r s t there was the attitude of the King. I n eighteenth 
century p o l i t i c s the King's support was s t i l l essential for the 
s u r v i v a l of a government, and such a policy cis was advocated by the 
opposition would never have gained the support of George I I I . The 
King was opposed to concessions to the Americans and would rather 
have abdicated than have made concessions without a struggle. 
Second, the major portion of the p o l i t i c a l classes in eighteenth 
century B r i t a i n v/ould not accept the opposition's policy. They 
believed the Americans had to be brought to heel. 
I n the government's opinion, the setfest method of avoiding the 
world war which, l i k e the opposition, they saw--threatening them i f 
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France became involved, was to i n f l i c t a sharp and decisive defeat 
on the Americans. They were confident that the B r i t i s h troops and 
the continental mercenaries which had been hired to help them could 
achieve such a victory, and that such a victory would achieve the 
aims of B r i t i s h policy f a r more surely than concessions would do so. 
That i s to say that i t would prevent any thoughts on the part of 
France of giving aid to the rebels, and avert euiy ideas of using the 
American war as a powerful drain on B r i t i s h resources during a 
struggle between the Bourbon powers and the B r i t i s h Empire, Such a 
view was well summed up by Lord Stormont when he wrote that the 
'public Tranquility' depended upon two things 'constant vigilance 
at Home, and uninterrupted success i n America'. 
This was the policy which was f i n a l l y adopted. I t had three 
p r i n c i p a l weaknesses. F i r s t , militeury success i n America could not 
be gueiranteed, and indeed i n the long term i t proved impossible to 
achieve; second, the government, lacking any positive leadership and 
direction, and increasingly torn by mi n i s t e r i a l jealousy and disputes, 
f a i l e d to maintain the 'vigilance' which Stormont so often stressed 
was e s s e n t i a l ; third, and possibly most s i g n i f i c a n t , t h i s policy 
meant that while a l l the government's attention was focussed on 
obtaining victory i n America, a passive policy was pursued towards 
France. Such a policy, aimed at avoiding at a l l costs a breakdown 
i n r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and France l a i t i l success was achieved 
i n America, enabled the French to take f a r greater l i b e r t i e s i n 
th e i r policy towards the colonies than would normally have been the 
case. 
These weaknesses proved f a t a l . There has been agreement from that 
time to t h i s that the rebels would have been unable to carry on the 
war without the aid sent from France. The correct way for the 
government to have proceeded would have been to sever the l i n k between 
France and America, and leave the rebellion to wither and die. 
General S i r William Howe wrote i n November of 1776 that the only thing 
which kept the rebellion a l i v e was the hope of aid from France:-
• I f that door were shut by any means and i t 
were publicly known here, i t would i n my 
opinion put a stop to the rebellion upon the 
a r r i v a l of the re-inforcements i n the Spring'.^' 
I f i t can be argued that Howe could have been seeking to cover h i s own 
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f a i l u r e to crush the rebels by finding other reasons for their 
strength then we have the evidence of modem historians with no 
such axe to grind. Stephenson, i n his a r t i c l e about the supply of 
gunpowder, draws the conclusion, af t e r a detailed examination of 
the evidence, that without the regular and , substantial imports of 
powder the revolution would have been forced to a s t a n d s t i l l long 
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before the Saratoga Campaign even began. R.B. Morris also gives 
i t as h i s opinion that 
'without t h i s French aid, to which the Spanish 
i n i t i a l l y contributed the i r mite, the Patriots 
could not have sustained t h e i r m i l i t a r y effort, 
kept the i r armies i n the f i e l d ... or confronted 
and conquered the Redcoats and Hessians at . 
Saratoga'.69 
However, inspite of t h i s clear evidence that i t was French aid 
which sustained the rebels, the B r i t i s h made no definite attempt to 
prevent these shipments from being sent. The only attempts which were 
made were the type of informal protests which St. Paul referred to 
(see above pp. 112 - 113). What was required was a strong formal 
protest i f r e s u l t s were to be achieved; however there i s evidence that 
instructions were issued to Stormont which expressly forbade such 
actions. As early as December 1775 he wrote:-
'This, (the French involvement with the Rebels) 
however. My Lord, I never pretend to see, but 
always seem to r e s t e n t i r e l y s a t i s f i e d with the 
assurances they give me. 
This was the general Line which His Majesty's 
wisdom marked out for me before I l e f t England, 
and from t h i s Line, without positive orders, I 
Shall not depart'.70 
Thus we can see that Stormont had c l e a r l y been given orders during^ 
h i s stay i n B r i t a i n , that he was not to make strong or formeJ. protests 
to Vergennes or Maurepas about the operations of the Americans i n 
French ports. The object of such orders was to avoid provoking 
France into a v/ar i m t i l such time as the colonies had been subdued. 
However, a l l the signs which we have noted suggest that, at no 
time before the victory at Saratoga, were the French sure enough of 
the Americans' determination to be w i l l i n g to commit themselves to 
open war. Even after Saratoga the French ministers hesitated and 
did not commit themselves u n t i l Vergennes became anxious that unless 
France committed h e r s e l f the Americans woiild make peace and the 
opportunity would be l o s t . To add to the fact that France was 
122. 
reluctant to commit h e r s e l f to joining the rebels, there i s also 
s t r i k i n g evidence of success on the one occasion when the B r i t i s h 
did make a forceful protest. This came on the subject of the 
American privateers that were using French port f a c i l i t i e s . On 
4 J u l y 1777 f Weymouth wrote to Stormont:-
' I t i s His Majesty's pleasure that you 
acquaint the French Ministers, that however 
desirous His Majesty may be to maintain the 
present Peace, He cannot, from His respect 
to His own Honour, and His regard to the 
I n t e r e s t of His trading subjects, submit to 
such strong and public instances of support 
and protection shown to the Rebels by a 
nation that at the same time professes i n 
the Strongest terms i t s Desire to maintain 
the present Harmony subsisting between the 
two Crowns. The sh e l t e r given to the armed 
Vessels of the Rebels, the f a c i l i t y they 
have of disposing of t h e i r Prizes by the 
Connivance of Government, and the 
conveniences allo\ired them to r e f i t are such 
irrefragable proofs of support, that 
scarcely co\ild more be done i f there was an 
avowed All i a n c e betwixt France and them, and 
that We were i n a state of War with that 
Kingdom'. 
Stormont v/as instructed to say a l l t h i s to the French ministers, 
'.... expressing at the same jtime that an 
explanation i s desired, not a menace 
intended; but on f u l l consideration of the 
circumstances they must be s a t i s f i e d Peace, 
however earnestly wished, cannot be 
maintained, unless an effectual stop i s put 
to our j u s t causes of complaint'.71 
Here at l a s t was a strong protest which weis made on the basis of 
sound evidence. The r e s u l t s of t h i s were to be very interesting. 
Five days l a t e r , on 9 July, Stormont reported his conversations with 
Vergennes and Maurepas on t h i s subject. Maurepas had appeared to be 
very uncomfortable i n the face of t h i s new and more aggressive approach 
on the part of the Ambcissador. He instructed Stormont that he should 
take a l l the d e t a i l s to Vergennes, Stormont did so, and Vergennes, 
confronted by;the facts» promised action. He said that French crewmen 
would be withdraim from the privateers, and that the privateers would 
be expelled from French ports. Stormont gave i t eis his opinion that 
the zeal of the French i n carrying out these promises would depend 
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on the success of B r i t i s h arms i n America. But, s i x days l a t e r , 
123. 
Stormont reported an o f f i c i a l reply from Vergennes which stated 
that orders had been given to seize three privateers i i n t i l guarantees 
could be obtained that they wo\ild return to America; that prizes were 
no longer to be brought into French ports or sold at them, and that 
the f a c i l i t i e s granted to the Americans should not extend beyond the 
l i m i t s of lega l trade - i . e . powder and supplies of munitions should 
not be sold to them.^-^ 
Thus i t can be demonstrated that by applying heavy diplomatic 
pressure at a time when the fighting i n America seemed to be 
favouring B r i t a i n , the B r i t i s h government caused a considerable 
reduction i n the assistance rendered to the Americaois; and this 
reduction f i l l e d the American envoys i n Paris with despair. Had such 
resolute action been taken i n regzurd to the French programme of aid 
at an e a r l i e r stage, and had i t been vigorously pursued, i t seems 
probable that the amount of aid which reached America from France 
would have been d r a s t i c a l l y reduced, and the outcome of the American 
Wcir might have been totcdly d i f f e r e n t . As i t was, the B r i t i s h policy 
towards Freuice was regeu^ded as being secondary to events in America. 
The r e s u l t of th i s was that when B r i t i s h fortunes took a turn for 
the worse i n America, B r i t a i n became involved i n a world wide war at 
a most inopportune moment. Gi*ciiam has written:-
'When the B r i t i s h Government f i n a l l y decided 
to resort to force, i t was a blimder of the 
f i r s t magnitude not to have applied that force 
d i r e c t l y on land and sea i n overwhelming 
strength'.74 
I f t h i s was a blunder, i t was equally disastrous that the government 
f a i l e d to adopt a policy of vigorous protest against French 
involvement i n the struggle from an early date to support i t s efforts 
i n America. 
NOTE A 
The term 'Guardship' appears to have been subject to a variety 
of interpretations to judge from the numbers of ships which were 
cleissed sis such at different times. There are three figures which 
i l l u s t r a t e - t h i s well which are to be fovind i n the King's correspondence. 
At the end of 1775 there were said to be 19 'Guardships'; on 20 June 
1776 there were 29 vessels 'completely f i t t e d out as Guardships'; 
while on 23 October 1776 the figure had contracted to 23 'Guardships i n 
commission',^^ The only def i n i t i o n of a 'Guardship' which I have been 
able to find i s that i t was a ship of the l i n e which was three f i f t h s 
manned,7^ 
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CHAPTER VI: ESPIONAGE AND INTERCEPTION 
Apart from two b r i e f references to these two subjects i n the 
previous chapter, l i t t l e attention has been given to any influence 
v/hich they may have had upon the formulation of government policy. 
The reason for t h i s omission i s very simple: a study of the period 
has made i t c l e a r that neither the reports from B r i t i s h agents i n 
France, nor any information that may have been gathered from 
intercepted correspondence, played an important part i n deciding 
B r i t i s h policy tov/ards France. However, since both these methods were 
employed by the government to obtain information, i t i s now proposed 
to examine them b r i e f l y , to see f i r s t what information was obtained 
and whether" i t was important, and second why this information weis not 
used. 
I t was on the question of intercepted correspondence that my 
in t e r e s t i n this period was f i r s t aroused. I n particular I was 
curious to find out whether any of the l e t t e r s written by 
Beawmarchais to h i s friends and contacts iri England and, when he v/as 
hi-mself i n t h i s country, to his masters i n P a r i s , had been intercepted 
and read by agents of the B r i t i s h government; i f they had been 
intercepted and read i t seemed beyond doubt that they v/ould have been 
of considerable i n t e r e s t because they were f i l l e d with indiscreet 
language. 
From a very early date, Beaumarchais urged Louis XVI to believe 
that the B r i t i s h would seize the French and Spanish islands i n the 
Caribbean, whether they won or l o s t their struggle with the Americans. 
I n September 1775, while he was i n London on a mission rel a t i n g to 
the Chevalier d'Eon, Beaumarchais met John Wilkes and began to 
r e a l i z e the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for s t a r t i n g a trade i n arms and ammunition 
bett-/een Europe and the rebellious colonists. From th i s point on, 
Beaumarchais' l e t t e r s show that he had made the l i n k betiireen these tvro 
items. He constantly urged the need for France to a s s i s t the rebels 
and also warned against the host i l e intentions of B r i t a i n , 
I n A p r i l of 1776 Beaumarchais returned to London, and began to 
v/rite a s e r i e s of l e t t e r s to the French ministers at V e r s a i l l e s . 
As an o f f i c i a l agent of the French government, furnished with a 
mission by Sartines to give him protection, Beaumarchais was i n ad-
delicate position. That he was aware of t h i s cannot be doubted, for 
he had written i n 1775:-
125. 
' I t would be an unpeirdonable blimder i n me to 
compromise i n any such a f f a i r , the dignity of 
my master, or of his minister '.2 
But, although he v^as aware of t h i s , Beavonarchais made no attempt to 
moderate the language which he employed i n h i s l e t t e r s . I n A p r i l 
1776 he wrote from London:-
'Les Americains sont d ' a i l l e u r s aussi bien 
q u ' i l s se puisse. Armees de terre, f l o t t e , 
v i v r e s , courage, tout est excellente. Mais 
sans poudre et sans ingenieurs, comment 
vaincre, ou mthie se defendre? 
Voulons - nous done l e s l a i s s e r p ^ r i r plutot 
que leurs prater vai ou deux millions?'.3 
He then v/ent on to urge Vergennes to return to the King and persuade 
him of the benefits which would accrue to his coimtry from t h i s 
small amount of aid to the rebels. 
Vergennes replied to Beaumarchais while the l a t t e r Weis s t i l l i n 
England, and h i s reply was s i g n i f i c a n t . He wrote that although there 
v/ere advantages to be gained from helping the Americans, as 
Beaumcirchais had seen, there were cdso disadvantages which he had 
overlooked. However, Vergennes then went on:-
'Cette preface n'est point destinee a^lre^futer 
votre prevoyance, que j e loue, au contraire, 
et j'approuve. Mais ne croyes pas, pcU?cequ'on 
ne l a s a i s i t point avec rapidite' qu'on l a 
r e j e t t e ... Pensees y bien, et vous me2 
trouveres plus pres de vous que vovis ne 
1'imagines'.4 
These l e t t e r s c l e a r l y show that the French ministry weis moving tov/cirds 
Beaumarchais' opinions on t h i s subject. There are two questions which 
are r a i s e d by these l e t t e r s and by the subsequent correspondence 
between Beaumarchais and Arthur Lee i n London: was the B r i t i s h 
government aware of these l e t t e r s ; and i f i t was aware of them, did 
i t take any action based on the information gathered from them? 
The earliest reference to Beaumarchais i n the correspondence 
between the Secretary of State and the B r i t i s h envoys in Paris came, 
perhaps surprisingly, i n a despatch from Pa r i s rather than one from 
London. The following extract from t h i s despatch shows the extent and 
e f f i c i e n c y of the int e l l i g e n c e network established by the B r i t i s h 
embassy i n France:-
126. 
»I must now mention, My Lord, that I have good 
gromds to believe that for some months past, 
there have been French agents i n England, 
endeavouring to procure sums of money for the 
Rebels i n America, from t h e i r friends i n 
England, i n order to convey them i n French 
ships to the French islands, and from thence 
to the Congress. M. de Beaumarchais i s , I 
understand concerned i n t h i s Business, but 
he i s not alone; within these 18 months he 
heis made 8 voyages to London, and i n the 
space of three weeks, he went tv;ice».5 
From t h i s time onwards, Beaumarchais was closely watched. He was 
eilready suspected by the Foreign O f f i c e ' i n London, and i t was for 
t h i s reason he had been furnished with a mission from Sarticues 
to buy up old Portuguese coinage i n London for use in the Caribbean, 
On 14 Augiist 1776 Stormont reported to Weymouth that a man Cedled 
'Dana' had recently been to P a r i s . This man, Stormont reported, was 
either an agent of the American congress or was at l e a s t in 
communication with that body.^ On 16 August 1776, V/eymouth wrote to 
Stormont, i n a l e t t e r which would have crossed with that j u s t quoted:-
»Mr Deane, one of the Connecticut Delegates, 
Wcis appointed by a secret committee for 
foreign negotiations named by the American 
Congress as Deputy to the Coiirt of France 
to induce that Court to a favourable 
disposition and to ask from i t supplies of 
arms and clothing for 25,000 troops with 
200 brass f i e l d pieces Deane arrived 
at Bourdeaux early i n June and at Paris 
e a r l y i n J u l y , and soon afterwards had a 
long conversation with Monsr. de Vergennes, 
who pi?oposed i n order to avoid siAspicion 
that M. Gerard should be the vehicle of so 
much of t h e i r correspondence eis did not 
require a personal interview 
About the middle of July, Deane asked from 
the French ministry i n beheilf of the Congress, 
arms and clothing for 25,000 men together 
with 200 l i g h t brass f i e l d cannon. 
The arms were immediately promised by Monsr. 
de Vergennes, and Deane was given to 
understand that Persons would be found who 
would furnish the Clothing on the Credit of 
the Congress .... 
Beaumarchais was recommended to. Deane by 
Monsr. de Vergennes as a proper person to 
supply the Congress with such other Goods 
and Commodities as they might want. 
Beaumarchais offered to credit them to the 
amount of three m i l l i o n s . Deane proposed 
127. 
to obtain from him a quantity of Ammunition 
euad other A r t i c l e s wanted by the Congress'. 
Wejnnouth concluded by asking Stormont to try to v e r i f y t h i s information, 
7 
and stressed the need for great secrecy-in such an investigation. 
This despatch i s an astounding testimony to the efficiency and 
viligance of the espionage services of Great B r i t a i n . Only on 10 Jvine 
1776 had the French government given Beaumarchais h i s funds and only 
8 
af t e r that date had Roderigue Hortalez and Company been set up, but 
i t i s c l e a r that t h i s process had been car e f u l l y watched. Only two 
months after t h i s had happened the government was able to furnish 
Lord Stormont with t h i s report on the method by which the French 
ministry vas sending aid to the rebels. The information which enabled 
them to compile t h i s report had not come from the embassy i n France, 
but must have been derived from the reports of B r i t i s h government 
agents working i n France. The accuracy of this, information was 
r e f l e c t e d by Stormont when he wrote to the Secretary of State on 21 
August confirming almost a l l the information which Weymouth had 
given him. From then onwards the watch on Beaumarchais became 
intense. B r i t i s h employed spies followed him everywhere he went, and 
the surveillance was so complete that when Beaumarchais l e f t Paris 
s e c r e t l y , without even t e l l i n g h i s mistress of h i s destination, the 
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B r i t i s h ambassador knew exactly where he was. 
Later the same year, a further despatch pays tribute to the 
excellence of Stormont»s spies and l i n k s the question of information 
to interception of correspondence. I n t h i s despatch, Stormont gave 
d e t a i l s of the system by which l e t t e r s were sent from Beaumarchais i n 
P a r i s to the friends of America i n London. Beaumcurchais wrote his 
l e t t e r s to a gentleman CetLled 'M. Morand», but he addressed them to.' 
•Mr, V/all, at Mr. Moores, Crutched Pryars'. The replies from 
'M. Morand' were sent to 'M. Manon, Chez M. Simon, Imprimeur du 
Parlement a Peiris'. Stormont wrote:-
•This correspondence, which i s trusted to 
the common post, would be well wor'th'iilooking 
into, but i t i s es s e n t i a l that the l e t t e r s 
should not be stopped, nor opened in such a 
Way as to beget the l e a s t suspicion'. 
He also gave d e t a i l s of the addresses to which l e t t e r s were sent for 
Deane, Franklin and Bancroft from people in England and a l i s t of the 
names of those i n England who wrote to the rebel envoys. He 
recommended looking into any l e t t e r s where the names of these people 
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appeared: he f e l t suc± investigations might well 'lead to very 
useful discoveries'.'''^ I n his reply, Weymouth wrote 
'I am not unmindful of the information Your 
Excellency hcis given with respect to the 
correspondence carried on by the persons 
mentioned i n your Letter'.12 
From t h i s v e i l e d reference, i t seems not unlikely that Weymouth did 
inf a c t order the interception of these l e t t e r s . We should now turn 
to a b r i e f examination of the system by which l e t t e r s were 
intercepted. 
Interception of correspondence was carried out by the Post Office, 
through which a l l l e t t e r s passed, except those which were sent by 
special messenger. Within the organization there was a separate 
department known as the 'Secret Office', which was maintained and 
directed by the Secretaries of State. This was headed by a permanent 
C i v i l Servant who was known as the 'foreign Secretary'. Orders to 
intercept correspondence could only be given by a secretary of state 
or the Prime Minister, and the o f f i c i a l s of the Secret Office had to 
take an oath not to open any l e t t e r s without express orders from a 
proper person. Those despatches which were opened were copied, 
re-sealed and sent on. The copy weis then sent to the King and from 
the King to the Secretaries of State. There can, therefore, be 
l i t t l e doubt that any information obtained i n th i s way would have 
been known to the Cabinet. 
Despatches coming from France were read i n the Secret Office for 
the entire period between the peace treaty of 1763 and the outbreak 
of war i n 1778. However, aft e r 1766 the intercepted l e t t e r s were 
classed as private papers and were not kept on f i l e , which has made 
them harder to trace. However, the despatches were read consistently 
i n t h i s period, and, as Dr. E l l i s has written, 
'The best tribute to the standard of security 
came from foreign governments, diplomats and 
private correspondents continually trusting 
the Post Office and providing the government 
with veiluable information'.•'••' 
However, although these despatches were read, and although they would 
have contained much useful information, l i t t l e use seems to have been 
made of that information, and l i t t l e warning taken by the B r i t i s h 
government. Indeed the absence of any mention of interception, or 
knowledge gleaned from i t , i n the King's correspondence i s very s t r i k i n g ; 
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and, apart from the references given above, there i s no further mention 
of the subject i n despatches between London and P a r i s . 
There were, of course, a number of factors which could reduce the 
value of interceptions, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n regard to o f f i c i a l despatches 
to and from embassies. F i r s t , any r e a l l y important despatch weis 
l i k e l y to be sent by messenger and therefore would never go near the 
Post O f f i c e . Second, l e t t e r s could be written and sent by the common 
post, which were intended to be intercepted; i t i s possible that some 
of the l e t t e r s from Vergennes to Guines i n London f e l l into t h i s 
category for these contained re-assuring language which was not 
consistent with the r e a l aims of French policy. Third, i n this 
p a r t i c u l a r case, the French ambassador in London was not trusted by 
Vergennes and therefore, especially towards the end of his period i n 
London, he was not kept informed of the r e a l objectives which France 
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Weis pursuing. 
I f there were, thus, some concrete reeisons for the B r i t i s h 
government not to tr u s t the evidence of French aid which i t obtained 
from intercepted correspondence, we must now consider whether there 
were s i m i l a r reasons for i t s f a i l u r e to use the reports which were 
sent to London, and to Lord Stormont in P a r i s , from spies who were 
employed to gather information. 
Espionage was as common i n the eighteenth century cis i t i s today, 
and the B r i t i s h were not the only nation to make use of i t . However, 
there can be no doubt that i n the War of American Independence the 
B r i t i s h were well served by their agents. One major reason why the 
Secret Service weis so e f f i c i e n t , i s that a large niunber of Americans 
remained l o y a l to the crown. These men were able to peiss themselves 
off as rebel sympathisers and thus gain the confidence of important 
figures on the colonial side, thus providing a constant stream of 
information for the London g o v e r n m e n t . A t l e a s t two authors have 
shown convincing proofs of the excellent work done by the B r i t i s h 
agents Bancroft, Thornton, H3nison and Carmichael who were employed to 
inform the B r i t i s h about the relations between the rebels and the 
French ministry; d e t a i l s can also be found of the organization of 
the Secret Service with William Eden, Secretary to Lord Suffolk, at 
i t s head, assisted by Paul Wentworth.^^ I n addition, two other types 
of agent were used. F i r s t there were men employed by the Admiralty 
to watch the French ports and relay information to London about 
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a c t i v i t i e s i n them. I t was from these reports that the papers of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e to be found i n the Sandwich papers were compiled. As 
we saw i n Chapter IV, these reports gave an accurate impression of 
the development of French naval strength. The second clciss of spies-
were those who were employed by the ambassador at Peur-is. These were 
generally paid to watch particvilar people or places or for individual 
pieces of information. I t was from these sources that Stormont 
gathered h i s information about the movements of Beaumarchais, Deane 
and other leading figures i n the negotiations; and also information 
about coimcil meetings and secret audiences between the French 
ministers and the American envoys. Rather than catalogue each incident 
i n which information was obtained or reported, i t i s our task to 
observe what effects these reports had. 
There can be no doubt that the Admiralty took notice of the reports 
which i t received from i t s agents, because we have already seen that 
Sandwich became more alarmed at each new report of French strength. 
However, the information gathered and sent to England by Stormont and 
St. Paul often seems to have had l i t t l e or no e f f e c t . The 
government rarelyi. took any action however loudly i t s envoys i n P a r i s 
proclaimed the need for i t . The most l i k e l y explanation for t h i s seems 
to be that the information peissed on by the envoys was too often 
inaccurate and lin r e l i a b l e . For example, at the end of the naveil sceire 
of 1775, S t . Paul wrote to inform the government that he had been 
assured that there was no armament taking place, and that the alarm 
had been caused by the removal of naval stores from their Weffehbuses 
so that the quantities could be checked. At the end of t h i s depatch, 
St, Paul wrote that the information upon which his reports had been 
based had come from 'one of the principal channels of Intelligence, 
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well known to Lord Stormont'. V/hen the information of the 
eimbassador or his deputy was frequently shown to be based on reports 
which turned out to have no foundation, i t i s perhaps not so 
surprising that the government did not take alarm at reports from 
that quarter. 
However, i f the government was frequently correct not to believe 
the reports which i t received from i t s embassy i n P a r i s , no such 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n can be found for i t s f a i l u r e to take account of the 
detailed information which reached i t through the network of agents 
organised by Eden and Wentworth. Bancroft i n particular has been 
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shown to have provided much v i t a l information. How was i t that 
t h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e was given l i t t l e or no weight i n the government's 
deliberations on policy? 
The answer to this question appears to l i e i n the attitude of 
King George I I I to the Secret Service. The King \ias unwilling to 
believe in t e l l i g e n c e reports, and h i s robust refusal to do so seems 
to have crushed such attempts as were made, especially by North, to 
bring these reports to h i s attention. The King's attitude has been 
well summeirized by Brooke:-
'Secret Service money, as i t s name implies 
was used to meet State expenditure that had 
to be kept secret ... King George I I I thought 
that money spent i n th i s way was largely 
thrown away 
Spies always seemed to imagine that they were 
paid for t h e i r reports at so much a word, and 
so i f they had no information, they invented 
i t . They were credulous, ill-informed, and 
of doubtful moreO- character. The King d i s l i k e d 
having to resort to corruption and espionage'.^8 
The King's reluctance to dabble i n th i s kind of operation i s also 
c l e a r l y shown by certain passages i n h i s correspondence. I n January 
1776 North wrote to him:-
'Lord North has the honour of transmitting 
to his Majesty two l e t t e r s from Mr. 
Wentworth, which agree with other 
intelligence and leave no doubt of the 
ess e n t i a l assistance that France and Spain 
have promised, and are on the point of 
affording to the Rebels'.^9 
North received no reply to th i s l e t t e r , although the King did send 
instructions to Sandwich that more ships were to be sent to America 
to prevent the import of arms and powder from the Caribbean islands. 
A l a t e r exchange between the King and North makes the position 
c l e a r . By t h i s time the King had conceived a f i e r c e d i s l i k e of 
spies, e s p e c i a l l y Paul Wentworth, and North was c l e a r l y aware of t h i s 
and was trying to change the King's mind. I n December 1776 North 
reported a l e t t e r of intelligence-to the King which confirmed that the 
French ministry had given orders that American vessels were to be 
convoyed out of the Bay of Biscay by French f r i g a t e s . Evidently this 
had already been reported by Wentworth and had received a host i l e 
response from the King for North wrote:-
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•Hence i t appears that there i s such a 
report i n France, and that i s i t believed 
by others than Mr. Wentworth''. 
He then went on to point out that although Wentworth's information 
had usually been unpleasant, i t had usually been accurate:-
'Almost everything he has told us .... hais 
been confirmed either by Van Zant, or Lee's 
Journal, or the papers delivered by Hynson 
or by some other event'. 
North went out of h i s way to make i t clear to the King that this was 
not an isolated report and that i t did not depend jupon Wentworth for 
i t s foundation, but had been confirmed by a c i t y merchant who had no 
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connection with Wentworth. The King remained unmoved. He replied that 
V/entworth's l e t t e r was 
'..,, so exact a copy of that from the 
Ambassador that i t does not require great 
astuteness to see that the intelligence 
heis been collected from the former. 
Whether i t i s exactly true or not, we are 
taking a l l the steps that would be proper 
i f the intentions of our neighbours 
should prove as represented'.^-"-
The King's d i s l i k e and distrust-of Wentworth and his kind were 
reaffirmed i n the strongest possible terms i n November 1777:-
•The two l e t t e r s from Mr. V/entirorth are 
cer t a i n l y curious, but as Edwards ( t h i s 
was Bancroft's code name) i s a stock-
jobber as well as a double spy no other 
f a i t h can be placed i n h i s intelligence 
but that i t s u i t s h i s private views to 
make us expect the French court mean 
war, whilst undoubtedly there i s good 
grovmd to think that the Event i s more 
distant than we might suppose s i x 
months ago, Mr. Wentworth, I suspect 
i s also a dabbler i n the Alley and as 
such may have views, I am certain he 
has one, the wish of getting some 
employment',22 
Time and again the-King rejected intelligence reports on the grounds 
that those who sent them, i f they were not ac t u e i l l y dishonest, at 
l e a s t had some personal aim i n view. There may have been some 
foundation for these doubts, for i t i s certain that Bancroft did 
make money on the stock exchange and that he was a double, or more 
l i k e l y , a t r i p l e agent. To succeed i n gaining the confidence of the 
rebel envoys, Bancroft went to extraordinary lengths, even to being 
cirrested while i n London and to becoming involved with the arsonist 
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23 'John the painter' who set f i r e to the naval dockyard at Portsmouth. 
Hot-; ever, although-there may have been doubts about the morality of 
the informants, the information was repeated so frequently and from 
so many varied sources, as Lord North pointed out (see above p. 132), 
that to ignore them was extremely foolhardy. 
ffae King's ref u s a l to believe the information which was gathered 
by the B r i t i s h agents seems to have t o t a l l y prevented the use of that 
information i n the determination of B r i t i s h policy towards France. 
Only i n a few peirticular cases, (such cis that described on pp. 126 
and 127 above) was t h i s information used, and then only for t a c t i c a l 
rather than s t r a t e g i c purposes. I n t h i s respect the King must 
surely bear a heavy re s p o n s i b i l i t y for the loss of the war, for had 
these reports been believed i t seems certain that Br i t a i n ' s policy 
towards France would have been different, and had they been acted on 
B r i t a i n would surely have been better prepared to face France v;hen 
war f i n a l l y broke out between the two countries i n 1778. 
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CHAPTER V I I : CONCLUSION 
The aim of t h i s study has not been to examine B r i t a i n and America 
i n the conventional sense, that i s to say the diseistrous Saratoga 
campaign or the quarrels between Germain and the generals i n America; 
nor to examine the reasons why B r i t a i n f a i l e d to subdue the colonies. 
This study has been concerned with B r i t a i n ' s relations with her 
t r a d i t i o n a l enemy i n Europe during the years between 1775 and 1778. 
I t i s now time to sum up the findings by asking whether Brit a i n ' s 
policy was dictated by French actions or f r e e l y chosen, whether 
that policy was the right one, and i f i t was not the right one, then 
we should see why i t v:as not, and " v/hether there were better 
a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
From the facts already given there can be no doubt that France 
played a v i t a l role i n enabling the American colonies to lib e r a t e 
themselves from B r i t a i n . She helped the Americans in four major 
v/ays. F i r s t , by sending supplies of m i l i t a r y necessities to America, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y gunpowder, cannons and shot; second by sending 
experienced o f f i c e r s and engineers to a s s i s t the American army which 
v;as p a r t i c u l a r l y weak i n these ti^o respects; third, by allowing 
American privateers to use French ports as shelters in both European 
and Caribbean v;aters, thus enabling them to i n f l i c t considerable 
los s e s on English merchant shipping and to hinder the supplying of 
the B r i t i s h army i n America; fourth, by providing a distraction for 
the energies of Great B r i t a i n , for, v;ith the threat of a French 
attack, the B r i t i s h feared to concentrate a l l the i r resources on the 
American struggle. I t i s therefore beyond doubt that the B r i t i s h 
needed to formulate a definite policy tov/ards France. 
I t seems that there v/ere three options open to the B r i t i s h , two 
of which attracted attention at the time, and we shoiild now examine 
these. F i r s t , l e t us look at the position of the opposition. They 
began, as did eilmost a l l p o l i t i c i a n s of the day, with the firm 
b e l i e f that the colonies could not be allov/ed to obtain their 
independence; to achieve t h i s end, they advocated that the 
government should make meaningful and vrorthwhile concessions to the 
colonists i n order to r e t a i n t h e i r loyalty, and the v i t a l American 
trade, especially i n timber. 
They also argued t h i s policy of concession for two more p r a c t i c a l 
reasons. F i r s t they had serious doubts about Britain's capacity to 
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subdue the colonies, for they were better informed than the 
government about the strength of feelings i n America. But even i f 
the colonies were to be subdued, the opposition argued, then B r i t a i n 
would face the teisk of ruling a reluctant population of conquered 
colonists at 3,000 miles distance; this v/ould require garrisons of 
troops. Thus even i f the revolt were to be suppressed, the res u l t 
would be to cause b i t t e r resentment on the part of the colonists, 
and increased expenditure for many years to come. Second, and to 
the opposition most important, they argued that i f the war with 
America was permitted to drag on, then sooner or l a t e r France would 
seize the opportunity to take revenge for her defeat in the Seven 
Years War, 
Concession to a l l colonial -demands save that for independence 
would, so i t seemed, achieve a l l that B r i t a i n desired. The colonists 
would remain B r i t i s h of theirown free w i l l and thus no expense 
vrould be incurred by having to impose B r i t i s h rule; the American 
trade and timber would remain dominated by B r i t a i n ; and France would 
either r e f r a i n from attacking B r i t a i n once she had no other 
commitments, or, i f she did attack, B r i t a i n would be able to face 
her confidently. 
Such ideas had a considerable appeal for the writers of the 
nineteenth and early t\^entieth centuries. They could be held to 
symbolize the attitudes of B r i t a i n ' s libereil democracy while at the 
same time protecting B r i t i s h trading i n t e r e s t s . I n addition there 
were ideas here which v/ould have appealed to those familiar v/ith 
representative government and Dominion Status as the opposition 
appeared to advocate a limited form of s e l f government for the 
c o l o n i s t s . However, these ideas had one overriding weakness. 
They attracted l i t t l e or no support at the time they were put 
forward. This \ras the case because the opposition, which advocated 
t h i s course, was divided among i t s e l f ; because the majority of the 
p o l i t i c a l c l a s s at the time f e l t that the Americans ought to be 
d i s c i p l i n e d ; because the King was opposed to such a policy; and 
because i t rapidly began to be reali z e d that the colonists wovdd 
not be content with anything l e s s than independence. 
The second of the three options available was to pursue an armed 
struggle with the colonists i n order to reduce them to obedience. 
Since i t was the case, i n the eighteenth century context, that the 
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support of the King and the support of Parliament were necessary 
to be able to govern, the p o l i c i e s of the government were constrained 
within the l i m i t s of the attitudes described above. Before we 
examine t h i s policy i n d e t a i l i t should be noted that there were 
members of the ministry who were f a r from enthusiastic about 
subjugating the colonies. North himself was far from harsh i n h i s 
attitudes, while Lord Barrington was opposed to the idea of a land 
war i n America and the Adjutant General, Lieutenant General Harvey 
wrote: 
'to attempt to conquer i t (America) with 
our B r i t i s h Pirmy i s as wild an idea as 
ever controverted common sense'.3 
However, despite these objections the majority of the members of 
the government and the majority of the politiceiL cleiss favoured war, 
and so the government chose t h i s policy. They argued, l i k e the 
opposition, that the Americans could not be allowed to become 
independent, but they concluded from t h i s that the colonists must be 
reduced to thei r former status, and then arrangements could be made. 
I t can be seen, from the example of the Quebec Act, that the 
government weis prepared to pursue enlightened p o l i c i e s towards the 
colonies, but f i r s t the Americans would have to accept colonial status 
and B r i t a i n would have to prove her supremacy. To support this 
attitude, they argued, overconfidently, that the American farmers and 
peasants would show l i t t l e enthusiasm for fighting and that they 
would have no chance of success when faced by the B r i t i s h Army and 
i t s German mercenary reinforcements. 
The opposition's policy of concession to the colonists would 
have circumvented the need for formulating a policy towards France 
for they f e l t that France was the central problem, and therefore that 
America should be s a c r i f i c e d i n order to be ready to meet the French. 
But the government's policy did not offer any such easy solution. 
We know that the government was aware of the policy pursued by France 
and that aid was going from France to America i n considerable 
quantities. They also knev; that, with B r i t a i n committed to war i n 
the colonies, France would have an ideal opportunity to gain revenge 
for her defeat i n the Seven Years War, but the government's solution 
to t h i s problem, eind the key to thei r policy toweirds France, weis 
very different from that proposed by the opposition. 
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The government based its:~policy< upon the fac t that, as Stormont 
frequently wrote, France would not decide to enter the war u n t i l the 
Americans had proved t h e i r a b i l i t y and determination to stay i n the 
c o n f l i c t . Therefore, the government f e l t that the way to prevent 
France entering the v/ar Mas not, as the opposition advocated, by-
making concessions to the rebels, but by achieving crushing m i l i t a r y 
successes i n the colonies. This would v/ipe out the American 
diversion of B r i t i s h resources and, at the same time, give the 
French proof of B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y strength. Thus, the government 
dominated by the powerful personality of Lord George Germain 
concentrated almost c i l l i t s energies on the American c o n f l i c t , hoping 
by doing so to prevent France entering the war. However, there can 
be no doubt that the government was foolish to put i t s f u l l f a i t h i n 
t h i s policy, and to f a i l to take action i n regard to the preparations 
made i n France and the assistance sent from France to America, That 
they knew of both these factors i s beyond doubt and i t i s equeilly 
c l e a r that Sandwich, alarmed by the advantage of the Bourbon f l e e t s , 
urged B r i t a i n to take actions to meet the threats, but was 
consistently ignored by North; and also that Stormont frequently 
urged that B r i t a i n required not only success i n America but eilso 
vigilance and preparation at home, i n order to avoid a dangerous 
s i t u a t i o n . 
For a l l the errors made byu.the government i n i t s handling of the 
s i t u a t i o n i n America, and for a l l i t s stupidity in f a i l i n g to take 
separate measiAres to deal with the French .threat, i t seems clear 
beyond doubt that the government's policy was a more r e a l i s t i c and 
sensible one than that of the opposition. With the French reluctant 
to enter the war and the majority of Members of Parliament opposed 
to concessions to the colonists, i t seems l i k e l y that a swift and 
decisive success i n America would have removed most of the danger 
from the s i t u a t i o n . 
The two courses of action already considered were those which 
attracted attention at the time, but there i s also a third option 
v/hich, although there i s no evidence to suggest that i t was active l y 
con sidered, c e r t a i n l y has much potential i n t e r e s t . This i s the 
p o s s i b i l i t y that i t would have served B r i t a i n ' s purpose to have 
threatened France, i n the early stages of the-war, i n 1776 or 1777» 
that unless she stopped sending aid to the colonists, she would have 
to face war with Great B r i t a i n . 
138. 
This suggestion i s based on the following premises. F i r s t , that 
the aid sent by France to America constituted a valuable source of 
support to the Americans. Indeed we can go so far as to say that i t 
was v i t a l to the rebels, for such an opinion Weis given at the time 
by General S i r William Howe (see above p. 120) and his since been 
c l e a r l y shovm to be the case by the researches of Dr. Stephenson. 
V/ithout t h i s aid i t does indeed seem to have been the case that the 
American revolt would have collapsed. Second, the f a c i l i t i e s granted 
by the French to the American privateers created a situation i n which 
thEPe was a constant menace to B r i t i s h shipping i n European waters 
and i n the A t l a n t i c . Therefore a force of B r i t i s h ships had to be 
made ready i n order to patrol these waters to ensure, as far as 
possible, safe passages for B r i t i s h merchantmen, and supply ships on 
t h e i r way to America. This caused considerable expense to B r i t a i n , 
e s p e c i a l l y because the ships used for these duties were mostly ships 
of the l i n e since the majority of B r i t a i n ' s frigates were i n American 
v/aters. French aid therefore did not only drain Bri t a i n ' s resources 
i n America, where resistance was prolonged byt i t , but also damaged 
B r i t a i n by means of these losses of merchant shipping and through the 
increased expenditure required to try to furnish protection to the 
merchant shipping and capture the American privateers. 
I n the l i g h t of these .ifactors i t can be argued that B r i t a i n and 
Freince were, beneath the ceilm surface, r e a l l y i n a state of war. 
A l l the benefits of the sit u a t i o n accrued to France, where, for the 
expense of f a i r l y small sums of money, the government could watch the 
Americans sap B r i t a i n ' s fighting strength; while a l l the disadvantages 
f e l l on B r i t a i n , where the government had to pay to fight a war i n 
America which was sustained by France, and also had to equip a f l e e t 
of ships to patrol the Bay of Biscay and the eastern Atlantic, and 
yet B r i t a i n could not actueilly gain anything at French expense. 
I n addition to these factors, v;e can be certain from the writing 
of Vergennes i n the Considerations and the Reflexions that the 
French did not wish to j o i n the war u n t i l they knew that the Americans 
were committed to war and were l i k e l y to win; although Lord North's 
government did not have access to these documents, i t was frequently 
informed by Stormont that the French were most unlikely to j o i n the 
v;ar i f the rebels appeared to be losing i t . For example in October 
1776 he wrote:-
139, 
'There i s no Country l e s s disposed than t h i s 
i s to take up a losing game 
V/e eilso know that on the only occasion when Stormont was ordered to 
make a strong protest to the French on the subject of the privateers, 
the French Ministry was greatly disturbed, and took prompt action to 
remedy the si t u a t i o n . 
I n the l i g h t of these facts i t seems l i k e l y that, had B r i t a i n 
pursued a policy of vigorous protest against the assistance rendered 
by S.France to the Americans, had B r i t a i n even threatened France with 
war i f she did not take steps to put her professions of friendship 
into practice, the r e s u l t s of such an action vrould probably have been 
b e n e f i c i a l . Even i f the French had refused to comply, and war had 
followed, the s i t u a t i o n of B r i t a i n would hardly have been worse, for 
her f l e e t was forced to go to sea to defend the merchantmen any way. 
Indeed the sit u a t i o n might have improved for i n a state of war B r i t a i n 
would have the chance to seize French possessions and shipping; and 
B r i t i s h morale, somewhat low i n the war against the colonists, v/ould 
probably have . r i s e n i n a war against France. Certainly the situation 
would have been no worse than i t was i n 1778 when the French f i n a l l y 
declared t h e i r hand and joined the war. However, instead of such a 
policy of protest, we have cl e a r evidence that Stormont was under 
instructions not to do anything which might offend the French 
administration (see above pp, 121 - 122), 
F i n a l l y we must return to a consideration of the B r i t i s h 
government's policy towards France. I t has usually been argued that 
the i n i t i a t i v e - . i n t h i s period l a y v/ith France, to decide whether or 
not she would j o i n the v/ar. But, from the evidence sulanitted above, 
i t can be suggested that t h i s was not the case, and i t can be argued 
that i t was B r i t a i n which was i n the commanding position. I t was 
the success or f a i l u r e of B r i t i s h arms i n North American which v/as 
the deciding factor i n the French decision; i f the B r i t i s h had 
defeated the rebels a l l Vergennes' attempts to p u l l the wool over 
Stormont's eyes, most of which f a i l e d , would have been to no a v a i l , 
and the manoeuverings of Franklin and the other envoys at Versedlles 
would s i m i l a r l y have been i n vain. For although France was keenly 
a/are of the opportimity she was offered by the American revolution, 
i t i s not convincing to argue that she \ras committed to war from an 
early stage. Her refuseil to help the Austrians i n the Bavarian 
Succession c r i s i s stemmed from a wish to be able to j o i n the war i f 
140, 
a suitable occasion occurred rather than from a determination to j o i n 
the war a t a l l costs. I n f a c t i t seems to have been the case that 
even a f t e r Saratoga the French were reluctant to commit themselves, 
and i t was only fear of losing the chance which made them j o i n the war. 
U n t i l the end of 1777 the B r i t i s h government's policy of pursuing 
m i l i t a r y success in America i n order to keep France out of the war 
had some success. The f a l l of New York i n 1776 was described by Lord 
Stormont as a 'Thunderstroke' to the hopes of the French^ while he 
reported that the news of the B a t t l e of Long Island was a 'decisive 
blow' and that Vergennes had appeared much put out by the news of 
the B r i t i s h victory.^ However, i f such a policy were to succeed i t 
required greater energy than Lord North was prepared to devote to 
i t . The Weu: i n America required vigorous prosecution with large 
numbers of troops and a sizeable f l e e t , and the French court, which 
was unwilling to j o i n the Americans u n t i l the end of 1777, ought to 
have been pressed to give concrete proofs of i t s professed friendship 
towards B r i t a i n . Had these two things been done i t seems l i k e l y that 
the government's policy, which had been selected to avoid a war with 
France, to r e t a i n the colonies iinder B r i t i s h rule and to meettwith 
approval from the B r i t i s h Parliament, woiald have succeeded and would 
have been praised rather than c r i t i c i s e d both at the time and 
subsequently. 





135 1 See Correspondence of King George I I I . . . 
ed. Fortescue vol.iv, pp. v i and v i i . 
136 2 Valentine A. Lord North v o l . i , p.378 
136 3 Valentine A. Lord George Germain p.118. 
139 4 PoRoOo SP/78, 300. Stormont to Weymouth 
16 October 1776 (Secret) 
140 5 PoR.Oo SP/78, 300. Stormont to V/eymouth 
13 November 1776 (Confidential) 
140 6 PaRoOo SP/78, 300. Stormont to V/eymouth 
l i f l . 
APPENDIX 
Since the research for t h i s thesis was done two works have 
appeared which contain information on the period i n question. In 
t h i s section i t i s proposed to summarise the arguments of each work 
as b r i e f l y as possible i n so far as they affect the above work, 
( l ) Dull, J . R. The French Navy and American Independence. Princeton, 
New Jersey. 1975 
In t h i s book, the author i s mainly concerned to re-appraise the 
motives which guided the actions of the French ministry i n f i r s t 
helping, the Americans and then a l l y i n g with them, and then with showing 
the part played by the French Navy i n helping the Americans to gain 
t h e i r independence. He begins by examining i n some d e t a i l the position 
of France i n 177^ 1 s t r e s s i n g her weakness and showing that t h i s 
dictated a cautious policy towards B r i t a i n . In particular he draws 
attention to the weakened condition of the French Navy which he 
attributes to four years of neglect between 1770 and 177^. 
He deals, i n considerable d e t a i l , with the struggle i n the 
French ministry during the spring of 1776 as to whether the French 
ought to send clandestine aid to rebels. I t i s h i s contention that 
Turgot, who had hitherto been the dominant force i n the ministry was 
now becoming unpopular as a r e s u l t of h i s economic reforms. This 
enabled Maurepas, Vergennes and Sartines (upon whose a c t i v i t y as a 
propoment of war Dull lays considerable s t r e s s ) to imite i n a campaign 
to drive Turgot from power. 
For 1777 Dull paints a picture of increasing tension between 
France and Great B r i t a i n which led up to the privateering c r i s i s of 
Ik2. 
the summer. He writes:-
•Vergennes and the council were forced to move with 
great caution during the period of. French rearmament, 
balancing the need to sustain the Americans and 
prepare for a war against the need to avoid precip-
i t a t i n g a war for which France was not yet prepared.' 
To support the idea that France was anxious to avoid a pre-
mature ruptiore with B r i t a i n , Dull l a t e r shows that there was panic 
among the French ministers when the B r i t i s h made i t clear that they 
escpected severe action to be taken against the American privateers 
and stated that i f such action was not taken war between the two 
countiies would probably be the consequence. 
B u l l ' s work, i n the sections which cover the period under 
discussion here, i s mainly concerned with French a f f a i r s . There 
i s a considerable degree of agreement between what Dull has written 
of French policy and what I have written above, although I believe 
that there i s room to doubt the extent to which Maurepas was an 
active advocate of war, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the way i n which Dull 
presents B r i t a i n ' s policy over the privateering c r i s i s as merely an 
attempt to discredit the French i n American eyes and to prevent the 
French from sending further troops to the West Indies, rather than 
as a serious threat of war. But despite these issues, Dull's work 
tends to show that France was anxious about the p o s s i b i l i t y of an 
early break with B r i t a i n , and t h i s therefore confirms the point made 
above that B r i t a i n held an advantageous position i n regard to France 
i n the ea r l y stages of the c o n f l i c t , i f only her leaders had acted 
with the s p i r i t and determination to exploitFrance's fears. 
(2) Harris, R. 'French Finances and the War of American Independence' 
i n Journal of Modern History.' 1976. 
This a r t i c l e i s concerned with the effects of the war on French 
I i f 3 . 
finances, and p a r t i c u l a r l y with discovering how far the c r i s i s i n 
the Royal finances of I789 was a re s u l t of the stra i n s imposed on 
France by the war of American Independence. Harris i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
concerned to vindicate the reputation of Necker, and t h i s concern 
i s outside the scope of the present enquiry. The most important 
point made by Harris i s that the effects of the war were far l e s s 
important than has been thought hitherto. This discovery tends to 
detract from the arguments of Turgot at the time that the war would 
prove to be the ruination of France. However those arguments were 
advanced very powerfully at the time by Turgot, and the fact that 
we can now show that they were inaccurate does not detract from the 
influence they would have had on the minds of men at the time. 
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